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NOTICES 



THE WAR OF 1812 



BY JOHN ARMSTRONG, 



LATE A MAJOR-GENERAL IN THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, 
AND SECRETARY OF WAR. 



IN TWO VOLUME: 

Vol. I. 



NEW YORK: 
PUBLISHED BY WILEY & PUTNAM. 

1840. 



&^ 






W' 



4^' 



\.- 



Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1836, 

BY GEORGE DEARBORN. 

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern District oi 

New- York. 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

PAGE 

Causes of the War. — Declaration of War by the United States. — 
Opposition to the measure. — Its character and effects. . . 9 

CHAPTER II. 

Hull's Expedition. — Loss of MichiUmackinac. — Surrender of De- 
troit, the Michigan Territory, and the Army 15 

CHAPTER III. 

Militia Operations in the West — ^Harrison's Autumnal and Win- 
ter Campaigns 52 

CHAPTER IV. 

Operations on the Niagara. — Partial Armistice. — Renewal of 
hostiUties. — Van Rensselaer's attack on Glueenstown. — 
Smyth's invasion of Canada. — Dearborn's Campaign against 
the British advanced posts on Lake Champlain. . . . 97 

CHAPTER V. 

First investment of Fort Meigs. — Dearborn and Chauncey's Ex- 
pedition. — Reduction of York and Fort George. — Chandler's 
defeat and capture on Stony Creek. — ^Bcerstler's defeat. — Af- 
fair of Sacket's Harbor, 121 

]* 



^.j CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER VI. 



PAGE 

Second investment of Fort Meigs. — Gallant defence of Fort Ste- 
phenson. — Defeat of the British fleet on Lake Erie. — Capture 
of Amherstburg. — Recapture of Detroit and the Michigan Ter- 
ritory. — Harrison's pursuit and defeat of Proctor. — Arrival of 
a part of the Western Army on the Niagara. . . .163 

Appendix. 187 



"Were nations to review in peace their motives 
for having made war, with the means they em- 
ployed, and the method by which they conducted 
it, they would in general find much to blame in 
a moral as well as a military view ; the conviction 
of the wrongs they did, and the blunders they com- 
mitted, might, on another and similar occasion, 
improve both their ethics and their tactics, and 
make them, at once, better men and abler soldiers ; 
but as nations cannot be brought together, it rests 
with governments to perform this duty of self- 
examination ; when, if they omit it, the task de- 
volves on the historian." 

Mabby. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 



CHAPTER I. 



Causes of the War. — Declaration of War by the United States. — 
Opposition to the measure. — Its character and effects. 

The Treaty of Paris of 1783, by which Great 
Britain acknowledged " the freedom, sovereignty, 
and independence of the United States," was, on 
the part of the former, virtually a truce, not a 
pacification ; a temporary and reluctant sacrifice of 
national pride to national interest ; not a frank and 
honest adjustment of differences, seeking no cause, 
nor indulging any disposition, to renew the contro- 
versy. Indeed, so little careful was this power to 
conceal, or even to dissemble her temper and policy 
on this subject, that the first American minister 
accredited to her court, had scarcely passed the 
threshold of the palace, when he discovered, that 
a spirit of unextinguished animosity towards the 
United States, pervaded alike her councils and her 
conduct.^ Nor was it the effect of longer residence, 
or more intimate acquaintance, to modify, much less 
to efface this first impressit)n. Every overture on 

I Appendix, No. 1. 



10 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

his part, made with a view of placing the diplo- 
matic relations of the two countries on a fair and 
friendly footing, was disregarded; the north-west- 
ern, and other military posts, though confessedly 
within the limits of the United States, were forcibly 
retained ;^ the Indian nations in alliance with Great 
Britain, were openly instigated to a renewal of hos- 
tilities ; and when at last, this diabolical purpose 
was accomplished, as if to leave no room for doubt- 
ing her instrumentaUty in the case, she was found 
extending her territorial encroachments, and taking 
a new and formidable position on the Miami of the 
Lake ; whence, during three campaigns, she supplied 
the wants, and prompted the attacks of these savage 
tribes. ** 

Checked by Wayne's victory in 1794, in this plan 
of desolating the west, she next employed herself 
in attempting to corrupt the east ; and in 1809, 
mistaking the freedom of political discussion, for a 
spirit of revolt, despatched a confidential agent to 
Boston, with authority to mature the terms on which 
that section of the country would separate from the 
Union, and reconnect itself with the British Em- 
pire. The failure, no less than the atrocity of this 
project, forbade its acknowledgment ; but though 
officially disavowed, the number and character of 

1 The posts retained contrary to treaty, were Michilimackinac, De- 
troit, Niagara, Oswegotch^, Point au Fer, and Dutchman's Point. 

2 St. Clair's Narrative of the campaign of 1791, and Lord Dorches- 
ter's Speech to the Indians, in 1794. See, also, Washington's letter 
to Jay, of the 30th of August of the same year. Appendix, No. 3. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812; 11 

the documents produced in support of the charge, 
leave no doubt of its validity.^ 

It cannot be supposed that the spirit of hostility, 
thus manifested on the land, would be slow in show- 
ing itself on the ocean. Having in 1793, become 
a party to the coalition against republican France,** 
she adopted a policy, which sought at once to dis- 
tress and impoverish her enemy and enrich herself, 
at the expense of neutral commerce ; and accord- 
ingly, on the 8th of June of that year, issued an 
order for capturing and carrying into British ports, 
" all vessels laden wholly or in part with corn, flour, 
or meal, and destined to France, or to other coun- 
tries, if occupied by the arms of that nation." 

Offensive as this measure could not fail to be, its 
vexations and injuries were nearly forgotten, in the 
greater mischief and malignity which characterized 
that of the 6th of November of the same year ; and 
which, by instructions secretly communicated to her 
cruisers, subjected " to capture and adjudication, all 
vessels laden with the produce of any French colony, 
or with supplies for such colony" — a measure, which 
in the opinion of a careful inqui er and competent 
judge, " annihilated at a blow, a large portion of 
the commerce of the United States."^ But how- 
ever great, in this case, the loss to us, or the profit 

1 Appendix, No. 4. 

2 The basis of the several coaUtions against France, was the con- 
ference at Mantua in 1791; to which the King of England was a 
party, as elector of Hanover. — M. Mollink''s Annals. 

3 Dallas's exposition of the causes and character of the late war. 



12 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

to her, there was soon superadded another measure, 
which interdicted all neutral commerce, not only 
with ports blockaded by forces sufficient for the 
purpose, (which the laws of war would not have 
forbidden) but with places where no force whatever 
existed ; and even with whole coasts of territory, 
which her naval means, if acting in concert, would 
have been incompetent to blockade. Still, her abuse 
of power did not stop here ; it was not enough that 
she thus outraged our rights on the ocean ; the 
bosoms of our bays, the mouths of our rivers and 
even the wharves of our harbors, were made the 
theatres of the most flagitious abuse ; and, as if 
determined to leave no cause of provocation untried, 
the personal rights of our seamen were invaded ; 
and men, owing her no allegiance, nor having any 
connexion with her policy or arms, were forcibly 
siezed, dragged on board her ships of war and made 
to fight her battles, under the scourge of tyrants 
and slaves, with whom submission, whether right 
or wrong, forms the whole duty of man.^ 

Evils of such magnitude and continuance, could 
not fail to produce a high degi-ee of excitement in 
the nation, and much of a correspondent feeling on 
the part of the government ; but though three suc- 
cessive administrations saw in the conduct of Great 
Britain, sufficient cause of war, all doubted the 
expediency of acting upon it. Barely recovered 
from the debility, resulting from the defects of their 

1 Official letters of Mr. King while Minister at London. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 13 

first Federal compact, and but just entered on the 
experiment of another of more efficient character, 
forbearance was adopted as a principle, and means 
simply diplomatic prescribed, as those alone which 
could be employed with safety and success. Un- 
fortunately, this estimate of their value was decep- 
tive, and the event showed, that with a nation like 
Great Britain, which makes her own interest and 
convenience the governing rules of her conduct, 
persuasion, admonition, remonstrance, argument, 
and even concession, are alike unavailing. All 
these elements of diplomacy were frequently and 
faithfully employed, but without other effect than 
that of multiplying and augmenting the evils they 
were intended to mitigate or remove ; the appetite 
of the aggressor grew on what it fed ; her insolence 
increased with her power, and the violation of one 
right, was made to justify that of another ; when 
at last, disdaining longer to discuss wrongs she had 
no intention to redress, she officially announced — 
that " farther negotiation was inadmissible." ^ 

Having thus lost the respect of her adversary, it 
but remained for the United States to decide, whether 
she would preserve her own ? On this question, she 
could not hesitate long or seriously ; and accord- 
ingly, on the 18th of June, 1812, declared war 
against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland and their dependancies. 

It must not however be dissembled, that this act. 



Dallas''s Exposition. 
2 



14 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

though forced upon the government by the long- 
continued and increasing injustice of England, re- 
ceived from the community, a less general support, 
than might have been expected from the purity of 
the motives in which it originated, or the nature 
and extent of the evils it was intended to redress. 
The habitual opponents of the administration, believ- 
ing the circvimstances of the times furnished a favor- 
able opportunity for attempting the recovery of the 
political ascendency they had lost, hastened to in- 
stitute a system of indiscruninate opposition ; directed 
as well against measures merely preparatory for war, 
as against those which were in themselves acts of 
war. In this headlong career, the fiscal operations 
of the government were opposed ; the recruiting ser- 
vice discountenanced ; the militia made insubordi- 
nate, and even the constitutional authority of the 
President to organize their masses and direct their 
services within the states respectively, denied and 
resisted. We need hardly add, that an opposition, 
thus active and lawless, could not fail to be mis- 
chievous, and became, as will be seen in the progress 
of our story, the source of both calamity and disgrace 
to the nation.^ 

1 Appendix, No. 5. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 15 



CHAPTER II. 

Hull's Expedition.— Loss of Michilimakinac— Surrender of Detroit, 
the Michigan Territory, and the Army. 

Among the measures of precaution, taken by the 
Government of the United States, previously to their 
declaration of war,^ was that " of placing within 
the Michigan Territory, a force that should be com- 
petent to the defence of the north-western frontier 
against Indian hostility ; and which, in the event 
of a rupture with Great Britain, would enable the 
United States to obtain the command of Lake Erie ; 
and with it, the means of more easily co-operating 
with such other corps, as might be destined to the 
invasion of the Canadas."* The troops assigned 
to this service^ amounting to two thousand men of 
all arms,^ were placed under the command of Brig- 
adier-General Hull, then Governor of the Michigan 

1 The principal of these were, an Act laying an embargo on ship- 
ping — a second, avithorizing a detachment of one hundred thousand 
militia— a third, for increasing the regular army — a fourth, for the 
acceptance of volunteers — and a fifth, for borrowing money on public 
account. 

2 President Madison's Message to Congress, of Nov. 4th, 1812. 

3 Three companies of the first United States regiment of Artillery ; 
the fourth, and part of the first regiment of Infantry ; three regiments 
of Ohio volunteers ; the Michigan militia and one company of Rangers. 



16 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

Territory ; and formerly an officer, not without dis- 
tinction, in the war of the revoUition. 

This General, after giving the necessary attention 
to the equipment and subsistence of his corps, ^ began 
his march from Dayton, a frontier town in the State 
of Ohio, on the first day of June, 1812. Though 
unencumbered with artillery, and in no way impeded 
by an enemy, his progress was unavoidably slow ; 
from the necessity of opening roads, making bridges 
and constructiug blockhouses, for the better security 
of his rear, and of tlie supplies and reinforcements 
moving upon it. It was not, therefore, until the 
30th of the month, that he was enabled to reach 
the Miami of the Lake ; where, under an admoni- 
tion, recently received from the War Department, 
"to quicken his movements,'* he determined to 
avail himself of the means of navigation which now 
offered, for the more rapid and economical trans- 
portation of his baggage, stores, sick and convales- 
cent. '^ Embarking these, accordingly, on board of 
the Cayahoga Packet, they were despatched for 
Detroit ; while the army, with the same destination, 
resumed its march by land. 

The day following this transaction, the General 

1 Hull asserts, that he found the Ohio volunteers deficient in arms, 
equipment and clothing ; and even unprovided with either contract, 
or commissariat, for the supply of their food. — HuWs Memoirs. 

2 Colonel Mc Arthur admonished the General against tliis measure, 
on the presumption that war was already declared, and furnished 
strong evidence of the fact ; but with so little effect, that the General 
availed himself of the packet to forward, even "the instructions of his 
government and tlie returns of his army." 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 17 

received the first official notice of the declaration of 
war ; and on reaching the river Raisin, was made 
acquainted with the fate of his detachment ; which, 
in attempting to pass the British post of Maiden, 
had been attacked and captured, " by a subal- 
tern and six men, in a small and open boat." 

The effect of this disaster on General Hull, was 
not such as might have been expected from long 
military service, or high military character ; and 
probably produced the first doubts that existed of 
his capacity as a leader. Instead of exciting to 
increased spirit and exertion, which would soon 
have compensated for the loss and atoned for the 
disgrace so unexpectedly incurred, he unfortunately 
saw it only in the light of an evil omen, and pre- 
cursor of an attack, fatal alike to the objects and 
agents of the expedition ; and accordingly employed 
himself in imagining and practising devices to avoid 
a battle,^ which all circumstances — time, place and 
relative strength — made it his duty to seek. Nor 
were his stratagems on this occasion unavailing ; 
the enemy saw and respected his strength, and per- 
mitted him to reach Detroit, without molestation or 
menace. 

Finding himself now vested with an authority to 
invade the Canadas, " if consistent with the safety 
of his own posts," and not having, as he believed, 
any thing to fear on their account, he on the 12th 
of July crossed the river Detroit and encamped at 



1 Hull's Memoirs, p. 39. 

2* 



IS NOTICES OF TFIE WAR OF 1813. 

Sandwich, with the professed object of marching 
directly upon Maiden — a measure, recommended 
by many considerations ; but more particularly by 
the fact, that from the local position of the fort, 
(nearly twenty miles in the rear of Detroit) its gar- 
rison had the power of destroying or obstructing all 
supplies coming from the United States, unless pro- 
tected by a force superior to itself. 

In prosecution of this important object, the Gene- 
ral began by issuing a proclamation addressed as 
well to the hopes, as to the fears of the Canadian 
colonists ; and vaunting, in an especial manner, the 
possession of a force " equal to the purpose of either 
protection or punishment." Nor did the party ad- 
dressed, put a different estimate on its power of 
doing good or evil — "all opposition seemed to fall 
before it; one month it remained in the country, 
and was fed from its resources. In different direc- 
tions, detachments penetrated sixty miles into the 
settled parts of the province, and the inhabitants 
seemed satisfied with the change of situation which 
appeared to be taking place. The militia at Am- 
herstburg were daily deserting, and the whole 
country under the control of the army, asking for 
protection — while the Indians generally, appeared 
to be neutralized and determined to take no part in 
the controversy." ^ 

If such was the effect of the mere appearance of 
the American army within the limits of Canada, 

I Hull's official letter to tlie War Department, 27th August, 1S12. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 19 

what might not have been expected from a prompt, 
steady and well-directed application of its powers] 
Maiden was but eighteen miles from Sandwich ; 
the road between the two, wholly unobstructed ; 
and Avhat at the former was called a fortification, 
utterly unworthy of the name.^ Nor was the gar- 
rison more formidable than the Avork it occupied ; 
consisting only of one hundred regular troops, and 
four hundred disaffected militia and neutralized 
Indians. Instead, however, of availing himself of 
circumstances thus auspicious, and putting into his 
conduct that vigor and intelligence, which always 
deserve success and often command it, the General 
unfortunately took council only from his fears, and 
for the first time discovered, that " he had neither 
cannon nor howitzers of large calibre, fit to travel ; 
and that without arms of this description, it would 
be unsafe to advance." Artificers were therefore 
set to Avork to supply the deficiency, and at the end 
of three weeks, two twenty-four pounders and three 
howitzers, were put upon wheels strong enough to 
carry them.^ 

It may be reasonably supposed that this long 
interval had not been permitted to escape, without 



1 Hull's trial ; Cass and Miller's testimony. 

2 General Brock's estimate of the use of heavy cannon in breaching 
earthern walls and cedar pickets, was very different. In approaching 
Detroit, a Avork of much more strength than Maiden, he would not 
encumber his movements with guns of larger caUbre than six and 
tliree pounders. Yet to Brock's knowledge of his trade, General 
Hull bears willing testimony. 



20 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. 

some movements calculated to try the strength and 
temper of the enemy ; and more particularly, that 
the approaches to his position, as well as the posi- 
tion itself, had been thoroughly reconnoitred and 
ascertained. Nothing, however, of this character 
was either meditated or executed, if we except two 
or three small and isolated detachments, sent as far 
as the river Canard ; but without any sustaining 
corps, to enable them to hold what they gained, if 
found to be useful ; nor even any instruction to do 
so, if practicable, by the means they possessed. Of 
these, the detachment commanded by Colonels Cass 
and Miller is most worthy of notice. 

On approaching the river (a narrow but deep 
stream four miles from Maiden) a British picket 
was found in possession of the bridge, and appa- 
rently determined to hold it. After a short trial of 
strength, the position was turned and the picket 
driven back upon the fort, whither the fugitives 
carried their panic along with them, "creating in 
the garrison much alarm and confusion" — a state 
of things which continued to exist until it was dis- 
covered that the detachment, instead of being (as 
had been imagined) the precursor of an army, was 
merely a reconnoitring party, ignorant of the value 
of the position it had gained, or not instructed and 
prepared to maintain it.^ 

If the effects of this experiment on the enemy, 
appear to be extraordinary and without sufficient 

1 Hull's trial ; Forbish's testimony. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 21 

cause, how much more so must be considered those 
which it produced on the American commander 1 
When the success of the party in talving the bridge 
and driving in the picket, was reported by Colonels 
Cass and Miller, they did not fail to report also the 
importance of the acquisition they had made to the 
future objects of the campaign ; and entreated, that 
if any circumstances unknown to them, made it 
inexpedient or improper to move the army to this 
new and important position, they might themselves 
be permitted to hold it and be sustained in doing 
so, by occasional or permanent reinforcements and 
supplies. On this expression of facts and opinions, 
which should have excited only respect for those 
who had given them, the General yielded to a 
paroxysm of ill-temper and obstinacy ; criminated 
the attack made on the enemy, as a breach of 
orders ; rejected the advice offered to him in all its 
parts, and peremptorily commanded the immediate 
return of the detachment. Nor could any modifi- 
cation of this order be obtained, but on condition 
that Colonels Cass and Miller Avould take upon 
themselves the whole responsibility of the measure, 
without any corresponding obligation on the part of 
the General to supply the means necessary to its 
execution — a condition, to which he well knew, no 
prudent officer would yield his assent.^ 

1 Hull's trial. Colonel Miller's testimony. — " Witness mentioned to 
Colonel Cass and they agreed, that as they had not the disposition of 
tlie whole force, they should not take the responsibility." See also 
the testimony jf Quartermaster-General Taylor. 



22 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

Such want of knowledge, of judgment and of 
etiterprise, could not be long concealed by any 
devices ; and had now become so flagrant and 
alarming, that even the General appeared to be 
touched by a desire of redeeming what he had lost. 
He regretted that a blow had not been already 
struck ; and declared himself pledged to lead the 
army promptly and directly to Maiden.^ The am- 
munition was accordingly placed in Avagons ; the 
cannon, on floating batteries ; and every other 
requisite for the attack prepared, when to the grief 
and disappointment of all, the plan was abandoned, 
tlie encampment raised, and the army, with the 
exception of a small detachment of one hundred 
and fifty men, recrossed in the night of the 7th of 
August, to the town and fort of Detroit ! 

While the American commander was thus de- 
pressing the spirit of his own army, raising that of 
his enemy, taking from the savages every motive 
for longer inaction, and entirely destroying the con- 
fidence reposed in his promises by the Canadian 
colonists, his adversary (General Brock) was pursu- 
ing a system, which, in all respects, tended directly 
to augment and confirm these effects. Apprised, 
as early as the 26tli of June, of the declaration of 
war,*^ he hastened to transmit the information to his 
outposts ; and without waiting the instructions of 
Sir George Provost, suggested to the commandant 

1 Colonel Cass's letter to the Secretary of War, of the 10th Sep- 
tember, 1812. 

2 Christie's Memoir of the late war in the Canadas. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 23 

of St. Joseph's, an immediate attack on Fort Miclii- 
limackinac, as the best mode of defending his own. 

Though Captain Roberts, the officer to whom 
this suggestion was made, found himself ill-pre- 
pared for an enterprise of such moment ; yet enter- 
ing fully into the views of his commander, and 
being cordially supported by the agents of the two 
western fur-companies, he in the short space of 
eight days, organized a force, naval and military, 
with which on the 17th of July he made the experi- 
ment; and (it may be safely presumed, as much to 
his surprise, as entirely to his satisfaction) found 
the commanding officer not only unprepared for the 
attack, but ignorant of the declaration of war, and 
not unwilling to surrender his post, without even 
the ceremony of a refusal.^ 

Having thus easily and cheaply succeeded in 
wresting from the United States their most important 
western position, the British General now conceived 
a project of yet more contemptuous daring ; having 
for its object, not merely the safety of Maiden and 
the expulsion of the American army from Canada, 
but the pursuit and capture of this very army, 
within its own territorial limits and defences. As 



1 TMs surrender, to say the least of it, was precipitate. Some 
experiment of the enemy's power to take the fort, was due to the 
American flag and ought to have been made ; and the more so, as 
tlie result would probably have shown, that an investing corps, com- 
posed of thirty regulars and a rabble of engag(5s and savages, with 
two old rusty iron guns of small calibre, was much less formidable 
tlian had been imagined. 



24 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

a first step in this new career, he superseded Colonel 
St. George in the command of the district, and sub- 
stituted for him Colonel Proctor. This officer, who 
arrived at Maiden on the 29th of July, brought 
Avith him no important accession to the number of 
the garrison;^ but, what was justly considered as 
even more necessary, — a competent knowledge of 
his profession, a thorough acquaintance with the 
views, and a ready submission to the authority of 
his chief. Witli such quaUfications it is not to be 
supposed that he would be slow in appreciating the 
advantages to be derived from the position of the 
fort in which he commanded ; the concentrated 
state of the force it contained, and the naval means 
given him to employ and to second this. He 
accordingly determined to avail himself of the 
swamps and defiles on the American side of the 
Detroit ; and by thus seizing the key of his adver- 
sary's resources, not merely recall him from Canada, 
but literally compel him to fight for his daily bread, 
or surrender at discretion. Nor had he long to w^ait 
for an occasion, on which to test the value of the 
plan he had adopted. 

Three days before the retreat of the American 
army from Canada, General Hull, who had hitherto 
shown great indifference to the state of his com- 
munications,^ consented to the march of a detach- 

i " Ten or twelve men." Hull's trial ; Gooding's testimony. 

2 " The Colonels of the Ohio militia applied for leave to take a detacli- 
ment and open a communication with Brush, and bring the provisions 
in safety to Detroit ; but the General refused to grant the request and 



NOTICES OF THE ^VAR OF 1812. 25 

ment, as a guard to the mail and additional convoy 
to a quantity of flour and a number of cattle, des- 
tined for ttie use of the army, which the policy, 
adopted by Proctor and already detailed, had stopped 
at the river Raisin. With that infatuation, how- 
ever, which marked so mucii of his public con 
duct, and entirely forgetting the panic he had 
himself suffered in passing the defiles of Maguago 
and Brownstown, on the preceding 4th of July, 
(though then at the head of an army,) he per 
verse] y limited the number of the detachment to 
two hundred men.^ Tiiis small body, composed of 
volunteers and militia, and marching with that 
want of circumspection which so often occurs in 
the movements of troops of this description, fell into 
an ambuscade prepared for them near Brownstown, 
and were immediately beaten and dispersed ; with 
the loss of four captains, two subalterns, sixty pri- 
vates and the public mail, of which they had been 
the escort. Major Vaji Home, the commanding 
officer, did what was possible, to lessen the loss and 
prevent the disorder of the retreat ; and thus endea- 
vored to atone for the error he had committed, in 
disregarding the information previously given him, 
of the strength and position of the enemy ; of 

appeared indifferent about the fate of the Captain and the provisions. 
On the 6th, the Colonels apphed for five hundred men to bury the 
killed (in Van Home's affair,) and to open the communication with 
Brush ; but the General refusing to let them take more than one 
hundred, and this being a number much too small, the project was 
abandoned." — Mc^lffee^s History of the War in the West. 
I Hull's tnal ; IMc Arthur's testimony. 
3 



26 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

which, had a proper use been made, the misfortune 
might have been easily and entirely avoided.^ 

To fulfil the intention of this unsuccessful and 
ill-conducted enterprise, the importance of which, 
(now that the army had recrossed the Detroit and 
could no longer live on the resources of the enemy,) 
became every moment more obvious and urgent, a 
second detachment was ordered, and the command 
assigned to Lieutenant-Colonel Miller of the fourth 
United States regiment of infantry. But, as in the 
former case, the General had not become wise by 
the experience of others, so in this, he continued to 
be ignorant in despite of his own. Disregarding 
the admonition, so abundantly furnished by the 
disaster and disgrace incurred on the 5th, and 
entirely overlooking the fact, that, his adversary 
having now nothing to fear with regard to Maiden, 
was at all times in a condition lo repeat the lesson 
with his whole force, if deemed necessary, — he per- 
tinaciously refused to extend the corps beyond five 
hundred combatants ; and would have hazarded 
these without the protection of a single piece of 
artillery, had not Colonel Miller insisted upon taking 
with him, one six-pounder and one five and a half 
inch howitzer.'^ 



1 "After passing the Maguago villages, a Frenchman informed 
Major Van Home, that three or four hundred Indians and some 
British, were lying in ambush near Brownstown, for the purpose of 
intercepting the party. Not sufficiently respecting the information, 
the Major marched on." — McAffee's History. 

8 Dalliba's Narrative. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 27 

The detachment beginning its march on the 8th 
of August, and being conducted with the necessary 
attention and skill, suffered no serious interruption 
from the enemy, until the afternoon of the 9th ; 
when on entering a wood near Brownstown, the 
advanced guard, commanded by Captain Snelling, 
found itself within pistol-shot of a long and hostile 
line, covered in front by a breastwork of logs and 
brushwood, and strongly flanked by the Detroit on 
one side, and a succession of swamps and thickets 
on the other. A heavy and destructive fire now 
opened on Snelling, v/ho sustained and returned it 
with his usual gallantry, until Colonel Miller (by 
promptly converting his order of march into an 
order of battle) was enabled to interpose his front 
line. ■ It was in executing this manoeuvre, that 
finding himself both outflanked and outnumbered, 
and perceiving many of his men to fall and some to 
waver, while little if any impression was made on 
the covered ranks of the enemv, this distinsfuished 
officer determined to bring the contest to the deci- 
sion of the bayonet. The execution of this purpose 
was not less rapid than its conception was judicious ; 
the order to charge was received with loud and re- 
peated huzzas ; the breastwork was instantaneously 
mounted and passed, and tlie centre and left of the 
enemy, (composed of British regulars and Canadian 
militia,) not merely beaten, but decidedly routed.^ 

1 "This rout continued for a mile, when coining into a piece of open 
ground, they endeavored to form, but on the approach of the Ameri- 
cans, a^ain broke and fled into the woods." — Dalliba's J^arrative. 



28 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

Tecumseh, who at the head of what remained 
of his tribe formed the left of the British hne, was 
more difficult to move. Apparently unaffected by 
the fate of his ally, he continued the contest with 
great vigor ; and when compelled to abandon the 
breastwork, withdrew to the neighboring thickets, 
took new and strong positions, and for a moment 
rendered it doubtful, whether, after all, the battle 
was more than half won. Unfortunately, these last 
efforts, (the agonies of exhaustion and despair,) 
were mistaken by Major Van Home, who com- 
manded the right flank of the American line, as 
evidence only of the habitual prowess, untiring en- 
ergy and great force of his Indian enemy ; which, 
as he concluded, could not be long resisted, with- 
out the aid of a re-enforcement. A message to this 
effect overtook Colonel Miller, while closely pursuing 
the British and Canadian fugitives, a circumstance 
which could not fail to embarrass his movements. 
A halt was accordingly commanded, when, after 
a moment's reflection, giving up the glory of cap- 
turing one half of his enemy's force, he rapidly 
retraced his steps to rescue his comrades and cannon 
from the grasp of the other. A second message, 
soon after received from the right, leaving no doubt 
that the victory was as complete, as the action had 
been general ; and that Tecumseh, like Muir, had 
at last been compelled to save himself by flight. 
The pursuit of the latter was resumed ; but with the 
effect only of increasing the regret, at the well- 
meani but erroneous estimate of the powers and 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 29 

perseverance of the Shawanee chief. On reaching 
the shore of Lake Erie, the flying enemy was still 
visible ; but at a distance, that rendered every 
attempt at farther annoyance useless, and on an 
element prohibiting all nearer approach.^ 

Returning to the place of combat, an encamp- 
ment was hastily traced and the necessary guards 
posted ; when the American commander employed 
himself in collecting the wounded, burying the dead, 
and ascertaining the state of his communications 
with the river Raisin. Receiving on this last head 
satisfactory information, that the Indian villages in 
his front were abandoned, and that there no longer 
existed any obstruction, on the part of the enemy, 
to his farther progress, he hastened to detach Cap- 
tain Snelling to General Hull with an account of 
the action, and a requisition for boats to remove the 
wounded ; for provisions, of which he was already 
much in want ; and for such a reinforcement of 
men, as would replace those who had fallen in the 
combat. With even these modest and moderate 
demands, the General did not think it prudent to 
comply. Boats were indeed permitted to be sent, 
which, by the exertion of Colonel McAithur, arrived 
at nine o'clock on the morning of the 10th ; but a 
reinforcement sufficient to fill up the chasm made 
in the ranks of the detachment, could not be spared ; 
and of provisions, so much only was forwarded, as 
in the present hungry and comfortless condition of 



2 Dalliba's Narrative. 
3* 



30 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

the troops, " but sufficed for a single meal." ^ Be- 
lieving, however, that the scantiness of this supply 
was the result of haste or accident, rather than of 
design, Colonel Miller despatched a second requisi- 
tion on the contractor, and fresh assurances to the 
General, that "his communications with the river 
Raisin were now fully re-established." The mes- 
senger employed on this occasion, by some misdi- 
rection of his route, did not get back to the en- 
campment until the evening of the 11th, and to 
the regret and astonishment of all, brought with 
him not the required supply of food, but a written 
and peremptory order "for the immediate return of 
the detachment." This order was strictly, though 
reluctantly obeyed, and at midday of the 12th, the 
corps re-entered Detroit.^ 

The General's conduct on this occasion could not 
escape animadversion. His more severe critics, com- 

i Hull's trial ; Miller's testimony. 

2 The American General, as usual, saw every thmg through the 
medium of his fears. The effect of even this victory on his mind, was 
depressing and degrading. His official letter giving an account of it, 
laments "that nothing was gained by it hut honor; and that the blood 
of seventy-five men had been shed in vain ; as it but opened his com- 
munications as far as their bayonets had extended." It is thus he spoke 
of a victory, which drove the enemy from the field and from his pur- 
pose ; wliich enabled the victors to remain nearly three days in front 
of Maiden witliout molestation ; and which, but for his orders of 
recall, would have ena])led them to accomplish all the objects of the 
expedition. What would a bold and able leader have made of the 
moral effect of this victory on his own troops and on those of his 
enemy ! With Mr. Hull, it degenerated into a chapter of lamentations 
on tlie value of a soldier's blood, and the vanity of a soldier's honor. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 31 

billing his imiform indifference to the state of his 
communications, the pressure necessary to induce 
him to take any measures for re-opening them, and 
the perverse preference given to those of the most 
inefficient and hopeless character, with this last act, 
of recaUing a corps, which had beaten and routed 
tlie enemy from a fortified position of his own choos- 
ing, and which had thus substantial!}" freed from 
obstruction the short remaining distance between 
itself and the river Raisin — did not scruple to im- 
pute to him a secret and systematic co-operation 
with the enemy ; while others, less prone to suspicion 
and of more charitable temperament, ascribed it to 
an honest but false estimate of the value of the ob- 
ject to be attained, or of the degree of danger to be 
incurred in attaining it ; and lastly, to a persuasion 
that the safety of his own position, now required a 
speedy and entire concentration of his forces. But 
of the several branches of this apology the General 
hastened to deprive himself, by organizing a new 
expedition, having the same object, but possessing 
inferior means ; and with the additional objection, 
that its plan involved a longer march, by a route 
merely conjectural, and at a moment when the 
British force was fast accumulating in his front, and 
its bold and active leader had arrived at Maiden.^ 

Colonel Mc Arthur, the officer to whom the com- 
mand of this new detachment had been assigned. 



1 General Brock arrived at Maiden on the 13th of August. — Chris- 
tie^s J\Ie7noirs. 



32 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

set out late in the afternoon of the 14th, and after 
strug-ghng with many and unforeseen difficulties — 
with thickets nearly impervious, with swamps almost 
impassable, and with hunger, which the General had 
forgotten to satisfy^ — was at last compelled to retrace 
his steps towards Detroit ; and arrived in the neigh- 
borhood of that post, in time to share in the misfor- 
tune, and witness the disgrace, which now awaited 
the main army. 

This army, as has been already stated, recrossed 
the river Detroit on the evening of the 7th and 
morning of the 8th of August, with the exception 
of a few volunteers, who, in madness or in mockery, 
had been left for the protection of such British colo- 
nists as yet adhered to the American standard.^ On 
tlie 11th, this shadow of support was also withdrawn ; 
and on the 14th, General Brock, in prosecution of 
the plan already indicated, appeared at Sandwich, 
and immediately employed himself in constructing 
a battery to protect, at once, his present position and 
future operations. In executing this work, he met 
with no interruption ; as every species of annoyance 
was either indirectly declined, or expressly forbidden 



1 " The only food they had on this march, was green corn and 
pumpkins, found in the fields." — Mc^^ffee. 

2 " Major Denny was left at the stockadc-work at Sandwich, with 
one hundred and thirty convalescents and Anderson's artillerists, un- 
der orders ' to hold possession of that part of Upper Canada ; to afibrd 
all possible protection to the well-disposed inhabitants, and to defend 
his post to the last extremity against musquetry ; but if overpowered 
bv artillery, to retreat.' " — Idenu 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 33 

by General Hull. In vain, was permission solicited 
to erect a battery, with which to dislodge or destroy 
the enemy's shipping ; in vain, a small detachment 
of one hundred men, required for the purpose of 
spiking the British cannon ; to these, and to every 
similar proposition, involving credit to himself or 
danger to his adversary, the General turned either 
a deaf ear, or a positive refusal.^ 

Such was the state of things on the morning of 
the 15th, when a marquee (the top of which was so 
painted as to give it a strong resemblance to the 
British flag) was found erected m the centre of the 
American encampment. While this circumstance 
engaged tlie attention of the troops, exciting the 
surprise of all, and the suspicion of many, a boat 
from the enemy was seen approaching the shore. 
The officer under whose direction it came, having 
announced himself " the bearer of a written message 
from General Brock to General Hull," was promptly 
received and conducted to head-quarters. On ex- 
amination, the letter he brought was found to con- 
tain a demand for the immediate surrender of the 
fort, and a menace of indiscriminate massacre in 
case of refusal. 

A requisition of this kind, which, in all its aspects, 
was alike important and unexpected, would, no 



I "If you will give permission, I ^vill clear the enemy, on the oppo^ 
site shore, from the lower batteries?" The General answered, "Mr. 
Palliba, I will make an agreement with the enemy, that if they will 
not fire on me, I will not fire on them." — DaUiba's testimony : HuWs 
trial. 



34 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

doubt, have warranted an immediate recurrence to 
a council of war; but no such step was either taken 
or suggested. For once, the American General 
appeared to be both competent and willing to act 
without advice, and to take upon himself all respon- 
sibility. He accordingly, in terms sufficiently decided, 
rejected the demand, and to God and his sword com- 
mitted the issue. Unfortunately, this defiance was 
addressed to one who knew w^ell how to appreciate 
its meaning ; and who did not for a moment suffer 
it to abate his diligence, lessen his hopes, or even 
increase his circumspection. His measures were 
pushed with a haste and temerity, w^hich excluded 
all doubts of success ; and with a disregard to rules, 
which sufficiently indicated his own conviction that 
he was but taking part in a pantomime.^ The re- 
turn of his messenger becoming the signal of attack, 
a fire from the newly-constructed battery was now 
opened on the town and fort of Detroit. This con- 
tinued until ten o'clock in the evening, and was 
recommenced in the morning, but without any ma- 
terial injury to its objects ; and was, in fact, but 
remarkable from its being the only semblance of 
stratagem, which the British commander conde- 
scended to employ in passing a river eleven hundred 
yards wide, in broad day, and within stroke of an 

I So satisfied was Brock that he had nothing to fear from his enemy, 
that M'hen advancing to the storm of the fort, his column of march was 
not preceded by a vanguard of any kind ; and the General himself 
was seen riding alone, two hundred yards in advance of his column. 
— Snelling''s testimony; HulVs trial. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 35 

enemy not less strong than himself. Nor, as the 
event showed, was there any error in the estimate 
(which this fact presupposes) of a want of courage, 
capacity, or fidehty in his adversary ; for, on making 
the experiment, it completely succeeded, and not 
merely without the loss of a single life, or of a mo- 
ment's time, but under a full demonstration that 
neither obstruction nor annoyance of any kind was 
meditated by the American General.' 

On crossing the Detroit, it was Brock's intention 
to establish himself at Spring-Wells, and with, the 
aid of the Indians, so to interpose between the Amer- 
ican army and its resources, as to compel it to quit 
its fortress, and risk a field-fight for the defence of 
its communications ; but having, soon after landing, 
received new information with regard to the fort and 
army generally, and having in particular, assured 
himself of the detachment made on the 14th from 
the latter under the command of Colonel McArthur, 
he determined to shorten the process, and substitute 
assault for investment. ** The force at his disposal 
for this purpose did not exceed seven hundred com- 
batants,^ and of this number, four hundred were 
Canadian militia disguised in red coats. With this 
small corps, preceded by five pieces of light artillery, 



1 "On the 12th, (two clays before Brock's demand of a surrender,) 
the commanding officers of three of the regiments (the fourth being 
absent) were informed, through a medium admitting of no doubt, that 
the General had stated that ' a capitulation would be necessary.' " — 
Colonel Cass's Letter to the Secretai-y of War, September 10th, 1812. 

2 Brock's official letter of the 17th of Ausust, 1812. 3 Idem. 



36 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

(six and three pounders,) he began his march along 
the margin of the river ; while the savages, by a 
parallel movement through a wood, covered his left 
flank. Between eleven and twelve o'clock, the head 
of the column presented itself at the tanyards below 
the town, (about five hundred yards from the fort,) 
when the American officer, commanding an exterioi 
battery of twenty-four pounders charged with grape 
shot, believing the moment had arrived when hos- 
tilities could no longer be postponed with propriety, 
directed his men to point their guns and commence 
a fire ; but the order was immediately counter- 
manded, and another issued in its stead, forbidding 
every kind of hostility, and menacing with imme- 
diate death all who should dare to infract it.^ 

The strength, position, and supplies of the Ameri- 
can army, at this critical moment, have been fre- 
quently stated, and even judicially established. The 
morning reports to the Adjutant-General, made its 
effective force one thousand and sixty, exclusive of 
three hundred Michigan militia, and as many Ohio 
volunteers, detached under McArthur. Of this force, 
four hundred effectives (infantry and artillerists of 
the hne) occupied the fort — a work of regular form 
and great solidity ; surrounded by a wide and deep 
ditch, strongly fraised and palisadoed, and sustained 
by an exterior battery of two twenty-four pounders.^ 
Three hundred Michigan militia, ready to combat foi 

1 JMcAtfee's History. 

2 HiLi 1 trial ; testimony of Captain Dalliba, General Taylor, and 
Majo Avsup. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. O/ 

their firesides and altars, held the town,^ which in 
itself formed a respectable defence against the best 
troops, and one quite redoubtable against the attacks 
of Indians or militia. Flanking the approach to the 
fort, and covered by a high and heavy picket-fence, 
lay four hundred Ohio volunteers, expert in the use 
of their weapons and anxious to employ them ; while 
one mile and a half on the right, advancing by long 
and rapid strides, was McArthur's detachment, re- 
turning by a route which (had a defence been 
hazarded) would have brought them directly on the 
rear of the enemy." Of provisions and ammunitions 
the supply was abundant ; fifteen days rations, and 
much fixed and loose powder and lead, were amply 
sufficient for a trial of strength and skill, which a 
single hour would have decided. 

Under circumstances thus auspicious, *' while the 
troops, in sure anticipation of victory, awaited the 
approach of the enemy ; when no sound of discontent 
was heard, nor any appearance of cowardice or dis- 
affection seen ; when every individual was at his post, 
and expected a proud day for his country and him- 
self" — an order was received from the General to 
withdraw the troops from all exterior positions ; to 
stack the arms and hoist a white fllag, in token of 
submission to the enemy ! " This order was re- 
ceived by the men with a universal burst of indig- 
nation; even the women were ashamed of an act, 
so disgraceful to the arms of their country ; and all 



Colonel Cass's letter, 10th September, 2 Idem. 

4 



38 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

felt as was proper and decorous, except the man in 
Avliose hands were the reins of authority."^ 

The terms of the capitulation which followed, 
were such as might be expected from the views 
and feelings in which it originated. No stipulation 
was made for the Canadian colonists who had joined 
the American standard ; the Ohio and Michigan 
militia were brought under engagements not to 
serve again during the war, unless exchanged; the 
territory in its whole extent, was yielded with the 
army ; and (that even more might be granted than 
was asked,) the supplies at (he river Raisin, with 
their convoy and McArthur's detachment, (the 
exact situation of which was not then known at 
the fort,) were, on the suggestion of General Hull, 
included within the act of surrender. By another 
provision of this instrument, the militia, whether 
drafts or volunteers, were liberated, while Hull and 
the regular troops were despatched to Montreal.^ 

About the date of these transactions, a calamity 
of similar, and to the individuals concerned, of 
severer character, awaited the garrison of fort Dear- 
born, — a military post on the south-western extrem- 
ity of Lake Michigan, possessing as was believed, a 
considerable influence over Indian wants and policy. 



1 Colonel Cass's letter of the 10th September. 

2 "General Hull with the officers and men of liis army, were intro- 
duced into Montreal on the evening of the 6th of September, in a tri- 
umphal, though mock procession, amidst the shouts of a scornful 
multitude, indignant at the savage threat of extermination breathed in 
his proclamation." — Christie'' s Memoirs. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 39 

Forg-otten alike by the government and the General 
until about the middle of July, an order was then 
sent by the latter to Captain Heald, "to dismantle 
the fort, destroy the surplus arms and ammunition, 
and withdraw the garrison to Detroit." From an 
ill-judged mode of communication, this order did 
not reach the fort until the 12th of August. On 
(he 14fh, the garrison, reinforced by a few Miami 
Indians, under the command of Captain Wells, 
began its intended march ; but had not proceeded 
more than a mile, when it was attacked, in both 
front and rear, by a body of five or six hundred 
savages, whom it had left at Chicago, professing 
a neutral, if not a friendly character. Captain 
Heald, after a hard and unequal combat, in which 
fifty of his party fell, (and being himself wounded 
and deserted by the Miamis,) was compelled to 
accept a proposition for a parley, which was soon 
and necessarily followed by a suiTender, on condi- 
tion that the lives of the American survivors, not 
now exceeding twenty, should be spared.^ 

Such was the termination of this first expedition 
of the new war ; the details of which, have in them 
so little to flatter, and so much to mortify the pride 
of the American nrms. Nor must it be forgotten 
that this catastrophe, however disgraceful in itself 

1 Captain Heald, his wife and some third person, fell to the share 
of a party of Indians living at St. Josephs. Carried thither by their 
savo.ge masters, they soon possessed themselves of a boat, in which 
they made their escape to Micliilimackinac, where they found protec- 
tion and the rneana of returning to the United States, 



40 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

or disastrous in its consequences, was not the result 
of any of those occurrences, which, in the affairs of 
nations and of individuals, are denominated acci- 
dents ; and which sometimes, triumph alike over 
the precautions of wisdom and the efforts of valor. 
We have seen that the army, in its march from the 
place of its rendezvous to that of its destination, 
was neither melted by heat, nor frozen by cold ; 
neither persecuted by storms, nor crippled by ene- 
mies ; neither wasted by disease, nor exhausted by 
famine ; but that on the 5th of July it arrived at 
Detroit, in unimpaired health and spirits. From its 
friends, it received a cordial welcome, abundant 
supplies and a respectable addition to its force ; and 
in its subsequent descent upon Canada, was scarcely 
less fortimate, as it found the British colonists indif- 
ferent, if not repugnant to the war ; the Indian 
tribes, though secretly hostile, cautious and calcu- 
lating ; and the fortress of Maiden, which alone 
sustained the enemy's interest in that section of the 
country, wholly indefensible. When at last, impor- 
tant changes had been wrought in this state of 
things, by the fall of Michilimackinac, the defeat of 
Van Home, the obstruction given to our communi- 
cations, the altered tone and temper of the British 
and savage population, and the doubts and mis- 
givings which could not but prevail in our own 
ranks — when, in a word, fortune appeared to have 
decidedly taken part with the enemy against us, it 
was but to lead him into indiscretions; which, had 
they been seen and punished, would have promptly 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 41 

reinstated our ascendency and accomplished the 
principal objects of the campaign. Like other ad- 
vantages, these were permitted to escape, probably 
without notice, and certainly without improvement ; 
leaving us only the mortifying reflection, that our 
disasters were of our own making, and the neces- 
sary consequence of an ignorance, which knew not 
what to do ; of a self-sufficiency, refusing to be 
instructed ; and of a cowardice, that in its terrors, 
lost all sense of national interest, personal dignity 
and professional duty.^ 

Remarks. The crimes and errors of public func- 
tionaries, however calamitous and disgraceful, are 
not without their uses ; and that on this occasion, 
the bitter fruits of experience may, if possible, be 
converted into wholesome aliment, we subjoin a few 
observations indicating the principal faults commit- 
ted, and the means by which they might have been 
substantially obviated, if not entirely avoided. 

I. " Every commander of a corps, destined to the 
reduction of a fortress by siege or investment, ought, 
if possible, to draw his antagonist from behind his 
works, and induce him to risk an action in the 
open field." This maxim, nearly as old as the art 
to which it belongs, is founded on a reason suffi- 
ciently obvious, viz. that, " as forts make the weak 
strong, and the strong stronger, it necessarily fol- 
lows, that it will be more easy to beat your enemy 

1 Hull's trial ; testimony of Jessup, Snelling, Tayloir, Eastman, &c 



42 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

without, than withm his intrenchments." Of this 
rule and the reason on which it is founded, General 
Hull was either entirely ignorant or utterly regard- 
less ; for though on the 2d of July, -according to his 
own statement, he found his adversary willing to 
forego the advantages given him by his fortress, 
and determined to risk a battle against a force 
much superior to his own; and with the additional 
disadvantage of interposing between himself and 
his only place of refuge, a wide and rapid river, — 
the challenge was not merely declined on our part, 
but such cunningly devised fables transmitted to 
Colonel St. George, as induced that officer to aban- 
don his chivalrous, but unmilitary project.* 

II. Another maxim of the art, which, like the 
preceding, is but a dictate of common sense, level 
to any ordinary capacity and requiring no scientific 
research, is, — that "whenever it be sufficiently as- 
certained, that your enemy is suffering under any 
extraordinary degree of debility, arising from defi- 
cient supplies, prevailing diseases, impaired disci- 



1 " A large body of the inilitia had reinforced the British garrison, 
and all the surrounding tribes of Indians had been invited to his 
standard. Every preparation for attack was made on the 5th of July, 
and it was only prevented by a communication made to a person in 
Maiden, who had the confidence of the commander ; that it icas not 
the intetUion of the armxj to march to Detroit ; that all the boats were col- 
lected on the icest side of the river; that cannon had been sent for to 
Detroit; and that my intention was to cross the river and attack the fort. 
This information caused the commanding officer to abandon the enterprise, 
and concentrate all his forces for the defence of Iiis post. — HuWs Me- 
moirs, p. 29. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 43 

pline, disaffection or want of numbers in his ranks, 
or ill-condition of his defences, it becomes yourduty 
to assail him incessantly and vigorously." 

It has been abundantly established, that between 
the 5th and 20th of July, fort Maiden was, in all 
its parts, in a dilapidated state, and on two of its 
sides, (the north and \vest,) wholly indefensible ; that 
during the same period, its nominal garrison did 
not exceed seven hundred men, of which, more than 
six hundred were militia and savages ; the one, 
indifferent, if not disaffected to the war, and the 
other, professing neutrality and strictly forbidden 
by their military usages, from taking part in the 
defence of fortified places.^ From these facts we 
are authorized to conclude, that had General Hull, 
at any time between the 5th and 20th of July, 
pushed boldly forward and presented his columns of 
attack before Maiden, the place v/ould have been 
surrendered to him, with as little ceremony as he 
surrendered Detroit on the 16th of August ; a con- 
clusion, put beyond all doubt by this additional fact, 
that when, on the 16th of July, the British out- 
post on the Canard was defeated and the bridge 
taken, so great was the alarm in Maiden, that the 
shipping was brought up to the wharves, and 
actually employed in taking in the baggage, &c.* 

1 Tecumseh's speech to General Proctor, ISdi September, 1813, — 
" you told us that we need not trouble ourselves about the enemy's 
gaiv-isons, and that you would take good care of your oion; which 
made our hearts glad." 

2 " There was a great deal of confusion in the towT», mo\'ing effects, 



44 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

III. Nothing can be more ill-judged and ruinous, 
than to send out small parties on services which 
necessarily expose them to the attacks of large 
ones ; and hence the maxim, that " the strength of 
a detachment should be proportioned, 1st, to the 
importance of the object to be obtained in sending 
it ; and 2d, to the disposable means possessed by 
the enemy of embarrassing or defeating the attain- 
ment of that object." In none of the detachments 
made by General Hull, were these conditions ful- 
filled ; and in that of Major Van Home, both were 
directly and grossly violated. What object could 
have been more important to the American army, 
situated as it then was, than the re-establishment of 
its communications with the State of Ohio ; from 
which alone were to be expected reinforcements of 
men and supplies of provision ? And again, what 
fact was better ascertained, than the facility with 
which the whole British force concentrated at Mai- 
den, and amounting to seven hundred combatants, 
could be brought to act upon any American detach- 
ment, marching by the route of Maguago and 
Brownstown ? Yet was Van Home sent to fulfil 
that object and by this route, with only two hun- 
dred militia-riflemen!^ 

IV. When, on the 8th of August, Colonel Miller 
was detached to effect the purpose which Major 

&c. The Ctueen Charlotte came to the wharf and took in the women 
and baggage, and had her topsails loose and ready to sail." — Foi'bish 
and Gooding''s testimony on HulVs trial. 

1 Hull's official report of the 26,th of August, 1812. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 45 

Van Home had failed to accomplish on the 5th, it 
required no spirit of prophecy to foresee, that Proctor 
(the British commander) would make every possible 
effort to overwhelm the second detachment as he 
had done the first ; but that to this end he must 
employ the whole force, composing the garrison under 
his command. It is extraordinary, that this simple 
and obvious view of the subject, should have escaped 
the attention of any man to whom military ideas 
were at all familiar ; or if it did occur to General 
Hull, that it should have failed to suggest the only 
means left for prosecuting his own objects, and con- 
verting the policy and enterprise of his antagonist 
into folly and misfortune. These means obviously 
were — so to strengthen Miller's detachment, as to 
leave nothing to chance ; and thus to assure him- 
self not merely of the discomfiture, but of the 
destruction of v/hatever force the enemy might 
hazard on the southern side of the Detroit ; while, 
contemporaneously with Miller's movement, a second 
and small detachment should silently and rapidly 
descend the river to the neighborhood of Maiden, 
and thence proceed to assail and carry the fort. 
That both parts of this plan (had it been adopted) 
would have entirely succeeded, there cannot now 
be a doubt ; since, with the corps he had. Miller 
defeated Muir at the head of the whole British, 
Canadian and Indian force ; and since, from the 
evening of tlie 7th to the 9th of August, fort Mai- 
den (ordinarily requiring the defence of seven hun- 



46 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

dred men) was left to the custody of a sergeanfs 
guard !^ 

V. Notwithstanding these repeated blunders of 
the American General, fortune did not yet entirely 
abandon him ; and on the 16th of August, pre- 
sented a new occasion, requiring on his part only 
the vulgar quality of defensive courage, to have 
completely baffled tlie designs of Brock and re- 
established his own ascendency on the Detroit. 
This occasion was found in the indiscretion of his 
adversary ; who, on crossing the river with a force 
smaller tlian that it was his purpose to assail, had 
hastily determined to risk the storm of a fortifica- 
tion, strong in itself, abundantly supplied and suffi- 
ciently garrisoned. If it be thought extraordinary, 
that under these circumstances. General Brock 
should have forgotten all tlie dissuasives from at- 
tack furnished by history, it was certainly still less 
to be expected, that General Hull should have for- 
gotten all the motives for defence furnished by the 
same source. Such, however, was the fact ; the 
timidity of the one kept pace with the temerity of 
the other ; and at last, in an agony of terror, which 
cunning could no longer dissemble and which his- 
tory is ashamed to describe, the fort, army and ter- 
ritory were surrendered without pulling a trigger ! 

The errors which yet remain to be noticed are 
attributable to the administration — ^a fact, furnish- 

l Lieutenant Forbjsh's testimony. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 47 

ing no reason why they should be treated with 
more ceremony than others, with which they were 
associated. They will be sufficiently indicated by 
the following remarks. 

VI. The nation which meditates the invasion of 
a neighboring territory, should be careful to employ 
the last moments of peace, in acquiring a thorough 
knowledge of tlie force it may have to encounter. 
Another duty, not less obvious and imperative than 
the preceding, will be that of speedily withdrawing 
or promptly reinforcing its own remote and isolated 
posts. If there be any thing in the local position 
of these, that may render their retention important 
to the progress or issue of the war, the latter course 
should be pursued — but if on the contrary, it will 
have no material bearing on either, the garrisons 
should be speedily recalled and the posts abandoned, 
while this can be done successfully and safely. 
Yet were both these important duties neglected. 
When Hull arrived at Detroit, he was ignorant 
alike of the condition of Maiden and the number of its 
garrison. So also the commandant of Michilimack- 
inac continued to be uninformed of even the declara- 
tion of war, until after the investment and surrender 
of his post ; while the garrison of fort Dearborn, 
still more remote, remained imrecalled, until the 
middle of August, when retreat had become wholly 
impracticable. 

VII. We have seen that General Hull lost his 
own baggage and that of the army, the icJiole of his 
hospital stores and intrenching tools, and sixty men, in 



48 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

consequence of the ill-judged and tardy manner 
employed in transmitting- to him the declaration of 
war. A fact, so extraordinary in itself, and so pro- 
ductive of injury to the public, calls for more devel- 
opment than has yet been given to it. It will be 
remembered that a declaration of war w^as autho 
rized on the 18th of June, 1812. On this day, 
Secretary Eustis wrote two letters to General Hull. 
In one of these, no mention was made of this impor- 
tant event ; in the other, it w^as distinctly and offi- 
cially announced. The former of the tw^o, was 
carefully made up and expedited by a special mes- 
senger, w^io arrived in the General's camp on the 
24th of June ; w^hile the latter, was committed to 
the public mail as far as Cleveland; and thence, 
through a Avilderness of one hundred miles, to such 
conveyance, "as accident might supply.''^ The result 
was, that the declaration did not reach its destina- 
tion until the 2d of July, two days after it had been 
received by the enemy at Jlfalden. On this occasion, 
the British government w^as better served : Provost 
received notice of it on the 24th of June, at Quebec ; 
Brock, on the 26th, at Newark ; St. George, on the 
30th, at Maldeu ; and Roberts on the 8th of July, 
at St. Josephs. But a fact, still more extraordinary 
than tlie celerity of these transmissions is, that the 
information thus rapidly forwarded to Maiden and 
St. Josephs, was received under envelopes, franked by 
the Secretary of the American Treasury.^ 

1 Official Report of Captain Hanks to the commandmg General 
at Detroit, see also Appendix, No. 6. 



NOTECES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 49 

VIII. Few things are more self-evident, than that 
so long as the enemy had a fleet on Lake Erie and we 
had none, Maiden could be supplied and reinforced 
by the British posts below ; and that if hardly pressed, 
its garrison could be safely withdrawn to one or other 
of these posts. To meet these contingencies, and to 
protect Hull's long line of provisionment from inter- 
ruption,^ two suggestions were made — the one, to 
construct a navy competent to the command of the 
lake;'^ the other, to assemble on the Niagara a mili- 
tary force, which by menacing the safety of forts 
Erie and George, would prevent Brock from making 
detachments to Maiden. In choosing between these 
alternatives, the government did not hesitate — they 
promptly rejected the former, and adopted the latter ; 
but, unfortunately, without taking measures suffi- 
ciently decided for giving it execution. When, ac- 
cordingly, Hull perceived that the enem3^'s force at 
Maiden was increased and increasing, he called aloud 
on the militia officer commanding at Buffalo for sup- 
port — who announced in reply, that " he had none to 
give, direct or indirect." So also, when the Secretary of 
War ordered Major-General Dearborn to make speedy 
movements on the British posts in his front, the General 
answered — that "fi// then, he had not known that the 
troops on the J^iagara made part of his command."^ 

1 The line extended two hundred miles tlirough a desert, and in 
a great part of its length was skirted by the lake, coremandod by the 
British ships. 

2 Hull's Memoirs ; testimony of Mr, Eustis on Hull's triaL 
8 Appendix No. 7. 



50 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

IX. The principal advantage accruing to a nation, 
which is the first to declare war, is that of selecting 
its time and point of attack, and of concentrating on 
the latter, such force as will ensure victory, and the 
moral effect produced by it on both belligerents. Of 
this truth, so obvious in itself, the American cabinet 
of 1812, do not appear to have been apprised — for 
when (according to General P. B. Porter's testimony) 
Hull required three thousand men, as the least num- 
ber with which all the objects of the campaign could 
be successfully prosecuted ; the government replied, 
that "more than two thousand could not be given. "^ 

Whether this decision be examined in relation to 
the capacity of the nation ; to the variety and im- 
portance of the services to be performed ; or to the 
means necessary to then' execution, nothing could 
have been more erroneous. To those who know any 
thing of the character or numbers of the western 
population, or of their peculiar interests and feelings 
at that period and on this subject, we need but re- 
mark, (and without any fear of contradiction,) that 
five thousand men could have been obtained as 
promptly as two thousand. When again it is recol- 
lected, that the defence of our western posts and ter- 
ritory ; the prevention of a war with the savages; 
the capture of Maiden; the command of Lake Erie, 
and the means of a prompt co-operation with the 
troops destined to act on the Niagara, formed the 
objects of the campaign — who can for a moment doubt 

1 Hull's trial ; General P. B. Portei 's testimony. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 51 

their magnitude or interest ? And lastly, though it 
be readily admitted, and we hope sufficiently proved, 
that the force given to General Hull was competent 
to the capture of Maiden and the preservation of 
Detroit, still it by no means follows, that it was com- 
mensurate with all the objects of the expedition ; 
since among these were to be found, " the capture 
or destruction of the British fleet,"^ an object w^hich, 
in the absence of all naval means, could only be 
effected by such an augmentation of the army, as 
would have entirely excluded that arm from the shores 
of the lake. 

Had the government taken this short and plain 
view of the subject, and invited Governor Shelby of 
Kentucky, or Governor Meigs of Ohio, to follow in 
Hull's track, with two thousand gun-men and Win- 
chester's brigade of infantry, how different would have 
been the issue of the campaign ? Unfortunately, we 
began by weighing military expeditions in gold scales ; 
and the experiment proved (as it will never fail to do) 
that parsimony, always paltry, in war is the most 
lavish and criminal prodigality. 

J President's Message of November 4th, 1812. 



52 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 



CHAPTER III. 

Militia Operations in the West. — Harrison's Autumnal and Winter 
Campaigns. 

Of the disasters detailed in the preceding chapter, 
those of most early occurrence — the fall of Michili- 
mackinac, the occlusion of supplies from Ohio, the 
defeat of Van Home, and the retreat of the army from 
Canada, were more productive of surprise than alarm : 
all wondered at the events which had so unexpect- 
edly taken place; but few, if any, ascribed them to 
their true cause, or foresaw either the extent of the 
evil, or the means most proper for remedying it. 
The executive confidence in the competency of the 
commander, continued to be unshaken ; and no 
doubts were entertained, but that with the aid of a 
prompt reinforcement and a vigorous diversion on 
the Niagara, he would be able to hold what he pos- 
sessed, recover what he had lost, and eventually 
accomplish all the objects of the expedition. 

With these views of the subject, orders were issued 
for immediately organizing two corps in the west ; 
one of which, to consist of sixteen hundred volun- 
teers and four hundred regular troops, under the 
command of Brigadier-General Winchester, was des- 
tined to the support of Hull : the other, to be com- 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 63 

posed of three regiments of Kentucky militia, sub- 
jected to the orders of Brigadier-General Harrison, 
was assigned to the defence of Indiana and Illinois ; 
while the army of the north, under the command of 
Major-General Dearborn, was directed to hold itself 
in readiness, for an immediate attack upon one or 
more, of the British positions in its front. ^ 

Of these orders, the first, so far as regarded the 
assembling of the troops, was promptly executed ; 
and the corps assigned to Winchester, actually in 
motion for the Ohio frontier, when on the 24th of 
August, the appalling information was received, 
that Detroit, the territory, and the army, had been 
already surrendered to tlie enemy. Unexpected ca- 
lamities are in general bad counsellors, and often 
hurry those disposed to listen to them, into the adop- 
tion of measures little calculated to promote their 
own objects. On the present occasion, the govern- 
ment, adhering to its policy of carrying the war into 
Canada, without apparently perceiving the want, and 
certainly without providing the aid, of any co-ope- 
rating naval force, now hastily determined to put its 
trust in an unlimited employment of militia and a 
lavish expenditure of money — a plan which, though 

I On the 1st of August, Mr. Eustis gave notice to General Dearborn 
of the contents of a letter received from General Hull, of July 19th, by 
express, in consequence of which he subjoins the following order : — 
" You will make a diversion in his (General Hull's) favor at Niagara 
and at Kingston, as soon as may be practicable, and by such other ope- 
rations as may be witlain your control." See vol. 6th, p. 199, Records 
of the War Department These orders, substantially, were repeated 
in several subsequent communications. 
5* 



54 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

far short of its objects, was, notwithstanding, well 
adapted to the feelings, wants, and calculations of 
the west. 

The sedative effect produced by the war on the 
value of ordhiary labor and its products ; the com- 
paratively ample compensation given for military 
service ; the political excitement of the times, and the 
increased impulse given to this by the late disaster 
at Detroit, operating conjointly on an abundant, un- 
occupied, and high-spirited population, could not fail 
to bring together a large mass of ill-equipped and 
undisciplined men, who believing in the infallibility 
of western courage and rifles, sought no auxiliary in 
fulfilling the intentions of government, within even 
the short period of their own engagements.^ The 
force, which under these influences was in a few 
weeks assembled at different points of the frontier, 
exceeded ten thousand combatants f of which, that 
portion originally destined to the support of Hull, 
and best prepared for immediate service, was de- 
tached to fort Wayne — a small post on the Miami 
of the Lake, already sustaining an Indian investment, 
and still farther menaced by a British detachment, 
advancing under the command of Major Muir. But 
of these enemies, the former disappeared on the ap- 
proach of the American column, without making 
any resistance ; and the latter, not showing more 
disposition to hazard a contest, hastily withdrew to 
its boats and returned to Maiden. It was now deemed 

\ McAflfee. 2 Idem. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 55 

proper, as well for the purpose of giving occupation 
to the troops, as for that of preventing any new at- 
tempt on the fort, to direct a few detachments against 
such of the Indian villages as had most contributed 
to the late investing party ; but though made with 
sufficient zeal and activity, the experiment failed 
in producing any effect more important than the 
destruction of a few cabins and the corn growing 
around tliem. 

While these circumstances were taking place in 
the northern section of the district, others, of a mixed 
character, good and bad, grave and ludicrous, were 
occurring in the southern. Early in September, a 
small band of savages, of the Potowatamie and Win- 
ebago tribes, appeared at fort Harrison ; and feigning 
weariness and hunger, besought for the night the 
shelter and hospitality of the fort. But on finding 
that Captain Taylor, the commanding officer, gave 
no credit to their story, and even suspected their 
hostility, they threw off the mask, and collecting 
their associates, (who had hitherto lain concealed in 
the neighboring thickets,) united in a bold and per- 
severing attack on the fort. Dining the progress of 
this, the assailants found means to burn a block- 
house, (which made part of the work,) and thus 
opened to themselves a new passage to the interior ; 
but, though making many strenuous efforts to profit 
by this advantage, they failed in all, and were ulti- 
mately repulsed with considerable loss. To make 
up in some degree for this disappointment, the party 
repaired to a frontier settlement on the Pigeon's 



56 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

Roost, where they killed or captured twenty-one of 
the inhabitants. 

This last incident would, perhaps, have been alone 
sufficient to have called forth a new display of Ken- 
tucky population and patriotism ; but to its authority 
was superadded that of a requisition from General 
Harrison for a force, which, with the three regiments 
already detached to Vincennes, would be competent 
not merely to the defence of Indiana and Illinois, but 
to the punishment of such Indian tribes as were most 
likely to disturb and molest any neighboring terri- 
tory.^ Governor Shelby, upon whom the requisition 
was made, hastened to give it execution, and with 
not more of attention, than the General himself had 
employed, in proportioning the quantum of force to 
the nature and exigencies of the service. When, 
therefore, we consider that the invitation to the field 
was without limitation as to numbers ; that the 
causes requiring it were not a little exaggerated,^ 
and that the policy, no less than the patriotism of 
the state, induced every man to become a soldier, 
we can no longer wonder that the Governor's proc- 
lamation should, within twenty days, have assem- 
bled an army of four thousand men, equipped for 
service, and all, Tartar-like, mounted on horseback. 

The command of this formidable array was com- 
mitted to Major-General Hopkins of tlie militia, 
who reached fort Harrison about the 10th of Octo- 
ber. Finding nothing nearer to his own frontier to 

1 McAffee. 

8 Harrison's letter to Shelby, 5th Sept, 1812 ; McAffee, p. 156, 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 57 

give him occupation, lie on the 14th, began his 
march for the Indian villages on the Wabash and 
lUinois. Much of the ground he had to traverse 
was of the prairie character, (scantily supplied with 
water and entirely destitute of wood,) but abound- 
ing in tall, coarse grass. The effect of this redun- 
dant herbage on the army resembled enchantment ; 
every step they took upon it, abated alike their 
ardor and intelligence ; the guides lost their way ; 
the General his authority, and the troops their sub- 
mission ; and on the fourth day after leaving fort 
Harrison (discovering that the prairie was on fire, 
and mistaking this for a ruse of the enemy) this 
" press of western chivalry" turned their backs on 
the war, and withdrew en masse to Kentucky. 

About the same time, and in concert with the 
preceding movement, an expedition on a smaller 
scale, but of more successful character, was insti- 
tuted by Governor Edwards of the Illinois Territory, 
and conducted by Colonel Russell of the rangers. 
Its object was an Indian town at the head-waters 
of Lake Peoria, which, by a rapid and well-directed 
march, the detachment was able to surprise and 
destroy. On the first alarm, the savages betook 
themselves to a neighboring swamp, whither they 
were hotly pursued and speedily routed — leaving 
behind them twenty dead bodies, a considerable 
store of corn, and sixty horses laden with baggage. 

A second expedition under the direction of Gene- 
ral Hopkins, and made for the laudable purpose of 
fulfilling the intentions and wiping out the disgrace 



58 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

of the first, was now organized at fort Harrison. 
The corps employed on this occasion, was composed 
of a few regular troops, about fifty mounted gun- 
men, and the three regiments of Kentucky militia, 
detached under the first requisition ; who, directing 
their march along the eastern bank of the Wabash, 
in eight days reached their first object, and destroyed 
in succession three of the principal Indian villages, 
with the loss of eighteen of their own corps ; who, 
by some negligence or misdirection in their march, 
fell into an ambuscade of the enemy. Admonished 
alike by this disaster, the nakedness of the troops, 
an unfavoral)le change in the weather, and the 
impossibility of bringing the savages to a general 
action, the commanding officer thought it advisable 
to return to Vincennes. 

Such was the state of things on the western 
frontier, when the government, having decided the 
rival pretensions of Generals Winchester and Harri- 
son, vested in the latter the command of the army 
and district ;^ with orders sufficiently definite as to 

I The intrigue by which this outrage on mihtary rules and the laws 
of Kentucky was accomplished, will be found in McAffee, pp. 107 — 
8, and is substantially as follows : Governor Scott had a desire to 
commission Harrison as a Major-General of the Kentucky militia, 
with a view of thus enabling him to supersede Winchester in the com- 
mand ; but to the honest and unsophisticated mind of Scott, the ar- 
rangement appeared impossible, inasmuch as by the laws of Kentucky, 
officers of militia must be inhabitants of the state — a qualification 
which did not apply to General Harrison. To get over these scruples 
of conscience on the part of the Governor, a few casuists were em- 
ployed to change his opinions, and in this they at last succeeded. For 
the General's own agency in the business, see Appendix, No. 6, 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 59 

the objects to be pursued, but entirely discretionary 
as to the time and mode of pursuing them. Avail- 
ing" himself of the latitude given by this new and 
increased authority, the General hastened to re- 
model his plan of campaig-n, and promptly rejecting 
his first project of recapturing Detroit by a coup de 
main,^ substituted for it a march by three separate 
and distant routes across the swampy and unin- 
habited region in his front, to the Rapids of the 
Miami — Avhence, " after accumulating one million 
of rations for the troops, and forage for two thousand 
horses and oxen,^ he proposed marching rapidly on 
Brownstown, crossing the river Detroit, and before 
the commencement of winter, taking Maiden and recap- 
turing the Michigan Territory.'''* 

1 While acting in a subordinate capacity to Winchester, the Gene- 
ral had no doubt of being able, with a few mounted men, to retake 
Detroit by a coup de main, and was careful so to inform the govern- 
ment. — McJiffee, p. 166. When, however, by means of this and other 
representations, having the same object, he became commanding offi- 
cer of the army and district, his views suddenly changed ; the rapid 
and certain process by a cotip de main was abandoned as hopeless, 
{McAffee, p. 141,) and one, more systematic and imposing, substituted 
for it — requiring as a preliminary to any direct movement on Maiden 
or Detroit, an accumulation at the Rapids of twelve months' forage and 
pro\'isions, with carts, wagons, &c., necessary to transport them from 
tlie place of deposit to the scene of action — or, in other words, the 
entire purchase of all surplus corn, flour and fodder, oxen, horses, 
carts, wagons, &c., to be found witliin the State of Ohio ; and this at 
a time, (22d of October,) when he says of the roads — "to get supphcs 
forward through a swampy wilderness of near two hundred milee, in 
wagons, or on pack-horses, wliich are to carry their own provisions, is 
absolutely impossible." 

2 McAffee, p. 167. 



60 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

In prosecution of this plan, the army was divided 
into three columns ; that of the left, composed of 
Kentucky militia and the seventeenth United States 
regiment, (commanded by Brigadier-General Win- 
chester) was assigned to the route of the St. Mary ; 
the central column, consisting of twelve hundred 
Ohio militia and eight hundred mounted infantry, 
commanded by Brigadier-General Tupper, to that of 
fort McArthur; while the column of the right, made 
up, or intended to be made up, (for all its elemen- 
tary parts had not yet arrived) of three brigades of 
militia from Pennsylvania, Virginia and Ohio, led 
by General Harrison in person, was to approach its 
object by the two Sandusky's. 

Under these arrangements, the General had hopes 
on the 4th of October, that "within a fortnight from 
that date" he would be able to accumulate at the 
Rapids the necessary supply of food and forage, as- 
semble the several parts of the army and begin his 
intended niovement on Brownstown. But these 
hopes, which had little if any thing to justify them, 
were not fated to be of long duration ; as on the 
very day on which they were expressed, the column 
of the left was found to be on the verge of mutiny 
and desertion. This conduct in a corps, which had 
hitherto showed only zeal in forwarding the objects 
of the expedition, was produced by the increased 
coldness of the weather and the miserable condition 
of their clothing ; by a state of the roads, rendering 
them nearly impassable ; by a deficiency of food, 
not easily to be accounted for ; and by a discovery 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 61 

(in which they but anticipated their commander) 
that his project of an autumnal campaign was wholly 
impracticable. ^ In this dilemma, the General found 
it prudent to employ persuasion rather than author- 
ity, and invoking the aid of Colonel Allen's elo- 
quence in addition to his own, prevailed upon the 
column to prolong its stay and its efforts. 

With Brigadier-General Tupper and the mounted 
men of the central column, he was less fortuna4:e. 
Learning while at Winchester's cantonment that a 
party of Indians occupied the Rapids, (his intended 
point of concentration,) he ordered Tupper with 
eight hundred mounted men to advance and dis- 
lodge them, but this order, though reinforced by 
another from Winchester, was from time to time 
scandalously evaded — when the troops losing all 
confidence in their General and the General in 
the troops, they mutually agreed to withdraw to 
Urbanna. 

To this useless band succeeded another, fortu- 
nately possessing a leader of more efficient character. 
Colonel Allen Trimble having arrived at St. Mary 
with a corps of five hundred mounted infantry, was 
directed to march to the defence of fort Wayne, 
(now menaced with a second investment by the 
Indians,) and thence to the Potowatomie villages, 
on the sources of the river St. Joseph. No enemy 
being found at the fort, the Colonel hastened to 
execute the remaining and secondary part of the 



1 McAffee, p. 146. 183—4. 
6 



62 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

expedition, when one half of the corps, in the exer- 
cise of its volunteer rights, refused to go farther. 
The Colonel, being thus left to choose between an 
abandonment of his purpose, or an attempt to exe- 
cute it with half the force originally assigned to the 
enterprise, did not hesitate to adopt the latter; and 
supplying the want of numbers by vigilance and 
activity, was soon able to reach and destroy the two 
villages indicated in his orders. 

It was now the 28th of October. The fortnight 
which, according to General Harrison's calculations, 
v/as to have done much, had passed away without 
doing any thing ; the rainy season had already be- 
gan ; land transportation, always difficult, was now 
impracticable; and idleness, nakedness and hunger 
were working their ordinary effects on the health, 
habits and temper of the troops ; rendering them sick, 
and sour, and restless — a state of things which the 
General could no longer conceal from himself, and 
which brought him, at last, to the reluctant confes- 
sion, that the project of an autumnal campaign must 
be abandoned, and a ivinter expedition adopted in its 
stead. " My present plan," he says, in a letter of 
the preceding date, to the Secretary of War, " is to 
occupy Sandusky and accumulate, at that place, as 
much provision and forage as possible ; to be taken 
from thence in sleds to the river Raisin. For to get 
supplies forward through a swampy wilderness of 
nearly two hundred miles extent, in wagons, or on 
pack-horses carrying their own provender, is impos- 
sible. Still the main object may be accomplished 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 63 

by using the frozen margin of the lake, if the troops 
are provided with warm clothing, and the winter be 
such as it usually is in this climate."^ 

As, however, many weeks must elapse between 
the date of this new determination and the actual 
occurrence of such a condition of weatlier as could 
alone render it practicable, it was deemed expedient 
to employ the interval in destroying such Indiait 
lodgements, temporary and permanent, as from ac- 
tual force or locality of position, were most likely to 
disturb the left wing of the army, or the transporta- 
tion of supplies going on under its protection. Of 
these lodgements, one had recently been made at 
the foot of the Rapids ; ostensibly for the purpose 
of gathering and transporting corn, but, as was 
suspected, secretly destined to co-operate witli the 
Miamis in some military enterprise on our frontier 
posts and convoys. To break up this party became, 
therefore, a matter of moment ; and to effect it. Gen- 
eral Tupper, whose feats in arms we have already 
connnemorated, was detached, early in November, 
at tlie head of six hundred and fifty Ohio militia and 
a few mounted rangers. On approaching his object, 
he prudently employed a reconnoitring party to 
ascertain whether any changes had taken place in 
the force or position of the enemy 1 And being as- 

i It was by thus qualifying his real opinions, that he carried the 
cabinet along with him in his attempts to execute his absurd projects. 
They at last saw, or thought they saw, in these contradictory state- 
ments, a desire on the part of the General, to escape responsibility, 
and a design to induce them to incur it 



64 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

sured, on the return of the party, that the aUies, red 
and white, besides continuing wlieve they had been, 
and without any material increase of numbers, were 
"now indulging themselves in singing and dancing," 
he manfully determined to cross the Miami and take 
part in the revel ; but defeated in this by the depth 
of the water and strength of the current, instead of 
ascending the river and seeking a fording place of 
safer and quieter character, (which might have been 
readily found,) he followed the stream downward, 
and placing himself directly in front of the British 
and Indian camp, sufficiently announced, not only 
his arrival, but his intention also of shifting from 
himself and imposing on his enemy, both the trouble 
and danger of crossing the river. In this last cal- 
culation, however, he entirely lost sight of the anti- 
chivalrous character of Indian warfare. The first 
care of the red man of the forest is to take care of 
himself; and the second, so to measure the strength 
and temper of his antagonist as will enable him to 
judge, not merely on what side of a stream he shall 
fight, but whether he shall fight on either side of it. 
With this view, on the present occasion, after send- 
ing their women and children to the woods, and their 
allies to their boats, the Indians made a show of 
engaging at long shot; while a few mounted par- 
ties despatched across the Miami, soon found out 
the flanks and rear of their adversary, and suflficiently 
indicated their intention — not of fighting a pitched 
battle, but of harassing his progress when he moved, 
and disquieting his positions when he became sta- 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 65 

tionary. As this was a state of things the General 
had not foreseen, and greatly disliked, he quickly 
resorted to the only expedient by which he supposed 
it could be remedied ; and accordingly, early in the 
night of the 15th, began a rapid retreat to fort Mc- 
Arthur.^ 

While T upper was making this second display 
of military talent, another expedition, under bet- 
ter auspices, was preparing at Fran Id into wn. A 
corps of six hundred mounted men, selected from 
the army, were placed under the direction of Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Campbell, with orders to march 
against the Indian villages on the Missisineway. 
Of these, they reached the most northwardly, at 
daybreak on the 18th of December, but without 
having been able to surprise it completely. A por- 
tion of the occupants escaped across the river ; 
whilst the remainder, after a short and feeble resist- 
ance, surrendered to the assailants. No time was 
lost in pursuing this advantage, and three other vil- 
lages were visited and destroyed by the party. 

The troops, having been now thirty-six hours on 
horseback, and having suffered much from cold, 
hunger, and fatigue, encamped for the night on 
the bank of the river, where they remained undis- 
turbed till near daylight ; when the outposts were 
furiously driven in, and the camp sharply and gen- 
erally assailed, but without producing the smallest 
ill-effect on its spirit and order. At the dawn of 



1 McAffee, p. 171. 



66 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

day, when a proper direction could be ^iven to the 
movement, both flanks of the Indian hne were rapidly 
turned, and its rear charged and routed. The gen- 
eral result of the expedition, however, was not flat- 
tering : twenty-three Indians were killed, forty-two 
taken, and four out of five villages, destroyed ;* 
while on our side, ten men were killed, forty-eight 
wounded, and nearly two hundred rendered unfit for 
service, by disease and frost-bitten hands and feet. 

These preliminary steps taken, and the column 
of the right with the park of artillery arrived at San- 
dusk}^, orders were now given to General Winchester, 
who had hitherto occupied a position near the mouth 
of the Au Glaize, to push forwaixi to the Rapids ; clear 
the front and flanks of that post of hostile parties ; 
construct huts for the better protection of the ad- 
vancing supplies; and prepare sleds for the intended 
movement on Maiden. Under these orders, the Gen- 
eral commenced his march on the 31st of December, 
at the head of about one thousand effectives ; but 
the roads becoming much obstructed by snow, it was 
not till the 10th of January, that he reached the point 
to which he was destined. Finding on his arrival 
no traces of an enemy, excepting a single and small 
Indian encampment, (the occupants of which were 
promptly pursued and routed,) he now directed his 
attention to the preparatory labors already indicated 
— -when on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of the month. 



> The fifth, and unapproaehed village, contained the principal Indian 
force. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 67 

expresses were received from the inhabitants of 
Frenchtown, representing the many and aggravated 
horrors of their situation, and entreating the interpo- 
sition of the American arms. " The British," they 
said, " no longer conceal their intention of carrying 
off our grain and our cattle ; and the savages menace 
us with the destruction of our dweUings, and the 
massacre or captivity of our persons. Without your 
aid, we have no hope ; with it, we may be able to 
defend ourselves, our wives, and our children ; but 
this aid, to be effectual, must be prompt. The pres- 
ent number of the enemy among us, does not exceed 
three hundred combatants — a force that will be soon 
and considerably augmented ; after which, your in- 
terposition would be useless, and our ruin complete." 
An appeal like this, addressed to men of high and 
liberal views, could not be made in vain. The warm- 
hearted and gallant Allen, became its ready and 
zealous advocate. To his quick and intelligent 
mind, the policy it invoked appeared to be sustained 
by every motive that ought to govern in the case — 
sympathy for the afflicted ; duty to fellow-citizens, 
and a correct interpretation of military maxims. 
" Can we," he said, "turn a deaf ear to the cries of 
men, women and children, about to perish under tlie 
scalping-knife and tomahawk of the savage ? Can 
we regard with indifference the perils of those whose 
attachments to the United States have alone rendered 
them obnoxious to the calamities they dread ? Can 
it be possible, that the wisdom of beating an enemy 
in detail, can either escape our notice or require argu- 



68 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

ments to obtain our approbation ? For what purpose 
are we here, but to seek, to find, and to fight this 
very enemy ? And shall we permit his advanced 
guard to perpetrate all the mischief it meditates, and 
return in safety to its main body '? Is it by such con- 
duct that we shall wipe out the disgrace of Hull's 
surrender, or fulfil the promises made to our friends 
when, leaving our own firesides, we took upon us the 
temporary profession of arms ] And if not, by what 
considerations is it recommended 1 Will it be said, 
that the force of the hostile detachment is too great 
to be successfully combated, or in other words, that 
a thousand freemen are unequal to a contest with 
three hundred savages and slaves ? The supposition 
is degrading, and merits not the ceremony of a refu- 
tation. Will it, on the other hand, be alleged, that 
it is too inconsiderable to be noticed 1 This also 
would be an error — for besides, that victory, on any 
scale, is not without its moral effects on both bellige- 
rents, an abstraction of three hundred men from the 
present force of the enemy, would materially dimin- 
ish his power, and give us a decided ascendency in 
prosecuting what remains of the campaign. Again : 
will it be said, (and, if I mistake not, it has been 
said,) that so near an approach to the den of the 
Lion would be imprudent 1 To this I reply, that 
danger is inseparable from war, and that the soldier 
who goes upon the plan of running no risk, is ne- 
cessarily self-condemned to inaction and disgrace ; 
whereas he who dares boldly, may do much. Since 
then, activity and enterprise are the elements of 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 69 

victory, let us beware of calculating dangers too 
nicely — this was the fault and ruin of Hull, and 
cannot surely be thought worthy of our imitation. 
If the Lion, as he has been called, moves at all, he 
will do so in one of two ways: — he will either send 
a second detachment to support the first, in which 
case, both maybe separately beaten, — or he will put 
his whole force in motion, and thus furnish us with 
a sufficient excuse for falling back upon our own 
army, which cannot now be far in the rear. From 
this brief and general view of the subject, I am 
led to conclude, that we should hasten our march 
to Frenchtown ; attack, and if possible, destroy the 
advanced corps of the enemy ; give protection to a 
meritorious and suffering people, and obtain the con- 
trol of resources, of which we are much in want, 
and which otherwise will go to sustain the war 
against us." 

The effects of this address were not equivocal — 
the General no longer hesitated, and the council, 
not having many or important doubts to remove,^ 
it was speedily determined that " a detachment 
should be sent, as expeditiously as possible, to 
Frenchtown." A corps was organized accordingly, 
and beginning its march on the 17th, it was able at 
three o'clock, P. M. of the 18th, to present itself in 
front of the town, when the fire of the British artij- 



1 Colonel Lewis and Major Madison stated, that according to their 
recollection, the opinion of the council of war was unanimous for 
proceeding to Frenchtown, 



70 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

lery opened upon it. The measures taken by Colonel 
Lewis, the commander of the American detach- 
ment, were well-timed and well-judged. Without 
the smallest unnecessary delay, he ordered the two 
battalions of Graves and Madison, (preceded by Bal- 
lard's light infantry,) to cross the river^ and drive 
tlie British and their allies from the houses and 
picket fences, of which they had hitherto availed 
themselves ; while the remaining battalion, under 
the command of Colonel Allen, was so posted on 
the right as to flank any retrograde movement 
made or attempted by the enemy. The first of 
these orders was gallantly executed, and in a few 
minutes, Reynolds, the British commander, was 
driven from the village and compelled to seek an- 
other position. In doing this, he was soon and 
necessarily brought into contact with Allen's bat- 
tahon, by which he was vigorously attacked and 
pursued, until at last, the shelter of a second group 
of houses and a wood enabled him to renew his 
defence. 

Lewis's conduct under these new circumstances 
was not less prudent and proper than on the former 
occasion. Retaining Allen's battalion on the ground 
it occupied, and which menaced at once the front 
and left of the enemy's position, he detached those 
of Graves and Madison to turn his right and rear. 
The firing which grew out of this manoeuvre be- 
came the signal for Allen to act ; when, under the 

1 The river was then covered by a thick and strong ice. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 71 

pressure of the two attacks, Reynolds was again 
routed and compelled to betake himself wholly to 
the forest. It was here that his Indian auxiliaries 
found their true champ de battaille; for though kept 
in constant retreat for three miles in succession, they 
maintained the conflict with great obstinacy, and 
but yielded at last to the superior force and well- 
conducted charges of the Kentucky militia. Colonel 
Lewis now led back his detachment to the town, 
and hastened to inform General Winchester of the 
events of the day. 

If victory often impairs the faculties of strong 
and practised minds, what ill-effects may it not pro- 
duce on those of less power, wholly unacquainted 
with war as a science 1 Unfortunately, on the 
present occasion, its only product was a self-sufli- 
ciency, in which every thing approaching the char- 
acter of military foresight and discretion was for- 
gotten. A council of war, convened on the morning 
of the 19th, determined "to maintain their new 
position and wait the arrival of reinforcements," and 
in this decision, the two Generals, Winchester and 
Harrison, united, but without sufficiently foreseeing 
the necessity of rendering more defensible an open 
village, within stroke of the enemy, and unprotected 
by a single cannon. Nor was it the effect of the 
arrival of the former of these conmianders to correct 
or in any degree to qualify, this oversight. On the 
contrary, the small accession of force brought by 
him, (not exceeding two hundred and fifty men,) 
became the cause of an increased security, which 



72 NOTIC TS OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

set aside even the most ordinary precautions ; as on 
the night of the 21st, (though informed that the 
enemy meditated an attack,) the troops were neither 
kept together, nor was a picket-guard placed on 
the only road, by which their position could be 
readily or conveniently approached.^ 

While thus in the American camp nothing was 
seen, but disregard for themselves, nor any thing 
heard, but contempt for their enemy, Proctor, the 
British commander, was fast advancing from Mai- 
den, at the head of his whole disposable force, and 
was even permitted to establish a battery within 
point-blank shot of the town, without being either 
disturbed or discovered. Instead, however, of avail- 
ing himself of this advantage, and making his 
attack before daybreak, which would have best 
secured him against Kentucky rifles, and probably 
effected the complete surprise of his adversary, he 
waited the approach of dawn, and thus became 
visible to an out-lying sentinel, who gave the alarm 
at the moment that the American drums were pre- 
paring to beat the reveille. Failing, therefore, to 
catch his enemy asleep, and forbidden alike by sea- 
son, weather and want of preparation, from employ- 
ing siege or investment, he resorted to assault, as 
the only means he had left for accomplishing his 
purpose ; and with this view, covering his front 
with artillery and his flanks with Indian marksmen, 
he began his movements on the town, and had ap- 

1 McAffee, p. 302. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 73 

preached within musket-shot of the pickets, when he 
was met by a fire so galling and incessant, as made 
an immediate retreat necessary.* 

The left of his attack was more fortunate. In 
the hasty dispositions made for defence, the de- 
tachment of two hundred and fifty men brought 
by Winchester on the 20th, instead of being posted 
behind the pickets and held there in reserve, or 
made to occupy the houses which entirely com- 
manded the approaches to the place, were most 
preposterously drawn out in line, on the right of 
the town, and without a 'point d'appui, for either 
flank. This weak and isolated position could not 
long escape the notice of the enemy, who hastened 
to concentrate upon it all his disposable means, In- 
dian and British ; and in twenty minutes, threw the 
American line into a state of confusion, which no 
possible exertion could restrain, and which soon and 
necessarily terminated in the capture or slaughter 
of nearly all the fugitives, including two companies 
of fifty men each, led from behind the pickets by 
Colonels Lewis and Allen. Yet with even this decided 
advantage. Proctor indicated little, if any disposition, 
to renew the attack on his first object. The experi- 
ment he had made on the covered part of the Ameri- 
can position, had taught him a lesson of prudence he 
could not forget. He had lost by it nearly one fourth 
of his regular force, without having made any serious 
impression upon either the strength or the spirit of 

1 McAffee, p. 215. 

7 



74 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1819. 

his adversary ; and to incur a similar loss by a 
second attempt, though attended by success, would 
in effect be exhausting on an advanced corps, the 
means given him of resisting the main body. Other 
considerations may be supposed to have increased 
the weight of this reasoning — the weather was cold, 
the snow deep, and Harrison's head-quarters already 
advanced to the Rapids ; while his own corps wag 
neither sufficiently provided against the elements nor 
the enemy. What, therefore, could not be done by 
a coup de main, (a sudden attack and speedy retreat) 
lie should forbear to attempt ; and the more so, as 
he was now encumbered with prisoners, and with 
the wounded of both armies. The pause in his 
operations, which took place about this time, may, 
therefore, be justly ascribed to reasoning like this, 
which must have been conclusive, and would have 
sent him back to Maiden, satisfied with the advan- 
tage he had gained, but that information was now 
brought that General Winchester was among the 
number of prisoners made by the Indians. This un- 
expected incident, suggested to Proctor a new course 
of proceeding, of v/hich he hastened to make the ex- 
periment. Causing the prisoner to be brought before 
him, he dilated freely on the extent of his force, 
and still more on that of his humanity. " I have," 
he said, " the means of setting fire to every house 
in the village, without risk to myself; and may 
thus, soon and safely reduce the party, which so 
unwisely attempts to defend it. But in this case, 
what will be the fate of the inhabitants, men, women 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 75 

and children, and of the American miUtia associated 
with them 1 Such of these as may escape the fire 
of our musketry and cannon, will unavoidably fall 
under the tomahawks of our allies, whom it will be 
impossible to restrain in the heat of action. May I 
never witness such a spectacle! But, need I tell 
you, tliat private feelings cannot be indulged at the 
expense of public duty ; and that, however agreea- 
ble it would be to me as a man, to avoid the employ- 
ment of means, so terrible in themselves as those I 
have suggested, yet as an officer, I cannot be justi- 
fied in omitting to do, whatever may be necessary 
or useful to the King's service. I have, therefore, 
to submit to you a single and short proposition, con- 
taining the only remedy the case admits of, and 
that is — that in your quality of commanding Gene- 
ral, you will immediately surrender to me French- 
town and the garrison it contaiiis." 

To Winchester, the situation of the gallant band, 
whom Proctor called tlie garrison of Frenchtown, 
appeared to be hopeless. He saw no reason to ex- 
pect any interposition in their favor from the Rapids, 
and from no other quarter was it possible to obtain 
any, in time to be useful; yet without a reinforce- 
ment, the contest, as he supposed, must be short 
and unavailing. He had, besides, just witnessed the 
slaughter or capture of nearly one half of his com- 
mand; and saw with horror what would probably be 
the fate of the other, if, as menaced by Proctor, it was 
deprived of its covering and obliged to combat on the 
open ground. His decision on Proctor's proposition 



76 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

was, therefore, soon and humanely taken, and hav- 
ing" yielded his assent, he immediately despatched 
an Aid-decamp to inform Majors Graves and Madison, 
that " they and their followers had been surren- 
dered prisoners of war, to the arms of his Britannic 
Majesty."' 

This annunciation of the unconditional surrender 
of a corps, which had hitherto triumphed over every 
attack made upon it, and which yet believed in its 
capacity of self-defence, could not fail to be ill-re- 
ceived b}^ those to whom it was addressed. Though 
entertaining- no doubts of the purity and benevolence 
of the General's views in taking this step, they did 
not scruple to question the validity of any engage- 
ment made by him in their behalf, after he had be- 
come a prisoner ; and the less so, as the agreement 
actually entered into and communicated, contained 
no security whatever against Indian or other out- 
rage, in the event of their acceding to it. The de- 
termination of Major Madison (whom the disasters 
of the day had now made commandant of the corps) 
was therefore judiciously taken. — "We shall run all 
risks," he said, "of a prolonged resistance, and per- 
ish, if such must be our fate, in a free and full use 
of our arms, unless the British commander will conie 
under a solemn engagement that private property 
shall in all cases be respected ; that the side-arms? 
of officers shall be restored to them on their arrival 
at Amherstburg ; that the wounded shall be promptly 

I McAffee, p. 215, 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 77 

and securely transported to that post ; and that, until 
this last provision be complied with, a guard suffi- 
cient for their protection shall be assigned to them." 
These conditions, though altogether such as brave 
men had a right to demand, and a liberal enemy 
would have had no hesitation in granting, were for 
a time resisted by Proctor; but finding that his at- 
tempts at either duping or intimidating his adversary 
were unavailing, and feeling the importance to him- 
self of even a qualified surrender, which should make 
unnecessary a renewed attack on the town or a longer 
continuance before it, he at last, after an altercation 
as little honorable to his manners as to his princi- 
ples,' yielded his objections, and entered into the 
engagements proposed to him. 

What remained of the day was assiduously em- 
ployed by the enemy in preparing for an immediate 
retreat, and in actually retreating, as far as Stony 
Creek. At twelve o'clock, the prisoners (amounting 
to about six hundred) were put in motion, and in^ 
tlie evening of the 23d, arrived at Amherstburg ; 
where "they were penned up in a small and muddy 
wood-yard, and exposed throughout the night to a 
cold and constant rain, without tents or blankets, 
and with only fire enough to keep them from freez- 
ing.'"' The dead, who lay where they had fallen, 

1 In detailing the circumstances of this meeting, Major Madison 
rtated to the Secretary of War, that " Proctor's conduct at French- 
town was as tmmanly, as at Maiden it was base" — alluding to his im- 
pudent denial, that "any engagements favorable to the prisoners had 
been entered into by him." a McAffee. 

7* 



78 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

in Frenchtown and its neighborhood, were not merely 
disregarded, but " formally denied the rights of sep- 
ulture, and left a prey to the hogs and dogs of the 
village ;"^ while the wounded, still more unfortunate, 
were literally abandoned to the mercy of the savages ; 
who, it was tauntingly remarked, "would be found 
to be excellent surgeons."'^ Soon after sunrise, the 
day following, instead of the sleighs which Proctor 
had promised, and which were anxiously expected, 
came two hundred Indians, hideous as yells and 
paint could make them ; who, after plundering the 
two houses in which the wounded were collected, 
set them on fire, and repulsing every attempt of the 
prisoners at escape, burnt the whole to the ground.^ 
Information of this disaster reached the Rapids at 
twelve o'clock of the day of its occurrence, and pro- 
duced effects there, which had no tendency to miti- 
gate the evil. The first intention of the commanding 
General, (who had arrived at this post early on the 
morning of the 20th) was to push forward such force 
as could be speedily assembled, interpose it between 
the flying troops and their pursuers, and save if pos- 
sible, the wreck of the American detachment. But 
being informed at the end of a single hour's march, 
that the retreating party (when last seen by such 
of the fugitives as had been able to make good their 
escape) was reduced to less than forty men, much 
exhausted by fatigue, and hotly pursued by a body 
of mounted Indians, he abandoned his purpose, and 

I McAffee. 2 Idem. 3 Idem. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 79 

committing the service, originally proposed for him- 
self, to a small detachment, he speedily retreated to 
the Rapids and immediately assembled a council of 
war. To the wisdom of this enlightened body, it 
appeared not merely possible, but highly probable, 
that Proctor would follow up the blow he had already 
given, and attack the post they now occupied ; or, 
that leaving this behind him, he would throw him- 
self on the head or flanks of the column of the right 
and the convoys moving in its rear. From such 
premises, it was not difficult to come to a conclu- 
sion — that the post must be abandoned; its defences, 
and the stores collected in them, destroyed ; and the 
garrison, amounting to eight or nine hundred men,' 
instantly withdrawn behind Portage river. Orders 
in conformity with this decision, were speedily given 
and executed, and with this event, virtually ter- 
minated General Harrison's second, or winter cam- 
paign ; which, unfortunately, having recovered no 
ground we had lost, nor effaced any disgrace we 
had suffered, utterly failed in ocromnlishing its 
objects ; and as matter of history, is only remarka- 
ble for a waste of money, time, cliaracter and life. 

Remarks. Of the many errors which signalize 
tills expedition, the first in date as well as in char- 
acter, was the plan of campaign, suggested by the 
government, and pursued by the General ; and 
which differed but little from that prescribed to 

I McAffce, p. 236. 



80 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

Hull, with respect to route, object and means. It 
may be concisely described as follows : — " Get to- 
gether a large mass of militia and volunteers ; arm, 
equip, subsist and march them without loss of time 
through the wilderness ; give protection to the fron- 
tier, recapture Detroit, and invade Canada." In 
thus substantially renev/ing their first and ill-fated 
plan, the government entirely overlooked, or disre- 
garded the circumstances which induced and jus- 
tified the first expedition, and the very important 
changes wrought in these, by Hull's surrender and 
other causes, in relation, as well to their own con- 
dition, as to that of the enemy. 

When on the 1st of June, 1812, Hull began his 
march to Detroit, we had an Indian war to prevent, 
which could be best accomplished by augmenting 
our military means in the neighborhood of the 
lakes ; we had several old-established forts on the 
frontier, which, from different views, it was deemed 
important to sustain ; we had a young and increasing 
settlement bordering on a British province, which 
both justice and policy commanded us to protect ; 
we were yet in a state of peace, which enabled us 
to carry on our operations without interruption ; we 
had the summer before us, from which to select the 
moments most propitious for crossing the swampy 
region, which separated us from our objects ; and 
lastly, we had an organized corps, equipped, supplied 
and ready for service. Such was the state of things 
on the 1st of June, when Hull began his march for 
Detroit. But how changed in all respects was it 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 81 

by the 30tli of Septeiiiber — the day on wliich Har- 
rison reached the St. Mary, and took command of 
the army and district ] It will be remembered, that 
at this period, we were at open war with Great 
Britain ; that our frontier settlements and posts had 
been wrested from us ; that the Indian tribes of the 
west, with few, if any exceptions, had taken part with 
the enemy ; that the rainy season had already com- 
menced, and the roads (always precarious) had be- 
come difficult for infantry and nearly impracticable 
to carts and wagons ; that the means of both sub- 
sistence and transportation, (beyond contract limits) 
were yet to be provided ; that the artillery, destined 
for the service and indispensable to it, was not far- 
ther advanced than Pittsburg ; that several corps 
of the army were also far in the rear, and that all, 
whether present or absent, required supplies, reorgan- 
ization and instruction. 

The condition of the enemy had also undergone 
changes, quite as important as our own, but of a 
character altogether different. In acquiring Detroit, 
he had become possessed of a fortress, much more 
defensible than Maiden ; and in the general issue 
of the campaign, had completely re-established the 
allegiance and services of his militia. In 

receiving the submission of Michigan, he had ac- 
quired the command of such supplies as that terri- 
tory could furnish, and of as much of the personal 
labor of its inhabitants, as was necessary to military 
purposes ; and lastly, in securing the attachment of 
the Indian tribes, he had obtained an ally, of all 



82 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

Others the most important to him, and formidable 
to us. 

That circumstances, thus multiplied and impor- 
tant, all forbidding a prosecution of the prescribed 
plan of campaign, and all pointing distinctly to the 
safer, the shorter and more efficient plan of a joint 
operation of naval and military means, in the spring, 
were either overlooked or underrated by the cabinet, 
is not to be doubted ; but of this apology, the com- 
manding General has deprived himself by his own 
written acknowledgments; for in a letter of the 4th 
of January, 1813, he says, "The experience of a 
few days, was sufficient to convince me, that the 
supplies of provision could not be procured for an 
autumnal advance ; and if even this difficulty was 
removed, another of equal magnitude existed, in 
the want of artillery." ^ On another occasion, he 
says, " A suspension of the operations of this army 
for the winter, without having accomplished the 
principal objects for which it was embodied, is an 
event, which has been long looked for by well-in- 
formed men, who know the character of the country 
and recollect, that the army of General Wayne, 
after a whole summer's preparation, was unable to 
advance more than seventy miles from the Ohio ; 
and that the prudent caution of President Washing- 
ton had directed it to be placed in winter quarters, at 
the very season when our arrangements were beginning.''''^ 



1 Harrison's official letter of the 4th January, 1813. 

2 Letter of the 8th of January, 1813. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 83 

On another occasion, he says, " From my know- 
ledge of the cost of transportation, I do believe that 
the expense, that will be incurred in the course of 
six weeks in the spring, in moving the provisions of 
the army along the roads leading from the Rapids 
to Detroit, would build and equip all the vessels 
necessary to give us the command of the lake ;"^ 
to which, in a subsequent letter, he adds, — " If a 
small proportion of the sums that will be expended 
in the Quartermaster's department, in an active pro- 
secution of the campaign during the winter, was 
devoted to obtaining the command of Lake Erie, 
the wishes of the government, in their utmost ex- 
tent, could be accomplished without difficulty, in 
the months of April and May. Maiden, Detroit, 
and Mackinaw, would fall in rapid succession." 

With such decided convictions of what was wrong, 
in the plan he was pursuing, and of Vvhat would 
be right, in the measure he suggests as its sub- 
stitute, we certainly had reason to expect, that the 
General, possessing as he did, a carte blanche for 
conducting the war, would have instantly aban- 
doned his crusade upon the elements and the trea- 
sury; taken a new and better frontier on the eastern 
side of the swampy region ; retained barely troops 
enough to occupy and defend it during the winter, 
t.nd dismissed without farther ceremony or hesita- 
tion, the mass of his militia to their own firesides. 
Or, if failing to do this, that he would, at least, 



84 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

have made a prompt and full disclosure of the prin- 
cipal facts connected with the case, and of his own 
impressions under them, without the smallest ad- 
mixture of other matter, having a tendency to neu- 
tralize their effects and keep up a false confidence 
in a mode of operating, which he thought so ob- 
viously wrong. 

Had he pursued either of these courses, he would 
have acted wisely and deserved well of his country; 
but unfortunately he pursued neither. The hope- 
less business of transportation was kept up, not 
merely until its follies and abuses became apparent 
to all, but until it had actually ceased to be practi- 
cable in any possible Avay ; until two teams had 
become necessary to carry the forage for a third ;^ 
until two trips, from one blockhouse to another, 
were sufficient to destroy a whole brigade of pack- 
horses ; until the whole route was marked with the 
wrecks of carriages and their lading, abandoned by 
their drivers and given up to destruction ; until the 
creeks and rivers had become as impracticable for 
boats, as the roads were for carts and wagons ; and 
lastly, (notwithstanding these wasteful and injudi- 
cious efforts,) until his advanced corps, though not 
now exceeding one thousand men, were literally 
starving in his front, and " compelled to subsist 
from the 10th to the 22d of December, on bad beef 
and the boiled roots of the hickory-tree.'"^ 



1 General Harrison's letter of the 22d December, 1812. 
S McAffee, p. 184, 5. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 85 

Nor will the time, or the manner, selected by the 
General for disclosing his opinions and convictions 
to the government, be more likely to satisfy an 
impartial inquirer ; for though these, as we have 
seen, were matured as early as the last of Septem- 
ber, or beginning of October, 1812, they were not 
communicated until the December or January fol- 
lowing ; and when they did make their appearance, 
were accompanied by so much that shook their 
authority and even led to opposite conclusions, that 
the cabinet, not inexpert at deciphering military 
diplomacy, and peculiarly shy of incurring any re- 
sponsibility it could avoid, determined (with perhaps 
less of patriotism than of prudence) to leave the 
question of continuing the winter campaign exclu- 
sively with the General ; who, appearing to hold two 
opinions on the subject, and being already vested 
with full authority for deciding between them, 
would, it was presumed, select that, which under 
all circumstances, would be the safest and best.* 

But if Mr. Harrison's conduct was culpable in 
adhering to a campaign, forbidden alike by political 
and physical reasons, the course he adopted in prose- 
cuting it, was not less open to censure, in a military 
view ; as in this, he scrupled not to violate the 
plainest and most important maxims of the art he 
professed ; and, with a uniformity, indicating either 
an entire ignorance of their existence, or an utter 
contempt for their authority. Of these maxims, we 

1 McAfFee, p. 190. 



86 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

subjoin the following, with a few brief remarks, 
applying them to the cases to which we refer. 

1st. " Of all military operations, winter campaigns 
are the most to be condemned ; because, most de- 
structive to health, temper, habiliments and equip- 
ments. The best troops cannot long sustain them." 
Yet did General Harrison institute a Avinter cam- 
paign, though left by the government to choose 
between that, and one in the spring; and though 
affecting to consider the former as doubtful, if not 
dangerous, and the latter as safe, economical and 
efficient — thus virtually convicting himself of omit- 
ting to do what he believed to be right, and of 
actually doing what he knew to be wrong. 

2d. "Every military expedition ought to have 
a useful and important object ; for without such, 
however successful it may be, it will be fruitless ; 
and of course, a mere waste of time, treasure and 
life." By the General's letter of the 12th Decem- 
ber, 1812, we find, that "the sole object he could 
certainly promise to accomplish, was tlie recapture of 
Detroit," of whicli he says, "this will be worse than 
useless, so long as the enemy hold Maiden in my 
rear, and Sandwich in my front; as from the former, 
he can intercept my supplies ; and from the latter, 
by a shower of shot and shells, compel me to hide 
the army, for its preservation, in the adjacent 
swamps." Yet did the General prosecute a cam- 
paign, having this worthless object, and such dan- 
gerous consequences ! 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 87 

3(1. " In ofTcnsive war, a single line of operation 
is to be preferred; as it keeps your forces in a state 
that best enables you to make, or to repel attacks." 
The General, in his wisdom, came to a different 
conclusion ; and accordingly, instead of keeping his 
force together, divided it into three corps. 

4th- " Other things being equal, the shortest 
line of operation i« the best, as it most economizes 
time and money, and oilers to your enemy the fewest 
opportunities for attack or annoyance." Hull's road 
would have best satisfied the demands of this rule, 
as its distance to the point of rendezvous was less, 
and its central position the safest. Yet to this route, 
was assigned the smallest and least efficient of the 
three corps. 

5th. "Double, or multiplied lines, are only to be 
employed when your enemy has committed the 
error of forming similar lines exterior to yours." 
But as in this case, Proctor committed no such 
fault, the reasor), which could alone justify the 
General's arrangement, did not exist. 

Gi\i. " Double, or multiplied lines, whenever 
adopted, should be kept within sustaining distance 
of each other ; and to this end, their movements 
must be simultaneous." This maxim, of the first 
importance in itself, was wholly disregarded ; as the 
General's lines were so far apart, and so deficient 
in the ordinary means of communication, as in a 
military sense to be completely isolated. Nor was 
the last injunction of the rule better observed than 
the first ; as Winchester's march from Defiance to 



88 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

the Rapids, was made without any corresponding 
movement on the part of either Tupper or Harrison. 

7th. " Military magazines should invariably be 
formed in the rear of the army they are intended to 
supply. If established in its front, they invite attacks 
from the enemy ; and if captured or destroyed, com- 
pel an immediate retreat." Instead, however, of 
acting on this rule, the General's constant effort and 
greatest care, was to accumulate a million of rations 
at the Rapids, forty miles in front of his central 
column, and seventy in front of his right wing, and 
without other protection than Winchester's corps, 
now reduced by disease or fatigue to eight or nine 
hundred combatants, destitute alike of fortifications 
and artillery, and but fifty miles distant from the 
enemy's main body.^ 

8th. " On a rigid maintenance of discipline, will 
depend the safety of the country, the preservation 
of the arnry, and the successful prosecution of any 
enterprise in which it may be employed." This 
maxim is so universally known, and so generally 
admtted, as to render unnecessary any new illustra- 
tion of it. It but remains, tlierefore, to inquire, how 
far this sine qua non of successful war, was attended 
to by General Harrison ? On beginning his career, 
this ofiicer unfortunately adopted a theory with re- 
gard to western militia which, though it sufficiently 
answered his purpose of displacing a senior officer 
and securing to himself the command of the army, 
operated very mischievously on the public interests, 

I Appendix, No. 7, 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 89 

In his letter to the War Department, of the 3d of 
September, 1812, he says, "The backwoodsmen are 
a singular people. They are susceptible [capable 
he probably meant] of the most heroic achievements ; 
but they must be taken in tlieir own way. From 
their affection and attachment, every thing is to be 
expected ; but I will venture to say, that they never 
did, nor ever will perform any thing brilliant under 
a stranger." All which, when translated into plain 
Enghsh, amounts to tliis — the men of the west ac- 
knowledge no principle of obedience, stronger or 
safer, than that of personal attachment to their chief. 
With them, respect for the government, reverence 
for the laws, sensibility to the national interest, and 
even a decent regard to their own characters, avail 
nothing, unless to all these be superadded, the ap- 
pointment of a leader " who will take them in their 
own way" — or in other words, who will gratify their 
whims, yield to their opinions, overlook their follies, 
and connive at their faults. 

We need hardly remark, that a creed like this, 
founded on an assumed insubordination on the part 
of the troops, and an unavoidable compliance on that 
of the General, is incompatible with every thing de- 
serving the name of discipline ; and will never fail 
to terminate in waste, peculation, disorder, and de- 
feat. Nor w^ere its effects different on the present 
occasion, as may be seen by recurring to many of 
the incidents mentioned in the text ; and still more 
distinctly by the following extracts, made from the 
General's official correspondence ; from McAffee's 
8* 



90 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

history of the war in the west ;^ and lastly, from the 
journal of the late Colonel Wood of the Engineer 
corps. In a letter of the 12th of December, to the 
War Department, when assigning the reasons why 
he did not sooner apprize the government of the im* 
pediments that obstructed his progress, he says — 
" Though I was always sensible that there were 
great difficulties to be encountered, &c., I did not 
make sufficient allowance for the imbecility and inex- 
perience of public agents, and the villany of the con- 
tractors." In the second letter of the 25th of January, 
m attempting to explain, why, after censuring Win- 
chester so freely for hazarding Lewis's movement 
on Frenchtown, he directed that officer to hold the 
position "a^ any rate^^ he says, "I am persuaded that 
nothing but a reiterated order would have produced 
obedience on the part of the troops."^ To these 
sentiments. Wood's Journal is an echo. " In the 
use of the axe, the mattock, and the spade," says 
the Engineer, " consisted the chief military knowl- 
edge of our army." And again : — speaking of 
Lewis's expedition and the arrangement of the 
troops at Frenchtown, he adds — " Not the least re- 
gard was paid to defence, order, regularity, or sys- 
tem, in posting the diffisrent corps." The historian, 
however, is still more frank in his confessions, 
than the General or the Engineer, for according to 

1 Report says, this work was principally founded on documents 
furnished and revised by the General, with a view to his biography. 

2 If such would have been the effect of a second order, why 
hesitate to give it \ 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 91 

him, — " Chaos and misconduct reigned in every de- 
partment, and particularly in that of the supplies; in 
which the best organization and arrangements were 
necessary to meet the inconceivable difficulties which 
were to be surmounted in that line. The General 
had excellent materials for an army in the Kentucky 
militia ; but he had no time to spend in preparing 
them for the field. ^ The only persons that could be 
procured as packhorse-drivers were, generally, the 
most worthless creatures in society ; who neither 
took care of the horses, nor of the goods with which 
they were intrusted. The horses were of course soon 
broke down, and many of the packs lost. The teams 
hired to haul, were also commonly valued so high 
in coming into service, that the owners were willing 
to drive them to debility and death, to get the price ; 
and in addition to this, no bills of lading were used, 
or accounts kept, with the wagoners ; of course, 
each had an opportunity to plunder the public with- 
out much risk of detection."^ 

9tli. "The General who divides his forces, will 
be beaten in detail. Officers who have neglected 
this rule, have generally paid a heavy penalty for 
doing so. Never, therefore, when acting offensively, 
make a detachment." In the wisdom and authority 
of this maxim, the General appeared to concur ; as 
he more than once asserts, that he "made it a rule, 
never to hazard a detachment that was not in itself 
sufficiently strong to resist the whole force of the 

I McAffee, p. 141. 2 Idem, p. 184. 



92 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

enemy." If, however, we test this assertion by 
facts, we shall soon discover that, in this respect, 
the General has greatly over-rated his own discre- 
tion ; and that his actual conduct, so far from ob- 
serving the rule by which he says he was always 
governed, was often a direct violation of it. 

We have already detailed the progress and for- 
tunes of three detachments, made under his direction, 
viz., Tupper's two attempts on the Rapids, and that 
of Campbell against the Missisineway villages ; all 
of which failed to accomplish the objects prescribed 
to them, either from the deficient number of the 
party, (as in the case of Campbell) or from the in- 
competency of the leader, as in that of Tupper. In 
these instances, therefore, Mr. Harrison was no strict 
observer of his own rule ; nor will his general plan 
be found to be better conformed to it, than his occa- 
sional practice ; for, from the moiTient he divided his 
army into three corps, and so placed these as to 
render mutual support impracticable, he virtually 
converted them into detachments of the worst kind; 
and of course, subjected them to all the evils incident 
to subdivision, and himself, to all the censi re attach- 
ing to so great an error. 

10th. " When the head of your line of operation 
is carried near to your enemy's principal station, it 
ought to be carefully strengthened ; for if it be weak, 
he will certainly attack and probably destroy it." 
Such, however, was not the General's opinion ; since, 
far from strengthening Winchester, when approach- 
ing the enemy, he would have taken two regiments 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 93 

from him, and tlius reduced the advanced corps to 
four or five hundred men.^ 

Conduct hke this, could only be justified by one 
or more of the following reasons ; that the strength 
of the whole army was so small, as to forbid an aug- 
mentation of any particular part ; that the objects 
to be gained or secured, by re-enforcing the advanced 
guard, were comparatively unimportant ; that the 
state of the roads and weather, rendered the move- 
ment of troops impracticable ; or, that the enemy's 
demonstrations, against other and important parts 
of the line, not only made a diminution from their 
strength improper, but justified a recall of a part of the 
vanguard, for the purpose of strengthening the naen- 
aced points. Unfortunately for the General, every 
fact here assumed, is without a shadow of foundation. 
The nominal force of the army amounted to ten 
thousand men ; and its eflfective or disposable force, 
to six or seven thousand.^ The object to be attained, 
(by re-enforcing Winchester) was of the highest im- 
portance, as well in itself, as in its consequences; 
being nothing less than the security of the million 
of rations, collected and collecting at the Rapids; 
and without which, in the General's opinion, tlie 
expedition must fail. The weather and roads, far 
from presenting any serious obstruction, were, during 
twenty days of December, peculiarly favorable ;^ 

I Appendix, No. 7. 2 McAffee's History. 

3 Letter from General Harrison to the War Department, of the 4th 
of January, 1813. 



94 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

Qor was there any thing in the movements of the 
enemy alarming to other parts of the line. It would 
be unjust to Mr. Harrison not to add, that he made 
no attempt to exculpate his conduct on either of 
these grounds ; and had he been equally prudent 
in forbearing to employ the defence he actually set 
up, it would have furnished, at least, one occasion 
for speaking favorabl}^ of his discretion. But what 
can we tliink of the capacity of a General, who, 
when the magazines necessary to his own eventual 
success were in jeopardy, could seriously wish to 
send back one half of the small corps employed in 
their protection ? And for what purpose 1 For a 
pitiful saving, arising from the mere difference be- 
tween contract and commissariat prices, to be made 
on the few rations necessary to the subsistence of 
five or six hundred men !^ 

11th. "Every position, taken b}^ an advanced 
corps in the face of an enemy's army, (if too weak 
to defend itself) should be promptly abandoned, or 
speedily re-enforced and fortified." And again : — 
"No advanced corps should be hazarded, beyond 
sustaining distance from its own army." Inatten- 
tion to these two rules, was no doubt the proximate 
cause of the disaster at French town, and the subse- 
quent defeat of the campaign. For, who will be hardy 
enough to assert, that if (after the affair of the 18th) 
Winchester's corps had been withdrawn, or his posi- 

1 McAffee, p. 193. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 95 

tion re-enforced and fortified : or lastly, if Harrison 
had been within sustaining distance of it, the loss 
and disgrace suffered on the 22dj would not have 
been avoided 1 ^ 

The first notice of the expedition to Frenchtown, 
reached the commanding General on the 16th. Its 
effects on him and the troops he commanded, is thus 
described by the late Colonel Wood. — " This news, 
for a moment, paralyzed the army, or at least, the 
thinking part of it ; for no one could imagine that 
it was possible for him [Winchester] to be guilty of 
such a hazardous step. General Harrison was as- 
tonished at the imprudence and inconsistency of 
such a measure ; which, if carried into execution, 
could be viewed in no other light, than as attended 
with certain and inevitable destruction to the left 
wing. Nor was it diflScult for any one to foresee 
and predict the terrible conseqaences which were 
sure to mark the result of a scheme, no less rash in 
its conception than hazardous in its execution.'"^ 
What then, we ask, under convictions thus full and 
distinct, of the folly and danger of the enterprise, 
was the duty of the commanding General ? Un- 
questionabl}^, to prevent the movement if possible ; 
and if not, to recall the detachment without a mo- 
ment's delay. Yet were both entirely omitted ! No 
order, forbidding the expedition, was given by Har- 

1 Appendix, No. 9, affidavit of Governor Madison, &c 
S McAffee's History p. 228. 



96 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

rison ; nor after his arrival at the Rapids on the 20th, 
did any issue for recaUing the troops. On the con- 
trary, he on that day, despatched his Inspector- 
General with an order to Winchester, " to hold fast 
the position at any rate,''^ or in other words, at every 
risk, — thus making himself entirely responsible, for 
whatever consequences might follow. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812, 97 



CHAPTER IV. 

operations on the Niagara. — Partial Armistice. — Renewal of hostilities. 
— Van Rensselaer's attack on Gluecnstown. — Smyth's invasion of 
Canada. — Dearborn's Campaign against the British advanced posts 
on Lake Champlain. 

We have already stated, that to lessen the pres- 
sure made upon Hull, and to reinstate the ascen- 
dency he had lost on the Detroit, Major-General 
Dearborn, who, in the distribution of service for the 
year 1813, had been assigned to the command of the 
northern army, was directed to make such move- 
ments against the British posts in his front, as would 
have the effect of preventing them from re-enforcing 
the garrison of Maiden ; or otherwise altering the 
relations as to strength, which had hitherto existed 
between Hull and Proctor. But for this service, 
the Major-General had made no preparation, and ap- 
peared to have little relish ;^ as on the very day on 
which he was thus instructed by the government, 

1 In the General's letter of tire 8th of August, we find an apology for 
this inaction, quite as unjustifiable as tlie inaction itself — " Till nota," 
he says, "I did not consider the Niagara frontier as coming witliin the 
limits of my command," — an assertion directly contradicted by the 
armistice entered into between him and Provost, and utterly inconsis- 
tent with the orders he received, from the 26th of June, to the 1st of 
August For these orders, see Appendix, Nos. 10 and 14. 
9 



98 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

(though sufficiently apprised that detachments had 
been sent to Maiden, and that the situation of Hull 
was becoming" more critical every moment) he did 
not hesitate to enter into an armistice, by which he 
completely disabled himself from giving any aid to 
that officer ; either by vigorously assailing the British 
posts in his front, (now rendered comparatively weak 
by the absence of Brock and the troops carried with 
him,) or by extending to him or his army, the ben- 
efits of the temporary suspension of hostilities into 
v/hich he had entered. Nor did this extraordinary 
policy, on the part of the General, stop here — for 
though promptly informed, that the arrangement he 
had made was disapproved by the President, and 
though peremptorily ordered to put an end to it as 
speedily as possible, he notwithstanding, continued 
its operation till the 29th of August ; thus enabling 
Brock, not only to consummate his victory on the 
Detroit, but to lead back his detachment and re- 
establish his defences on the Niagara.^ 

It would be a mere waste of time to inquire into 
the motives of the British commander, in proposing 
an arrangement, productive of such decided advan- 
tage to himself and his army f but why the Amer- 
ican General should have consented to it, in the first 



1 Brock left York on the 5th of August ; arrived at Maiden on the 
13th; received Hull's surrender on the 15th; returned to his post 
on the Niagara, on the 25th ; visited York on tlie 27th ; and early 
in October was again at Fort George, playing off liis artifices on 
General Van Rensselaer. 

2 For tlie use made of the armistice by Provost, see Appendix, No. 1 1. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 99 

instance, or continued it in the second, contrary to 
the express orders of his government 1 are problems 
less easily solved. Two official solutions have, how- 
ever, been given of them, which it is our duty to 
commemorate ; and which, if they do not instruct, 
can hardly fail to amuse the reader. According to 
that of the Secretary of War, the General had only 
mistaken a private, for a public letter ; and presum- 
ing that it contained some new and important over- 
ture on the subject of peace, hastened to adopt the 
preliminary measure of an armistice. But however 
well this solution may account for the General's first 
step in the business, it entirely fails to explain the 
second ; wliicli must have been made with a full 
knowledge, that his mountain had not even pro- 
duced a mouse, and that the despatch to which he 
had ascribed so much importance, had neither been, 
nor was intended to be, communicated to the Amer- 
ican Government. To supply, therefore, this obvious 
defect in the Secretary's explanation, we must recur 
to that of the General, who in a letter of the 27th 
of August, lets us into the secret that the ruse was 
altogether on his side ; that it was now in full ope- 
ration, and [though it might have deprived him 
of the power of saving Hull, or of capturing the 
enemy's posts in his front] was not to be either 
too much undervalued, or hastily given up ; " as he 
had yet on hand some useful stores which must be 
forwarded to Sacket's Harbor."* 

I Dearborn's letters of the 9th and 20th of August, 1812. 



100 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

But the time had now arrived, when something- 
more important than the transportation of puncheons 
and packages, was expected from an army impatient 
of longer inactivity ; and loudly, if not seriously, 
demanding an opportunity of meeting the enemy 
in the field. To this ostensible ardor, the gallant 
and successful enterprise of Lieutenant Elliot of the 
navy, (aided by Captain Towson and a detachment 
of the army) in capturing two armed brigs of the 
enemy under the guns of Fort Erie, gave a new and 
increased impulse ; approaching so nearly to a state 
of insubordination on the part of the militia, that 
motives of personal safety and reputation, no less 
than those derived from a sense of public duty, made 
a compliance with it indispensable.^ Major-General 
Van Rensselaer, (the local commanding officer) hav- 
ing accordingly made such preparations as he deemed 
necessary ; and having besides assured himself, that 
" General Brock had again set out for Maiden with 
a considerable re-enforcement,"^ selected the morn- 
ing of the 11th of October, for making an attack on 
Queenstown — a small village on the Canada side 
of the strait, defended by three batteries, a few artil- 
lerists, two companies of the 49th British regiment, 
and a small detachment of York volunteers. 

The corps designated for this service, and princi- 
pally composed of militia, assembled punctually and 
in good order, at the place of rendezvous ; and with 

1 General Van Rensselaer's report of October 14th, 1812. 
S Idem. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 101 

the exception of the weather, which was wet and 
windy, every thing wore a propitious aspect. But 
when, after long and patiently abiding the pelting 
of a north-easterly storm, the embarcation was or- 
dered, and the boats called for, none were found to 
be in readiness ; and on inquiry, it was discovered, 
that the person having charge of them, had not only 
withdrawn himself, but had carried with him all the 
oars, necessary for the service. For this unexpected 
occurrence, there was no remedy but patience ; the 
expedition was accordingly suspended, and the troops 
sent back to their cantonments. 

On the 13th, the project was renewed, without 
any essential change in relation to its object, or the 
mode of obtaining it. The former, continued to be 
the mere expulsion of the enemy from Queenstown, 
and the occupation of that village, " as a covering 
for the American army against the inclemency of 
the weather ;"^ while the latter, proposed only a 
hardy attack on that portion of the enem3^'s line of 
defence, which confronted the American camp at 
Lewistown. To effect these purposes, a corps of six 
hundred infantr)'^, composed in equal parts of regular 
troops and militia, commanded by Lieutenant-Colo- 
nels Van Rensselaer and Christie, were, under cover 
of the night, to cross the Niagara and carry the bat- 
teries by assault ; after which, the residue of the 
army was to follow and occupy the heights and the 
village. 

In prosecution of this plan, the infantry selected 

for the attack, assembled at the lower, or old French 
lApp. No. 25. 9 * 



102 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

Ferry, near Lewistown, aljout four o'clock, A. M. ; 
when, notwithstanding the recent admonition on the 
subject of boats, it was found that those provided for 
the present occasion, " were insufficient to transport 
more than three hundred men at a single trip."^ 
Two companies of the 13th United States regiment, 
formhig the right of the line, and commanded by 
Captains Armstrong and Malcom, were the first em- 
barked ; and from good fortune and skilful pilotage, 
were able to reach the opposite shore without either 
annoyance or discovery. Other and smaller parts 
of the same regiment followed, and with equal suc- 
cess, until the whole number who had made good 
their landing, amounted to somewhat more than one 
hundred combatants; v/hen it was deemed advisable 
to quit the shore, and take a position on the first or 
river bank, and there await the arrival of the resid- 
uary part of the corps. In executing this movement, 
noises which could not be entirely avoided, reached 
the British sentinels on the heights, and produced an 
hnmediate and general alarm. A random cannon- 
ade, on the course of the Ferry and place of American 
embarcation, followed ; while the two flank com- 
panies of the 49th and the York militia, forming the 
garrison of the post, concentrated their fire (from 
different parts of the hill) on the ground occupied by 
the American detachment, and with so much effect, 
that every commissioned officer belonging to it was 
in a few minutes either killed or wounded.^ Lieuten- 

1 Appendix, No. 12. 2 Idem. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 103 

ant-Colonel Van Rensselaer, who had accompanied 
this party, though among the latter and suffering 
seyerely, was yet able to stand ; and from a first and 
hasty consideration of the case, directed the men to 
withdraw, and shelter themselves under the bank ; 
but soon perceiving that a position of this kind was 
not less dangerous than the former, and wholly in- 
efficient as regarded the enemy, he hastened to issue 
the wiser and more military order, that "all such as 
could move, should immediately mount the hill and 
storm the batteries." Captains Ogilvie and Wool 
of the 13th, (the former of whom had about this 
time crossed the river,) promptly undertook the exe- 
cution of this order, and ascending the heights, 
turned the British position, seized the battery,^ and 
drove the covering party (composed of the two flank 
companies of the 49th) into a strong stone building 
near the water's edge. From this fortress, the com- 
panies soon after, made two or more vigorous, but 
unsuccessful efforts, to recover the ground they had 
lost ; in the last of which, the gallant Brock was 
fated to fall : — a circumstance which, for the mo- 
ment, gave tlie American party full and undisturbed 
possession of the heights of Queenstown. 

During the pause that now followed in the com- 
bat, several attempts were made to carry over from 
the American camp, supplies necessary to the furtlier 
prosecution of the general plan ; but so few and in- 
sufficient were the means provided for the purpose, 

1 This battery was a redan, — open in the rear, by which the assail- 
ants entered. 



104 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

and SO disorderly the employment of such as did 
exist, that the effects expected from them were very 
inadequately produced. Of artillery, but one gun 
could be brought to the west side of the river ; of 
ammunition, but a small quantity ; and of entrench- 
ing tools, all Avere forgotten and left at the place of 
embarcation. Nor was the transportation of the 
army, more successful than that of the supplies. 
Two detachments of the 6th, 13th and 23d regiments 
of infantry, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Christie and 
Major Mullany, found means to cross, ^ and Avere 
soon followed by Brigadier-General Wadsworth and 
a small battalion of militia ; but the mass of this 
latter description of force was immoveable. Neither 
entreaty nor threats — neither arguments nor ridicule 
availed any thing. They had seen enough of war, 
to satisfy them that it made no part of their special 
calling ; and at last, not disdaining to employ the 
mask, invented by faction to cover cowardice or 
treason, fifteen hundred able-bodied men, well armed 
and equipped, who a week before boasted loudly of 
patriotism and prowess, were now found openly plead- 
ing constitutional scruples, in justification of disobe- 
dience to the lawful authority of their chief ! 

While this degrading scene was going forward on 
the eastern bank of the river, occurrences no less in- 
teresting, but of a character somewhat different, were 
taking place on the western. Between two and three 
o'clock, P. M., a scattering fire was heard on the 
southern side of the heights, produced by an Indian 

I Appendix, No. 12. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 105 

attack made on a small party of straggling militia ; 
who being completely surprised, fled in great con- 
fusion, and carrying their panic along with them, 
threatened to extend the infection to other corps. It 
was at this critical moment that Lieutenant-Colonel 
Scott of the second regiment of artillery, placing him- 
self at the head of a few platoons of regular troops, 
charged the savages with a gallantry which soon 
checked, and at length drove them into a neigh- 
boring wood ; where the combat became nearly sta- 
tionary, and a mere trial of skill at sharp-shooting. 
Perceiving that a champ de battaille like this, secured 
to the Indians all the advantages of their habitual 
and peculiar mode of fighting ; while to his own 
troops it produced effects directly the reverse, the 
Lieutenant-Colonel prudently withdrew his party to 
the open ground ; and there took a position wliich, 
though it did not entirely put an end to the attack, 
made it too inefficient, longer to disturb the order of 
the American line. 

A discovery was, however, soon made, that the 
savages were not the only enemy the invading corps 
would have to contend with. From the heights of 
Queenstown, in the distance eastward, was now seen 
advancing a column of artillery and infantry. Its 
approach, though slow and circumspect, was steady 
and unremitting ; and of its character and objects 
there could be no doubts. About three o'clock, P. M., 
General Sheafe, the successor of Brock and leader 
of the colunm, after turning the village and throw- 
ing into it a detachment competent to its defence, 



106 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

presented himself and a force of eight hundred regu- 
lars, militia and Indians, in front of the American 
line — now reduced to less than three hundred com- 
batants, and sustained but by a single piece of artil 
lery, badly supplied with ammunition. In this state 
of things, a note was received from General Van 
Rensselaer, advising an immediate retreat, and pro- 
mising, on his part, the utmost exertion in furnishing 
the necessary boats and a covering lire, during the 
passage of the river ; but, at the same time, leaving 
to Wadsworth (the senior officer on the field) entire 
liberty to follow the dictates of his own judgment 
on the occasion. Tiiis note was immediately com- 
municated to the conuuandants of the different corps, 
and their opinions on the subject requested; but 
without producing a decision, either for or against, 
the proposed measure. The B.ritish commander in 
the meantime continued to manoeuvre from right to 
left, and from left to right; countermarching nearly 
the whole length of the American line twice, as if 
determined to count every man in the ranks, and to 
make himself familiar with every foot of the position, 
before he hazarded an attack. This deliberation on 
his part gave time for renewed councils on that of 
his adversary ; and a second consultation being held, 
a determination was at last taken to try the experi- 
ment of a retreat, as recommended by General Van 
Rensselaer. 

To have executed successfully, a purpose of this 
kind, in the face of an enemy so much more formi- 
dable than themselves, in numbers, discipline and 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 107 

variety of arms, would have been no easy task for 
soldiers the most practised, and officers the most 
skilful ; but was y»erfectly hopeless, when required 
from American levies, who had seen only an imper- 
fect service of three or four months. The result 
was such as might have been, and probably was 
anticipated by the reflecting portion of the corps ; 
the first step taken in retreat, produced a movement 
on the part of the enemy, which at once converted 
the march into a route ; and (superadded to the 
fact, that not a boat was found on the shore ready 
to receive them) made necessary an immediate and 
unconditional surrender. 

General Van Rensselaer, disgusted with the con- 
duct of the militia, and perhaps not entirely satisfied 
with his own, withdrew from service, about the 18th 
of October ; when the command of the Niagara or 
central army, as it was now called, devolved on 
Brigadier-General Smyth ; an officer, from whose 
patriotic and professional pretensions, the multitude 
had drawn many favorable conclusions. Nor was 
the estimate made of his military character by the 
government, more correct ; as it took for granted, 
a temperament, bold, ardent and enterprising, and 
requiring only restriction to render it useful. In 
the orders given for the regulation of his conduct, 
he was accordingly forbidden to make any new at- 
tempt at invasion, with a force "less than three 
thousand combatants, or with means of transporta- 
tion (across the Niagara) insufficient to carry over 
simultaneously the whole of that number." 



108 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

The interval between the 26th of October and 
27th of November, was usefully employed m getting 
together and preparing the necessary number of 
boats, and such increase of physical force, as would 
enable the new commander entirely to fulfil the 
cautious policy prescribed to him by the govern- 
ment. Having at the last of these dates, sufficiently 
secured both objects, as he believed, he issued an 
order, that the army should assemble early on the 
28th, at Black Rock, for the purpose of entering on 
the projected invasion. Nor was there any thing 
in the state of the weather, or of the river, or in the 
force and condition of the enemy, seriously to ob- 
struct the execution of this design. Tlie width of 
the Niagara from Black Rock to the Canada shore, 
does not exceed a mile — a distance ordinarily passed 
in a few minutes ; the weather was clear and cool, 
not cold ; the outposts of the enemy few and feeble, 
and too remote from forts Erie and Chippewa, to be 
promptly sustained by the garrison of either ; and 
of course offering to the invading army an opportu- 
nity of breaking down in succession, any detach- 
ments sent to their support. Such was not, however, 
the view of the subject taken by the General ; for 
besides, that no man had more thoroughly convinced 
himself that the " better part of valor is discretion," 
he had on this occasion, made a special promise 
" not to be beaten," ^ and to fulfil this engagement, 
determined to risk only a night-attack, with two 

1 Smyth's letter to Dearborn, of the 30th October, 1812. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 109 

small detachments, which, whether successful or not, 
should terminate the enterprise by a hasty retreat 
to their own shore. 

In pursuance of this plan. Captain King of the 
fourteenth United States regiment, with one hun- 
dred and fifty regular infantry, and seventy seamen, 
led by Lieutenant Angus, was despatched about 
midnight of the 27th, with orders to attack and 
carry the British posts at the Red House ; while 
Lieutenant - Colonel Boerstler, with two hundred 
rank and file of the same regiment, was instructed 
to land near the mouth of Frenchman's Creek ; 
assail the guard posted at that place, and destroy 
the bridge necessary to a communication between 
forts Erie and Chippewa. From bad pilotage, or 
some of the untoward accidents which often befall 
night movements, neither party succeeded in carry- 
ing over its whole force. Of King's ten boats, but 
four reached the point of attack designated for them. 
In these, were the seventy seamen and an equal 
number of infantry, who landed under a shower of 
grape and musket shot. The former, unaccus- 
tomed to the order of military movements, and re- 
quiring only to be told where the enemy was, rushed 
forward with their habitual gallantry and appropriate 
weapons, (pikes and cutlasses,) and after a short but 
sanguinary contest, carried the position, made sev- 
eral prisoners, threw two pieces of artillery and their 
caissons into the river, and set fire to the building. 

During these occurrences. King with his infantry 
was not idle. Directing his march on the two exte- 

10 



110 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

rior batteries, which the enemy yet held, he gallantly 
carried the lower by storm ; and on reaching the 
upper, found it hastily abandoned. After spiking 
the cannon and destroying the carriages of both, it 
but remained to fulfil the last injunction of his orders 
— assemble his party, and recross the river. But to 
his great surprise, neither on his retrograde march 
to the shore, nor on his arrival there, was any thing 
to be seen of Lieutenant Angus, the seamen, or the 
boats. All had disappeared, and he now found him- 
self in a situation the most painful to a soldier — 
that of encountering a sudden and unavoidable dan- 
ger, against which skill and courage could avail 
nothing. An accident, however, tended to mitigate 
the evil ; for in seeking his own craft, he found two 
of the enemy's, in which he despatched as many of 
his party as the boats would hold, but refusing to 
abandon the remainder, he and they were soon after 
made prisoners of war. 

The explanation of this unfortunate circumstance, 
offers a new proof of the perils of night movements ; 
and of the great inexperience of our best officers, at 
that period of the war, in this branch of military 
service. After the seamen, as already stated, had 
carried the first object of attack, (not knowing what 
direction had been given to the infantry of the 
detachment, and no signal of retreat having been 
agreed upon,) they hastened to the shore, with the 
wounded of their own party, and the prisoners they 
had made ; when finding but four boats of the ten, 
(with which the enterprise began,) and these with- 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. Ill 

out a guard, and ignorant of the fact, that this 
number only had made good their landing, Lieu- 
tenant Angus concluded, and not unreasonably, that 
Captain King had anticipated him in the retreat ; 
and accordingly embarking his party, returned to 
the Navy-Yard, near Black Rock. 

Bo^rstler's adventures, on this occasion, had in 
them little of interest, with respect either to what 
vv^as done, or what was suffered. Mistaking some- 
what the point of attack, he effected his landing 
with three boats out of seven, and without the loss 
of a man. The British guard being a small one 
and soon routed, the pursuit was continued towards 
the bridge, (the destruction of which formed the 
principal object of this part of the enterprise,) but 
being now informed by a prisoner, that " Ormsby 
was in full march, and nearly approaching it," the 
Colonel contented himself with detaching a Lieu- 
tenant and a few men, to effect its destruction ; and 
retiring with the mass of his party to the shore, 
entered his boats, and recrossed to Squaw Island. 
The return of both Angus and Boerstler, in a total 
ignorance of what had befallen their comrades of 
the expedition, could not fail to create much disqui- 
etude in the army ; and induced Colonel Winder to 
offer himself, with another small party, to go in quest 
of them. But on approaching the Canada shore, 
and finding the British batteries re-established and 
sustained by a body of infantry, he returned to 
Black Rock, with a loss of six killed and twenty- 
two wounded. 



112 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

The result of the enterprise, though sufficiently 
indicative of the error committed, in departing from 
the letter, as well as the spirit of the orders given 
by the government, had no tendency to quicken the 
General's appetite for a second experiment, upon a 
larger and more efficient scale. He even now be- 
gan to doubt, whether the force present and willing 
to co-operate with him, amounted to the number 
prescribed by his orders as necessary to invasion; 
nor did he forget the use, that in his present extrem- 
ity, might be made of the second injunction of the 
government, that " no attempt at invasion should 
be hazarded, without the advice and approbation of 
his principal officers." While, therefore, he ostensi- 
bl}' prepared for a second attack at another point, 
and with his whole force, he secretly held a council 
of war, in which, under different motives,'' it was 
agreed, that " the further prosecution of the present 
plan of invasion, should be abandoned." This de- 
cision was promptly followed by a general order, 
putting an end to the campaign, and directing the 
army to be placed in winter quarters ; when, to 
complete the gasconade, a flag was despatched to 



I Councils of war are famous for giving bad advice, and hence the 
maxim adopted by Eugene and Frederieli, that the General who 
resorts to tliem, seeks only an apology for doing notliing. The docj- 
sion in this case, was, however, taken on a different principle from that 
assumed in the preceding maxim ; it arose not from a dislike of an 
efficient course, but from a want of confidence in the skill and vigor 
of the General. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 113 

Fort Erie, requiring an immediate surrender of that 
post, and its garrison. 

The temper discovered by the mihtia and volun- 
teers, on this termination of the campaign, was 
highly insubordinate and disgraceful — the General 
was hissed and hunted from one hiding-place to 
another ; and at length, compelled to fly for safety 
to his own home, in Virginia. In noticing this cir- 
cumstance in his official report, he says — " It has 
been in the power of the contractor's agent to excite 
a clamor against the course pursued. He finds the 
contract a losing one at this time, and would wish 
to see the army in Canada, that he might not be 
bound to supply it." Such was the veil, with which 
he endeavored to cover his own follies and faults. 

During these occurrences, the main army, occupy- 
ing a position on the eastern side of Lake Cham- 
plain, and commanded by the senior Major-General 
m person, continued to slumber on its arms, though 
both the time, and the policy of adopting measures 
of offence, had been distinctly indicated by his own 
increasing strength,^ by the continued weakness of 

1 On the 26th of September, 1812, there were within district No. 9, 
commanded by General Dearborn, 13,000 men of all arms. On the 
Niagara, 3,300 regulars, and 3,000 volunteers and militia; at Sacket'a 
Harbor, 200 regulars, and 2,000 militia ; and on Lake Champlain, 
3,000 regulars, and 2,000 mihtia. Throughout tlie campaign. Pro- 
vost's regular force, covering a frontier of 900 miles, and extending from 
the Sorel to Fort St. Josephs, did not exceed 3,000 men. See Colonel 
Cochran's statement. Appendix No. 13. The British commander was, 
of course, unable to occupy the Isle aux Noix, during the campaign 
of 1812, or to obstiuct the roads leading to Montreal, from New- 

10* 



114 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

his enemy, and lastly, by the urgent character of 
the orders given him, — " 7iot to lose a moment in at- 
tacking the British posts in his front f'^^ — yet in despite 
of considerations so numerous and imperative, no 
movement of any kind, in the direction of the enemy, 
was made, till the 20th of November ; — and what 
then was hazarded, was on a scale so small, and for 
an object so unimportant,^ as rendered this last act 
of the campaign, though less disastrous, quite as 
ridiculous as any of its predecessors. 

Of this movement, the historian of the war in the 
Canadas, offers the following details ; which we the 
more readily adopt, because, not differing materially 
from those given by our own functionaries, they dis- 
tinctly show the feeble character of Provost's out- 
posts, and the small disposable force with which he 

York and Vermont. Three gun-boats sent out from England, for the 
defence of the Sorel, could not be employed for want of seamen, till 
June, 1813. About tlus time, a small re-enforcement arriving from 
New-Brims wick, the old fortifications on the Isle aux Noix, were re- 
paired, and the position occupied by a detachment under the command 
of Colonel Taylor. — See life and service of Sir Geoi'ge Provost, mid 
Christie'' s History of the War in the Canadas. At any time, therefore, 
during the autumn of 1812, this important post, emphatically called 
the key of Central Canada, might have been seized and held by the 
American General, ^vithout loss or risk of any kind ; as besides abun- 
dant means, strictly military, he was authorized, about the middle of 
October, to buy and equip such number of vessels, as would secure to 
tlie United States a decided ascendency on Lake Champlain and the 
Sorel. 

1 For the orders ^ven to General Dearborn, during tliis period, see 
Appendix, No. 14. 

2 This mighty object was the destruction of a blockhouse, occupied 
by a small party of Indians and Canadian militia. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 115 

was able to sustain them, when in November, 1812, 
he expected the attack of an army of ten thousand 
men. 

" The American army under General Dearborn," 
says Mr. Christie, " now gradually approached the 
frontier of Lower Canada ; and on the 17th of No- 
vember, Major Salaberry (commanding on the lines) 
received information that this army, to the number 
of ten thousand men, were advancing to Odletown. 
He immediately despatched tico companies of Volti- 
geurs and three hundred Indians, to the support of 
Major La Force ; who, with two companies of the 
embodied militia, formed the British outposts on the 
La Cole. The day following. Major Salaberry with 
the remainder of the Voltigeurs, a corps of Yoyageurs, 
and four companies of Chasseurs, advanced to the 
neighborhood of the menaced points. By this time 
the American army occupied the town of Champlain, 
two or three miles from the line, and a serious inva- 
sion was now momentarily expected ; but nothing 
of any consequence occurred till the 20th, when be- 
tween three and four o'clock, A. M., the Americans 
were discovered fording the La Cole. The guard- 
house was soon and completely surrounded ; Avhen 
the British militia and a few Indians, who were with 
them, rushed from it, broke through the American 
line and escaped unhurt. In the meantime, a second 
party of the Americans now advanced, and mistak 
ing those in possession of the ground for the British 
picket, a smart firing between the two ensued, which 
continued for nearly half an hour ; when being un- 



116 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

deceived, they united and hastily retreated, leaving 
behind them five killed and as many womided. This 
party consisted of one thousand five hundred infantry 
and a troop of dragoons, commanded by Colonels 
Pike and Clarke ; and with the main body of the 
army, soon after withdrew to winter quarters."^ 

Remarks. The errors which signalize the close 
of this campaign in the north, are numerous and 
striking. Those of Dearborn and Smyth appear to 
have been the result of constitutional defects — bar- 
renness or inactivity of mind in tlie one, and infirmity 
of purpose in the other ; while those of Van Rens- 
selaer were obviously sins of ignorance, the offspring 
of that deficient knowledge, which every man must 
feel, who for the first time, and without any previous 
instruction, finds himself at the head of an army and 
on the eve of a battle. Of the former, any new 
illustration would be unnecessary, as they have been 
already sufficiently indicated ; while of the latter, a 
special but brief notice may be useful. 

I. The false and improbable report of a spy, was 
made the groundwork of the expedition. "With 
practised Generals, the credibility of spies is always 
doubtful, and never confided in, unless sustained by 
some collateral evidence, furnishing a strong proba- 
bility in its favor." In the present case, such proof 
was entirely wanting ; and the report itself expressly 
contradicted by the fact, that the complete success 
of Brock's late expedition to Detroit, had left no rea- 

i Christie's Histoiy of the War in the Canadas, p. 90. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 117 

sonable motive for a repetition of tlie visit ; and the 
less so, as the hourly augmentation of the American 
army in his front, made the safety of the British posts 
on the Niagara his most important duty. Notwith- 
standing these obvious considerations, the knowledge 
and integrity of the spy were taken for granted, and, 
in the General's opinion, warranted not merely an 
attack on Queenstown, but a full dispensation from 
the employment of all military rules w^iile making it. 

II. " Every military enterprise, should have some 
useful and important object." Yet, according to the 
General's official report, his views were limited on 
this occasion, to the expulsion of a small British de- 
tachment from Queenstown, and the occupation of 
that village as winter quarters for his troops — objects 
which, if attained, would have little if any influence 
on the progress or issue of the war, while they could 
not fail to impose upon him the perils of defending 
throughout the winter, an open and unfortified vil- 
lage ; and (what would be worse) the absurdity of 
placing between himself and his resources, a wide, 
rapid, and unfordable river. 

III. The troops employed, or intended to be em- 
ployed, on this service, were principally militia ; 
and, therefore, not better chosen than the object 
itself. Why this Avas so, is a problem, not yet 
satisfactorily explained. If it originated in an esprit 
du corps, or belief of militia efficiency, there may be 
some color of excuse for the error ; but, if as re- 
ported, the arrangement w^as made to gratify the 
ambition of an individual, the act was not merely 



118 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

injudicious, but criminal. At the period in ques- 
tion, there were at the General's disposition, more 
than three thousand troops of the line ; from whom 
a corps might have been selected, which, if well 
found, equipped and commanded, would not have 
been either beaten or baffled. 

IV. " If it be necessary to pass an army over a 
large and rapid river, in presence of an enemy, 
demonstrations should never be omitted — provided 
the extent of your own force will justify detaching." 
That General Van Rensselaer had at this time a 
redundant force, will be seen by his official report ; 
yet so far from assigning any portion of it to this 
use, he was even careful so to distribute it as would 
have completely counteracted this intention, had it 
existed. Colonel Scott and his artillerists, were 
called from the Falls, and Smyth and his brigade 
from Black Rock — points, where, had they been 
left, their presence would have kept at their posts, 
the garrisons of Erie and Chippewa, and thus pre- 
vented their co-operation in the defence of Queens- 
town. ^ 

V. " Every officer, charged with the direction of 
a military enterprise, should, before commencing it, 
assure himself that the means necessary for the 
purpose, are provided and ready for use." In this 
case, it was different, as we have seen, that neither 
boats, oars, nor pilots, had been assembled in suffi- 
cient numbers ; and, (what is still more extraor- 

1 See Appendix, No. 12. 



NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. 119 

dinary) that no efficient means had been taken, for 
ensuring the safety, or regulating the employment, 
of such of these articles as had been collected. 

VI. "An army crossing a river in small detach- 
ments and consecutively, exposes itself to be beaten 
in detail, by an enemy much inferior to itself" — 
another and important maxim, which, on this occa- 
sion, was forgotten or disregarded. 

VII. The place selected for crossing the river, 
was ill-judged. " A sheet of eddies, from shore lo 
shore," as described by the General, and commanded 
by two of the enemy's batteries, could not fail to 
aggravate the evil of the preceding error ; and both 
multiply and increase the difficulties inherent in the 
operation, under circumstances the most favorable. 

VIII. The omission to ascertain, previously to 
the adoption of the project, the political sentiments 
of the militia on the question of invasion ; and that 
of not promptly recalling the advanced corps, after 
having ascertained that point, were errors of great 
magnitude. Both measures were entirely within 
the General's power, and had they been adopted, 
would either have prevented the enterprise, or have 
terminated it at a moment, when, b}' the death of 
Brock, and the ffight of the enemy, we should have 
had the credit of a victory, instead of the discredit 
of a defeat. And lastly, nothing could be more ill- 
judged than the attempt made to withdraw the 
corps, after it had lost its ascendency in the field ; 
and when the means necessary for passing the 
river, or of covering the retreat, no longer existed. 



120 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

Blunders and favills like those we have been em- 
ployed in narrating, could not fail to make a power- 
ful impression upon public opinion. With such of 
our population as had opposed the war, they became 
a fruitful source of ridicule, and augury of future 
and greater evils; and with those who had honestly 
and zealously advocated it, of sorrow and humilia- 
tion. These last mentioned feelings were not, how- 
ever, unmingled with hopes, that a second campaign, 
under better auspices, and more of preparation than 
was permitted to the first, would redeem many of 
its errors, and demonstrate that, though a peace of 
thirty years might have obscured or blunted the 
knowledge necessary for conducting the war, it had 
not utterly extinguished that spirit and aptitude for 
military enterprise, which so eminently characte- 
rized the latter stages of the revolutionary contest; 
and which even now, began to display itself on the 
ocean and the lakes. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 121 



CHAPTER V. 

First investment of Fort Meigs. — Dearborn and Chauncey's Expedi- 
tion. — Reduction of York and Fort George. — Chandler's defeat and 
capture on Stony Creek. — ^Boerstler's defeat — Affair of Sacket's 
Harbor. 

With the exception of a few unimportant combats 
on the St. Lawrence, between Forsyth's riflemen 
and the garrison of Prescott,^ the first military move- 
ments of this year took place in the west. It will 
be remembered that while Proctor, after defeating" 
and capturing Winchester, was hastening back to 
Maiden, to escape the attacks of Harrison,'^ — this 

1 On the 6th of February, Forsyth with two companies of the rifle 
corps in sleighs, ascended tlie St. Lawrence from Ogdensburg to 
Elizabeth on the Canada shore, surprised the British guard, made 
fifty-two prisoners, (among whom were one Major, three Captains and 
two Lieutenants,) liberated sixteen deserters, and made prize of one 
hundred and forty muskets and a considerable quantity of ammunition, 
without losing a man of his party. The British commander at Fres- 
cott, retaliated this blow on the 22d, by a visit to Ogdensburg ; drove 
Forsyth out of the place (killing and wounding about twenty of his 
corps, and capturing a quantity of stores and provisions and sLx pieces 
of artillery) with the loss of seven rank and file killed, and seven offi- 
cers and forty-one privates wounded. 

2 Proctor's reasoning on this occasion was sanctioned by military 
rules. Could it be supposed, that the main body of an invading army 
was so far in the rear of its advanced guard, as to be unable to sus- 
tain it ? If not, the circumstances assumed by Proctor were exactly 
those, in wliich Harrison ought to have been found on the 23d of 
January, 1813, 



132 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812, 

last mentioned officer, from similar apprehensions of 
his adversary, after setting fire to his stores, baggage 
and defences at the Rapids, retreated hastily to 
Portage river. The delusion under which this 
movement was made, could not be of long duration, 
and actually yielded to a few hours' reflection on 
the many embarrassments, from which even victory 
could not exempt the British commander ; severity 
of weather, roads rendered nearly impassable by 
snow,^ ranks thinned by fatigue and battle, prisoners 
to be guarded, wounded men to be taken care of, 
and though last, not least, the imperative character 
of Indian usages, which never fail to demand a 
debauch, as the first and best reward of valor and 
victory. Under the hifluence of these, and perhaps 
of other considerations leading to the same conclu- 
sion, General Harrison, on the evening of the 24th 
of January, announced to the government, that " a 
few days would enable him to resume and defend 
the position he had left, against any thing Proctor 
could bring against it." Advancing, accordingly, 
on the 1st of February, he took post on the eastern 
bank of the Miami ; and with a force amounting 
nearly to two thousand men, began a fortified camp, 
to cover the head of his intended operations.** 

Neither these movements, nor the objects at which 

1 " From the depth of the snow, those on foot were soon exliausted '' 
— Harrison's Report of Winchester's defeat. 

2 The General's late experience had taught liim a lesson of pru- 
dence. He had now, also, tlie benefit of Colonel Wood's presence 
and advice. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 123 

ihey aimed, could be long unknown to the British 
commander ; who, to defeat the latter, assiduously- 
employed himself in organizing a corps (British, 
Canadian and Indian) which, judging from past 
events, would be competent to the reduction of the 
American camp, either by direct attack, or by inter- 
cepting supplies, coming to its aid and necessary to 
its support. Leaving Maiden, therefore, on the 22d 
of April, and availing himself of his naval means to 
cross Lake Erie, and ascend the Miami, he on the 
26th, took a position on the western bank of that 
river, and there began the construction of two or 
more batteries. These being soon completed and 
mounted, a fire commenced on the 30th, of sufficient 
vivacity but of little effect, and so continued until the 
4th of May, when n message from Brigadier Clay, 
arriving about midnight, announced the near ap- 
proach of tv/elve hundred Kentucky militia, coming 
to the support of the garrison. Under this informa- 
tion, the American General immediately determined 
to risk a project of attack, suggested at once by 
the disi>ersed state of the enemy's force, and the 
incompetent protection given to his batteries. In- 
stead, therefore, of allowing the re-enforcement to 
form an immediate junction with the garrison, (as 
Clay intended,) he directed that officer to debark 
eight hundred of his brigade on the western side of 
the river, with orders," to turn and take the two 
British batteries there, spike the cannon, destroy the 
gun-carriages, and regain their boats as speedily as 
possible ;" while, simultaneously with this move- 



124 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

meiit, " the remainder of the brigade should land 
on the opposite shore, fight its way into the camp, 
and thus favor a sortie to be made by the garrison 
upon the third, and only remaining British battery." 
This plan, no doubt, indicated military character, 
(combination and enterprise,) and was only objec- 
tionable from the confidence it reposed in a militia, 
ignorant of the art of war, and likely from personal 
habits, to be as insubordinate, as they were unskilful. 
Still, the first steps of the detachment were, if not 
circumspect, particularly fortunate ; for neither its 
landing, nor its approach to the batteries, was seen 
or suspected by the enemy ; and so utterly uncov- 
ered were their redoubts, that Colonel Dudley, the 
officer commanding the enterprise, was able to make 
himself master of two of them, without losing a 
man. But here, good fortune and discretion alike 
abandoned the Colonel and his followers ; for, in- 
stead of confining their attention, as ordered, to the 
destruction of the enemy's artillery, and the securit}^ 
of their own retreat, they inconsiderately engaged 
in a bush-fight with a fcAv straggling Indians, who 
thus contrived to amuse them, until Proctor had 
time to interpose a strong corps between them and 
their only means of retreat. The result was such 
as may be readily imagined, partaking less of the 
character of defeat, than of destruction ; for of the 
eight hundred combatants, numbered in the morn- 
ing, but one hundred and fifty escaped captivity or 
slaughter.^ The undetached portion of Clay's brig- 
1 Harrison's Report, dated May 5th, 1813. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813. 125 

ade, (led by Colonel Boswell,) though resisted by 
the savages, effected its object, with little of either 
loss or annoyance ; while a detachment from the 
seventeenth and nineteenth regular regiments, aided 
by a few volunteers and militia, gallantly assaulted 
and carried the battery on the eastern bank, made 
a number of British soldiers prisoners, and handled 
roughly, such Canadians and Indians as came to 
its support. 

Though, on the whole, the fortunes of the day 
were such as furnished the enemy with pretensions 
to a victory,^ still the siege, in many of its circum- 
stances, was marked by facts, which, whether con- 
sidered separately or together, extinguished in the 
British commander, every hope of eventual success. 
No part of his calculations had hitherto been veri- 
fied ; his batteries had not only failed to make any 
serious impression on the American fort, but had 
all, in succession, been wrested from him ; and were 
at last, but partially recovered through an error of 
his enemy not likely to be repeated. His allies, 
also, were found to be incompetent to the service 
assigned to them ; they neither did, nor could, so 
invest the American camp, as to intercept or even 
seriously impede the junction of re-enforcements ad- 
vancing to its aid ; and at last, becoming weary of 
a service, little adapted to their personal habits and 
military usages, they no longer disguised their inten- 
tion of speedily abandoning it. If to these motives 



1 Provost's letter to Lord Bathurst, 14th June, 1813. 
11* 



126 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

for discontinuing the siege, be superadded the fact, 
that information of General Dearborn's successful 
descent at York, in the month of April, had already 
reached the British camp, we cannot wonder, that 
Proctor should deem it prudent to abandon all fur- 
ther prosecution of his designs, and regain, as quickly 
as possible, his position at Maiden. 

But to this course, however expedient, physical 
impediments had now arisen : his artillery being of 
large calibre, could not be transported by land ; and 
the wind blowing strong from the north, prevented 
its movement by water. To fill up the pause thus 
made unavoidable in his operations, and to cover at 
once the defeat of his general object, the retrograde 
movement he now contemplated, and the apprehen- 
sion excited by the probability of Indian desertion 
and American attack, he had recourse to negotiation. 
The form given to this, was the blustering one em- 
ployed against Hull — affected humanity, ridiculous 
menaces, and insolent demands. Despatching a flag 
on the evening of the 5th, he required the immediate 
surrender of the American post and army, as " the 
only means left for saving the latter from the toma- 
hawks and scalping-knives of the savages." Har- 
rison's answer to this proposition Avas sufficiently 
manly and decided. Considering it unworthy of a 
more serious notice, he but adverted to its folly, and 
admonished Proctor, " not to repeat it," — thus leav- 
ing to his adversary the choice of continuing the con- 
test, or, failing to do so, of virtually acknowledging 
his weakness or his fears. In making this election. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 127 

Proctor did not hesitate long or seriously ; the tone 
and object of his first message, were immediately 
abandoned, and a simple proposition for an exchange 
of prisoners, substituted in its stead. Bungling and 
ill-disguised as these expedients were, they became 
to the enemy, active and useful auxiliaries ; and 
appear to have effectually concealed his real pur- 
poses, until, " a change of wind and a general move- 
ment in his camp," made them apparent to all. But 
it was now too late to profit by the discovery ; at 
twelve o'clock the whole armament, with the excep- 
tion of the Indians, (who had gone off on the 7th and 
8th,) was found embarking and rapidly descending 
the river. 

Harrison's presence on the Miami being no longer 
necessary, he now hastened back to Sandusky and 
Franklin town, to organize the means indicated for 
prosecuting his part of a new plan of campaign, 
having for its objects — 

1st. The reduction of Kingston and York on Lake 
Ontario, and of forts George and Erie on the Ni- 
agara ; and 

2d. The capture of Maiden, and recovery of 
Detroit and the Michigan Territory.^ 

In prosecution of the former, two modes of pro- 
ceeding, differing as to time and means, Avere 
prescribed to Major-General Dearborn. The one, 
(founded on the supposition that Kingston might 
not be accessible at that season of the year to the 

1 See Appendix, No. 14. 



128 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

approaches of infantry and artillery,) made provision, 
that the movement should not be attempted until the 
navigation of the lake should cease to be impeded 
by ice ; when, by a joint operation of the fleet and 
army, Kingston, York, and fort George, should be 
attacked in succession, and in the order in which 
they are here named. The other, resting on the 
contrary supposition, that no important impediment 
arising from snow or ice would obstruct movements 
exclusively military, directed, that the two brigades 
wintering on Lake Chajnplain, and amounting to 
twenty-five hundred combatants, should be placed 
in sleighs, and moved under the command of Colonel 
Pike, by the most eligible route and with the greatest 
possible rapidity, to Kingston ; where (being joined 
by such force as could be brought from Sacket's Har- 
lx)r) they shotdd, by surprise or assault, carr}^ that 
post, destroy the shipping wintering there, and sub- 
sequently be governed by circumstances, in either 
retaining the position or in withdrawing from it." 

Though neither of the movements prescribed by 
these views of the subject was objected to on the 
ground of any great or unavoidable difficulty in its 
execution,' some reports of the increased strength of 
the enemy, and of an intention on his part to attack 

I General Dearborn's letters of the 18th and 25th of February. In 
the former he says, " Notliing shall be omitted on my part, in endeav- 
oring to carry into effect the expedition proposed ;" and in the latter 
he adds, " Chauncey has not returned from New- York. I am satis- 
fied that if he had arrived as soon as I had expected him, we miglit 
have made a stroke at Kingston on the ice ; but his presence was 
necessaiy for having the aid of the seamen and marines." 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 129 

Sacket's Harbor, got up b}^ Provost, as a mere nise to 
conceal his own weakness and fears,* were unfortu- 
nately mistaken by both the Major-General and the 
naval commander, as furnishing sufficient authority 
for altogether dispensing with the movement pro- 
posed to be executed by Pike ; and for so far changing 
the prescribed order of proceeding in the other, as to 
make Kingston the last object of attack, instead of 
making it the Jirst.^ 

In prosecution of this inverted plan of campaign, 
General Dearborn (embarking sixteen hundred rank 
and file of the army) sailed from Sacket's Harbor on 
the 25th of April, and on the 27th arrived off York, 



1 Provost, alanned for the safety of his western posts, prorogued the 
legislature on the 22d of February, and set out hastily for Kingston. 
That he brought no troops with him, and even took from Prescott an 
escort to protect him in what remained of his journey, are facts well 
ascertained. Yet was this, and other similar movements, mistaken 
for evidences of the march westward of large re-enforcements. See 
Appendix, Nos. 16 and 17. 

2 " To take or destroy the armed vessels at York, will give us the 
complete command of the lake. Commodore Chauncey can take with 
liim ten or tAvelve hundred troops, to be commanded by Pike ; take 
York, from thence proceed to Niagara and attack fort George by 
land and water; while the troops at Buffalo cross over, carry forts 
Erie and Chippewa and join those at fort George, and thence, collect 
our whole force for an attack on Kingston. After the most mature 
deliberation, the above was considered by Commodore Chauncey and 
myself, as the most certain of ultimate success." — General DearbonVs 
official letter to the War Department. PresidenVs Message, Mst Jan' 
uary, 1814. To this change of plan the President gave his approba- 
tion, from a belief, that " being on the spot, the General and Com- 
modore were most Ukely to be possessed of tlie information which 
should govern in the case." 



130 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

the capital of Upper Canada and the headquarters 
of General Sheafe. The defences of the place were 
few and feeble, composed of two or three earthen 
redoubts, four hundred regular troops, an equal 
number of embodied militia, and between forty and 
fifty Indians. 

Positions having been given to such of the armed 
vessels as were destined to cover the landing, and 
take part in the attack of the batteries, the debark- 
ation of the troops began about 8 o'clock, A. M. 
Forsyth and the rifle corps, forming the head of the 
column, were the first to make the experiment, and 
after much effort effected a landing ; not, however, 
as was intended, at the site of the old French fort 
Toronto, but at a point, more than a mile farther 
westward, " thickly covered with brush-wood, and 
already occupied by British and Indian marksmen." 
In the contest that followed, Forsyth lost some men, 
but no credit ; and being speedily sustained by Ma- 
jor King and a battalion of infantry, and soon after 
by the presence of General Pike and the arrival of 
the main body, the enemy were driven from one po- 
sition to another, and at last compelled to seek shel- 
ter in their redoubts. Of these, the first approached 
by the assailants, made little resistance ; as the oc- 
cupants, perceiving the storm that awaited them, 
made haste to abandon the work.^ The second, 
presented an aspect of more firmness ; but discon- 

i The Grenadier company of the sixteenth, commanded by Captain 
Walworth, was proceeding to the assault, when the redoubt was 
abandoned. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 131 

(iiiuiiig its fire suddenly and entirely, Pike concluded, 
and not unreasonably, that his antagonist, by so 
acting, sought the means of making an overture of 
surrender ; and in this belief, halted his troops at 
the distance of sixty rods from the battery, when a 
magazine exploding, burst on the head of the col- 
umn, spreading its mischief far and wide ; killing 
and wounding more than two hundred men, and 
creating in the remainder, much temporary alarm 
and confusion.^ 

Of this circumstance, Sheafe, the British comman- 
der, was careful to avail himself. Collecting what 
of his regular force remained, and leaving to their 
own resources the civil authorities and embodied 
militia, he began a hasty retreat in the direction of 
Kingston. The assailants, who in the meantime, 
had re-established their order, and resumed their 
march, were yet in a condition to have overtaken 
the fugitives, but unfortunately, their gallant leader 
had fallen a victim to the explosion ; the General- 
in-chief, was yet onboard of the fleet ;^ and Colonel 
Pierce, who thus fortuitously became the command- 
ing officer, being wholly uninstructed as to the orders 
or views of either, permitted hhnself to be amused 
by proposals for a capitulation, forbidden alike by the 

1 Sheafe asserts, that the explosion was the effect of accident ; and 
states the loss sustained by the garrison in consequence of it, as a 
proof of the fact. 

2 Dearborn, in his letter of the 28th of April, says, — " I had been 
induced to confide the command of the troops in action to General 
Pike, from a conviction that he fully expected it, and would be much 
mortified at being deprived of the honor, wliich he highly appreciated." 



132 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

laws of war and the policy of the moment ; and 
thus gave time to Sheafe and his followers, not 
merely to effect their escape, but to destroy, as they 
went along, a ship of war on the stocks, and a mag- 
azine of military and naval stores in the harbor. 

The defence of the town being no longer practi- 
cable, a surrender necessarily followed, by which it 
was stipulated, that the militia and others attached 
to the British military and naval service, should be 
paroled ; that private property of every kind should 
be respected, and that all public stores should be 
given up to the captors. Tliese last, according to 
the report of the General, consisted of an " immense 
depot of supplies, military and naval, and a sloop 
of war repairing for service."^ The enemy's loss on 
this occasion, amounted in killed, wounded and ta- 
ken, to five hundred men ; that of the United States, 
in killed and wounded, to three hundred and twenty. 

The first object of the expedition being thus ac- 
complished, tlie troops were immediately re-embark- 
ed, in the hope that they would be able to proceed 
to the second and more important, without loss 

1 Of this immense depot, we hear nothing further from the General, 
excepting that " so great was its magnitude, that the fleet could not 
carry the whole away," a fact the less to be regretted, as what they 
did carry with them, was burnt with many other stores at Sacket's » 
Harbor, through a misconception of the naval officer having charge of 
the magazines. Our trophies were fewer, but better taken care of. — 
One regimental standard taken, was, (by some strange confusion of 
ideas,) sent to the Navy department ; and one human scalp, a prize 
made, as we have understood, by the Commodore, M-as offered, but not 
accepted, as a decoration to the walls of the War Office. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 133 

of time ; but the wind becoming adverse, it was 
not till the 8th of May, that they arrived off fort 
George ; nor until the 27th, that they were suffi- 
ciently prepared for the attack of that post.^ At 
four o'clock, A. M. of this day, the batteries on the 
American side of the Niagara being ready for action, 
the means necessary for transportation provided, and 
a considerable re-enforcement of troops drawn from 
Sacket's Harbor, — tire army, (now amounting to 
nearly six thousand combatants,) began their move- 
ment in boats, along the lake shore, to Two-Mile- 
Run, the point designated for a general landing. 
When abreast of this, they rested on their oars, till 
the armed vessels had severally taken their covering 
positions, and the signal had been given for descent ; 
after which, resuming the movement, they pressed 
vigorously forward to the sliore. At nine o'clock, 
the light infantry commanded by Colonel Scott, 
effected a landing ; and being speedily supported by 
Boyd's brigade, and a w^ell-directed fire from the 
shipping,* were soon enabled to surmount the bank, 



1 This delay, was at one time ascribed by the General to some sins 
of omission, on the part of Generals Lewis and Winder, — and at an- 
other, to the late arrival of the fleet from York. 

2 In Commodore Chauncey's report of this affair, he says, — " All 
the vessels anchored within musket-shot of the shore, and in ten min- 
utes after they opened upon the [water] batteries, they were com- 
pletely silenced and abandoned." Again ; " The enemy, who had 
been concealed in a ravine, now advanced in great force, to the edge 
of tlie bank, to charge our troops, [when] the schooners opened so 
well-directed and tremendous a fire of grape and canister, that they 
[the ener^v] soon retreated from the bank." 

12 



134 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

break down the enemy's line in their front, and 
compel its scattered parts to fly in the direction of 
Newark and fort George. 

On approaching these, Vincent, the British com- 
mander, finding the former in flames, and the latter, 
nearly if not altogether untenable, wisely determined 
to hazard a retreat in the face of his enemy ; and 
by thus deserting his post, multiply the chances of 
saving his garrison. Fortunately for him, a contin- 
gency of this kind, was neither provided for in the 
original plan of attack, nor by any subsequent order 
given on the field ; and would, perhaps, have en- 
tirely escaped notice, had not Scott, from his advanced 
position, made the discovery, and deemed it his duty, 
to institute and continue a pursuit of five miles ; not 
merely without orders, but in evasion of such as 
were given, until at last, a mandate reached him, of 
a character so decided and peremptory, as, by leav- 
ing nothing to discretion, could not fail to recall 
him to fort George. 

About the time of this last occurrence, the com- 
manding General, who had now landed from the 
fleet, received information, that Vincent, re-enforced 
by the garrisons of Chippewa and Erie, aud a battal- 
ion of the eighth or King's regiment, had determined 
to risk a second combat for the defence of the pen- 
insula ; and that with this view, he had called in 
the militia, and was pressing forward to occupy a 
strong mountain-pass, called the Beaver Dams. 

Though much of this information was unAvar- 
ranted, by any thing which had been seen of the 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 135 

numbers, condition, or order of the retreating troops, 
and though directly contradicted by the report of an 
officer of the American staff ;^ still, receiving as it 
did the entire confidence of the General, an order 
was issued " for renewing the pursuit at daybreak 
of the 28th, in the direction of the Dams." Of this 
movement, we need only say, that it resulted in dis- 
appointment and mortification, — in disappointment, 
because on approaching its object, Vincent was not 
to be found; and in mortification, because it was 
now evident, that the report, on which the move- 
ment was ordered, was a mere artifice employed 
by the enemy, to put the army of the United States 
on a wrong track, and thus enable Vincent to 
anticipate them in the possession of Burlington 
heights ; " a position," without which, according to 
his own statement, " he could neither retain the 
peninsula, nor make a safe exit froui it." 

Under circumstances thus distinctly indicating the 
policy of the enemy, the American General could no 
longer mistake his own. We accordingly find him 
recalling the army, for the purpose of giving to their 
efforts a new and better direction. One chance, he 
said, yet remained — " embark the troops on board 
the fleet, and (should the winds be favorable) they 
will arrive at the head of Burlington Bay, before 
the British can reach it; and we shall then close 
the campaign successfully." But to this arrange- 

t Letter from Major Van de Venter, A, Cl. M. G. to the War De- 
partment. 



,136 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

ment, the assent of the naval commander was not 
less necessary than his own ; and though on the 
29th, the Commodore saw no objection to the plan, 
he on the 30th, entirely changed his opinion; and 
instead of lending- himself to a co-operation that 
would in all probability have been successful, he de- 
cided on a movement principally naval in its object, 
and altogether useless in its effects.* 

Deprived as the General now was of the aid of 
the fleet, (which in his opinion furnished the last 
remaining chance of excluding Vincent from the 
heights of Burlington,) he was necessarily left to 
choose between the inaction of a campaign merely 
defensive on the strait, and the pursuit and attack of 
the enemy amidst the mountain gorges and defiles, 
in which they had wisely placed their safety. Of 
these alternatives, he on the 1st of June, adopted the 
latter, and accordingly despatched General Winder 
with a single and small brigade, amounting, in all 
arms, to somewhat less than eight hundred com- 
batants, to give it execution. This officer, in the 
progress of his march, was not long in discovering 
that the enemy's force was more formidable than had 
been supposed ; and very properly decided, to await 
at Forty-Mile Creek, the arrival of such re-enforce- 
ments as, on a representation of the preceding fact, 
the General might think proper to send to his aid.° 

I His object was the defence of his naval stores and the new ship then 
on the stocks at Sacket's Harbor — but for the protection of neither 
did he arrive in time. They were saved by Brown and the garrison. 

S Burns reports the whole force (after Chandler's arrival) at one 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 137 

On the 3d of June, Brigadier-General Chandler 
brought up a second brigade ; and understanding 
that Vincent occupied a strong camp, eight miles in 
his front, which he was every hour making stronger, 
the new commander determined to shorten the dis- 
tance between them, and bring him to action as 
promptly as possible. The division was accordingly 
put in motion in the direction of the British camp, 
and Stony Creek passed by the American advanced 
guard ; between which and an out-lying British 
picket, a skirmish, of short duration and little im- 
portance, ensued. But as it was now sunset, the 
General found it necessary to halt for the night ; and 
proceeded accordingly to make the necessary dispo- 
sition of the troops, for passing it in safety. Taking 
the road as the centre of his line, he there placed his 
artillery, supporting it on the right by the twenty- 
fifth regiment, three companies of light infantry, and 
one of riflemen ; and on the left, by the fifth, six- 
teenth, and twenty-third regiments. Half a mile in 
his front, was posted a strong picket, and similar 
guards on both flanks and rear, with orders to send 
out frequent patrols. In addition to these arrange- 
ments, the thirteenth and fourteenth regiments, with 
Archer*s company of artillery, were stationed near 
the mouth of Stony Creek, (for the better security 
of the boats and baggage ascending the lake,) and 

thousand three hundred men ; if, therefore, this report be correct, the 
force originally sent did not exceed eight hundred, nor the re-enforce- 
ment five hundred. 

13* 



138 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

ill the rear of the whole, was posted the second 
reghnent of hght dragoons.^ 

While Chandler was thus employed in securing 
his camp, Vincent, who now saw that to retain his 
present position (on which all his hopes of eventual 
success depended) another battle must be fought, 
was deliberating on the mode most proper for giving 
it ; and having found by a careful reconnoissance, 
made early in the evening, that liis enemy's camp- 
guards were few and negligent ; that his line of 
encampment was long and broken ; that his artil- 
lery was feebly supported, and several of the corps 
placed too far in the rear to aid in repelling a 
blow, rapidly and vigorously struck at their front, — 
lie wisely determined to hazard a night-attack, in 
the hope of effecting by surprise, what he despaired 
of being able to accomplish openly and directly. 

In pursuance of this plan, the British column 
(seven hundred combatants) began its march about 
midnight ; and prosecuting it with great silence and 
much general attention to order, it was able at three 
o'clock in the morning to surprise and capture every 
man of the American picket, without giving the 
slightest alarm to the main body. Nor were its 
subsequent movements less judicious, though fortu- 
nately, much less successful. Selecting the centre 
of the encampment for assault, two small demon- 
strations (the one, made on the extremity of the right 

1 " This corps (the dragoons) lay at a considerable distance from 
the scene of active operation, as you will perceive by the enclosed dia- 
gram." — General Letois^s report, I4th of June. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 139 

flank ; and the other, on that of the rear guard) were 
mistaken by Chandler and Winder for real attacks ; 
and had the effect of producing such changes in the 
disposition made of the American line,* as enabled 
Hervey, at the head of the forty-niuth and part of 
the eighth British regiments, to gain the rear of the 
artillery, envelop a part of it, and make prize of some 
pieces of ordnance, three tumbrils, and about one 
hundred prisoners — among whom were found the 
two American Generals. 

How much farther the mischief might have been 
carried, but for one of those accidents common to 
night movements, can only be conjectured. Vincent, 
the British commander, quitting for a moment the 
track of the column which he had hitherto followed, 
lost his way ; and, as is not unusual in similar cases, 
every effort to recover it, carried him further from 
his object. It was not, however, until after Hervey's 
attack had succeeded, that he was missed; when 
(having been sought for without success) it was not 
unreasonably concluded, tliat a fortune, similar to 
that which had befallen Chandler, had awaited him.^ 
Hervey, finding himself in this new and unexpected 
situation, prudently determined to make sure of the 
trophies lie had won ; and, accordingly, began his 
retreat under cover of the night, leaving to his 
enemy, the care of his v/ounded, the burial of his 

1 "Hearing a firing in the rear, I instantly ordered Colonel Milton 
with the fifth, to form in oitr rear, near the tcoodsJ'^ — Chandler's report. 

2 «He was found the next day, four miles from tlie scene of action, 
without hat or horse." — Lewis's Report. 



140 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

dead, and one hundred privates of the eighth and 
forty-ninth regiments. 

Though at daybreak, the American army was 
found to have sustained ^ome diminution of its nume- 
rical force,' still, as this was not such as made retreat 
either necessary or expedient, an order for renewing 
the pursuit of the enemy, was both desired and ex- 
pected — but as the capture of Chandler and Winder 
had unfortunately devolved the command on an 
officer of cavalry, having no confidence in his own 
capacity for directing infantry movements,* a coun- 
cil of war, to whom the question was submitted, 
advised " the immediate retreat of the army to Fort^v- 
Mile Creek, there to await the further directions of 
General Dearborn." 

This officer, who, from ill-health and other causes, 
had uniformly committed the direction of field-opera- 
tions to subordinate agents, seeing nothing in the 
circumstances of the moment, to render necessary a 
departure from his ordinary practice, satisfied his 
sense of duty, by despatching to the army. General 
Lewis and the sixth regiment, with orders to bring 
the enemy to action, as promptly as possible. 

This new commander reached his destination at 
five o'clock, P. M., and found the troops encamped 

1 The loss of the American army in this action was small, " much 
lesa than that of the enemy." — Report of Colonel Burns. 

2 " Had either of the Generals remained in command, or, if Colonel 
Burns had been an officer of infantry, the enemy would have been 
pursued and cut up." — Dearborn's Report of June the Qth, to the War 
Department, 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 141 

Oil a plain, " at the foot of a perpendicular moiuitain 
of considerable height," whence, at six o'clock, the 
British fleet was discovered, shaping its course in 
the direction of Vincent's post; — a circumstance, 
forbidding, as the General believed, an immediate 
movement upon that officer, and making it proper 
that the American army should retain for the night 
its present position. At daybreak, on the 8th, the 
hostile armament was found "in a dead calm," 
about a mile from the shore, and abreast of the 
camp ; while an armed schooner, towed forward to 
a station favorable for the purpose, opened a fire oif 
the American baggage and boats, drawn up on the 
beach. But a few discharges of hot-shot, soon con- 
vinced the British commander, that the experiment 
was not likely to turn out advantageously, and thus 
iiastened the recall of the schooner to tlie fleet. 

It was under these circumstances, by no means 
inauspicious to the eventual success of the expedi- 
tion, that an order was received from General Dear- 
born, directing the immediate return of the troops to 
fort George ; from an apprehension, (founded on the 
appearance of two British schooners apparently em- 
ployed in examining the shore,) " that a serious 
attack on that post was meditated by the enemy." 
This ill-judged order was scarcely executed, Avhen 
it was found that the "minute examinations" made 
by the British schooners, had an object very different 
from that, whicli the General in his alarm, had as- 
cribed to them. Having in an hour or two, suf- 
ficiently ascertained, " that no American vessels. 



142 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

remained in or near the mouth of the Niagara,' 
they hastened back to their fleet ; which, after land- 
ing the supphes and re-enforcement it had carried 
to Vincent, repaired to the southern side of the lake, 
and was there, (according to Provost's statement to 
Lord Bathurst,) " usefully employed in intercepting 
provision-boats, going to fort George."^ 

Tlie tranquillity, which foUow^ed the preceding 
alarm in the American camp, w^as unfortunately 
permitted to become an absolute sleep of fourteen 
days ; of which, the British commander was careful 
to avail himself. Advancing his main bod}^ (now 
re-enforced by a battalion of the hundred and fourth) 
to Forty-Mile Creek, he thence pushed forward a 
party, under the command of Colonel Bishop, " to 
seize and fortify such mountain passes, as would 
best secure his own position ; and, at the same time, 
so circumscribe the range of the American troops, 
as to compel them to live on their own resources."^ 
In pursuance of these directions. Bishop began by 
establishing two posts on the lake road, and one on 
that of Queenstown ; the garrisons of which, with 
the aid of preconcerted signals, could be readily 
brought to sustain each other. 

The American General, awakened at last by a 
report of these encroachments, thought it expedient, 
on the 23d of June, to despatch Colonel Bcsrstler, at 
the head of six hundred men of all arms — dragoons, 



1 Provost's letter to Lord Bathurst, 3d of July, 1813. 

2 Idem. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 143 

artillerists and infantry, to strike at the Stone House, 
(one of the posts established by Bishop,) about two 
miles beyond the Beaver Dams, and seventeen from 
fort George. The result of the movement was such 
as might have been foreseen. Bcerstler was per- 
mitted to reach the Dams without annoyance, but 
having neither reserve to sustain, nor demonstration 
to favor him, he was surrounded by enemies, to 
whom (after three hours' useless fighting) he surren- 
dered himself, and his party. ^ 

The reader will recollect, that before General 
Dearborn thought it safe to attack fort George, he 
withdrew from the garrison of Sacket's Haibor, the 
whole of Chandler's brigade, and six companies of 
Macomb's artillerists, serving as infantr)^ — the effect 
of which, with the absence of the fleet, left the post 
(important as it was) in a condition decidedly weak. 
Provost, w^hose public duties brought him to Kings- 
ton, about the time of this occurrence, was soon 
made acquainted with it ; and believing that it fur- 
nished a favorable occasion for retaliating the blows 
sustained at York and fort George, and for perma- 
nently settling the doubtful question of naval ascen- 
dency on the lake, he hastened to organize an 
expedition, having for its objects, " the capture of 
the harbor and naval stores, and the destruction of 
the new ship General Pike, then on the stocks." 

Fortunately, the disposable force, under the direc- 
tion of this functionary, was, at that period, not 

1 For BcBrstler's delved account of this affair, see Appendix, No. 24. 



144 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

redundant ; and on actual muster, could be made 
to amount to but seven hundred, rank and file.^ 
With this small force, a few artillerists and two 
pieces of light ordnance, embarked on board of 
small vessels and convoyed by the fleet, the British 
commander-in-chief began his movement on the 
27th of May — "intending to reach the harbor in 
the night, and at daybreak in the morning, to as- 
sault and carry the place by surprise."^ Retarded 
by baffling or adverse winds, it was not until ten 
o'clock, P. M. of the 28th, that he arrived within 
striking distance of his object ; and then, under cir- 
cumstances, which had entirely changed the rela- 
tions as to force, previously existing between himself 
and liis enemy. Unable to make tlie movement 
covertly, as he had expected to do, some of even his 
first steps were discovered by the younger Chauncey; 
who, while hastening back to his post, fired signals 
of alarm — which, taken up by the guns of the fort, 
and thus extended to the country, had the effect of 
bringing together by mid-day of the 28th, six hun- 
dred militia in aid of the garrison ; and with them, 
a leader, both sagacious and intrepid, who, like 
Cincinnatus, was found at his plough.^ 

1 The detachments employed in the attack of Sacket's Harbor, 
were, " one company of the one hundredth, one section of the Royal 
Scots, two companies of the eighth, four of the one hundred and fourth, 
two of the Voltigeurs, and one of Glengary light infantry, with two 
sLx-pounders and their gunners." 

2 Baync's Official Report, MaySOtli, 1813, and "Life and Semces 
of Sir George Provost." 

3 General Dearborn, commanding the district. Colonel Backus, 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 145 

General Brown, the person of whom we speak, 
having a perfect knowledge of the ground on which 
he stood, was at no loss to discover the point at 
which the enemy would attempt to disembark ; or 
the route, by which, after landing, he would endea- 
vor to reach the forts. His dispositions were made 
accordingly; to the volunteers and militia forming 
the first line, was assigned the duty of meeting and 
repelling the descent of the enemy from his boats; 
while midway between the shore and the village, 
and on ground made difficult of approach by an ab- 
batis, was placed the second line, composed of 
regular troops,^ amounting to four hundred com- 
batants, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Backus. 
Still further in the rear, were a few artillerists, 
charged w4th the custody of the forts, which, in 
the General's plan of defence, formed his dernier 
resource. 

Such was the disposition made of the small Amer- 
ican force, when at daybreak of the 29th, the enemy's 
fleet was seen in line, between Stony Point and 
Horse Island ; and his troops, in small craft, covered 
by gun-boats, making for the southern side of a 
sandy ridge, throw^n up by adverse currents, and 
occasionally forming a causewaj'^ between the island 

senior officer of the United States troops at the Harbor, and Major 
Swan, acting Adjutant-General, had previously united in urging 
General Brown, a miUtia officer residing in the neighborhood, to take 
the command, in the event of an attack on the post. 

1 Detachments from the first dragoons, ninth and twenty-third 
infantry, and a few artillerists. 

13 



146 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

and the main land. To meet this movement,* the 
volunteer regiment stationed on Horse Island, was 
promptly withdrawn, and made to take a position 
on the shore, adjacent to that occupied b}^ the mi- 
litia ; when orders were given to both corps, " to 
conceal themselves as much as possible ; to reserve 
their fire until the enemy's approach should enable 
them to count his coat-buttons ; and, if driven from 
their ground, to rally in the adjoining wood, attack 
the enemy's flank, and, if unable to stop him, to 
retire on the left and rear of Colonel Backus's posi- 
tion, and there await further orders." Unfortunately, 
no part of these directions was complied with. A 
fire, much at random and given prematurely, was 
followed by a flight, nearly general, of both parts of 
the first line, and with such determination to avoid 
new dangers, that every attempt at rallying either, 
proved unsuccessful.^ 

For this unmanly and unexpected conduct on 
the part of the militia and volunteers, the General 
found himself greatly consoled by the coolness and 
courage of the regular troops, who, though compelled 
to abandon their first position, hastened to occupy 

1 " It was my intention to have landed in the cove, formed by Horse 
Island ; but on approaching, we discovered that the enemy were fully 
prepared, with a very heavy fire of musketry, supported by a field- 
piece. I therefore directed the boats to pull round to the other side of 
the island, where a landing was effected in good order, and with 
little loss."— 5rty?ie's Report, May 30th, 1813. 

2 General Brown's official letter, of June 1st, 1813. The only ex- 
ception to this conduct in the militia and volunteers, was found in the 
parties headed by Captains McNitt and Collins. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 147 

another, which, in their hands became impregnable; 
and soon brought the British commander to the con- 
clusion, that " the reputation and interest of his 
Majesty's arms, would be best promoted by an im- 
mediate retreat."^ This was accordingly ordered 
and executed ; leaving, as was his custom, his killed 
and wounded on the field of battle, as new subjects 
for the exercise of the humanity of his antagonist. 
On this fortunate issue of a business, involving so 
many high interests, and so little promising in the 
outset, we find but one drawback — the burning of 
the naval stores, storehouses and barracks — an eflfect 
of false information, imprudently given and too has- 
tily believed, by the oflficer charged with the custody 
of these buildings. 

The affair of Sacket's Harbor was followed by an 
attack of similar character and fortune, on Black 
Rock; and which, though having little, if any bear- 
ing on the progress or issue of the war, may, not- 
withstanding, be entitled to a brief notice. Colonel 
Bishop, commanding the elite of General Vincent's 
division, encouraged as well by the diminished 
strength, as the uniform inaction of the American 
army, pushed his enterprise onward to the Niagara, 



1 " At this point, the farther energies of the troops became unavail- 
ing; the block-house and stockaded battery could not be carried by 
assault, nor reduced by field-pieces, had we been provided with them. 
Seeing no object within our reach, that could compensate for the loss 
we werR momently sustaining, I directed the troops to form on the 
crest of the hill ; and from this position, we were ordered to re-embark," 
' — Bayne' Report. 



148 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1813. 

and finding fort Erie without a garrison, hastened 
to re-establish himself in that post. Being now 
within sight of Black Rock, and informed that it 
was the depository of a considerable quantity of 
public stores, he determined to make it a visit ; and 
on the 11th of June, crossed the river at the head 
of two hundred and fifty men, of the eighth, forty- 
first, and forty-ninth regiments. The militia in 
charge of the place, and nearly as numerous as the 
enemy, being non-combatants,^ withdrew at his ap- 
proach, and permitted him to execute his purposes 
without hindrance or molestation. Having at last 
accomplished his objects, spiked the heavy cannon, 
carried off the light ones, loaded his boats with flour 
and salt, and burned to the ground, both barracks 
and block-houses, he withdrew to the shore, with 
the intention of embarking himself and his party, 
when he discovered, that he had yet, like Cffisar at 
Munda, to fight for his life. 

A report of the predatory character of the expe- 
dition, spreading rapidly through the country, had 
the effect of assembling at Buffalo, about one hun- 
dred and fifty United States infantry, as many militia 
and a few Indians, who immediately set out to re- 
capture the public stores, and punish the invaders 
of the soil. For the first of these purposes, their 
arrival was too late — the plunder having been al- 



1 An effect of the eastern doctrine (on the causes and character erf 
the war) industriously circulated in the northern and western frontiers 
of New- York. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812 149 

ready secured ; but for the last, it was yet in good 
time, and after a contest made as brief by the fall 
of Bishop, as it had been vigorous while he lived, 
the British party was compelled to fly to their oars 
and recross the river; leaving behind them nine of 
their number killed and fifteen wounded. At other 
points, the enemy pursued his purposes with better 
effect ; and at last, virtuall}^ reduced fort George 
from a fortress, into a prison, with limits, little, if at 
all exceeding the range of its cannon. 

To account for a state of things so unexpected, 
and falling so far short of the promises held out by 
the General and the naval commander, when they 
began the expedition, we subjoin the following ex- 
tract from an official despatch of the former, of the 
20th of June. " From resignations, sickness, and 
other causes, the number of regimental ofiicers pres- 
ent and fit for dut)^, is far below what the service re- 
quires. A considerable portion of the army being new 
recruits, and the weather very unfavorable to health, 
the sick have become so numerous, in addition to 
the wounded, as to reduce the effective force far 
below what could have been contemplated. The 
enemy have been re-enforced with about five hun- 
dred men of the one hundred and fourth regiment ; 
whence 1 conclude, that he will endeavor to keep 
up such a plan, at, and near the head of the lake, 
as will prevent any part of our force in this quarter 
from joining, or proceeding to Sacket's Harbor, for 
the purpose of atteicking Kingston ; and such is the 
state of the roads in this flat country, in consequence 
13* 



150 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 181^. 

of continual rains, as to render any operations against 
the enemy extremely difficult, without the aid of a 
fleet, for the transportation of provisions, ammunition 
and other necessary supplies. The enemy would 
probably retreat on our approach and keep out of 
our reach, being covered by one or more armed 
vessels. The whole of these embarrassments have 
resulted from a temporary loss of the command of 
the lake." ^ 

The accounts of the General's health, were not 
more encouraging than that given of the condition 
of the army. In a letter of the 4th of June, he says, 
— " I am still very feeble, and gain strength very 
slowly." June the 6th, " I never so severely felt 
the want of health as at present ; a time when my 
services might perhaps be most useful." June the 
8th, "My ill state of health renders it extremely pain- 
ful to attend to current duties, and unless it improves 
soon, I fear I shall be compelled to retire to some 
place where my mind may be more at ease." June 
the 14th, "General Dearborn, from indisposition, has 
resigned the command, — not only of the Niagara 
army, but of the district. I have doubts whether he 
will ever again be fit for service."^ "As the Gen- 
eral is unable to write, 1 am directed to inform you, 
that in addition to the debility and fever he has been 
afflicted with, he has, within the last twenty-four 
hours, experienced a violent spasmodic attack on his 

1 General Dearborn's letter to the War Department, of the 20th of 
June, 1813. 

2 General Lewis's letter of the 14th of June, to the Secretary of War. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 151 

breast, which has obliged him to lehnquish business 
altogether."^ 

It cannot be thought extraordinary, that under 
circumstances so alarming, as well in relation to the 
General as to the troops, an order should have issued 
on the 6th of Jul}^ recalling the former from the 
command of the district f and enjoining on his suc- 
cessor, " not to prosecute any offensive operation, 
until our ascendency on the lake was re-established." 

Remarks. We have seen that, by the plan of 
campaign prescribed to General Dearborn, Kingston 
was made the first object of attack ; after which (if 
successful) the army should proceed to the reduction 
of York, fort George and fort Erie. This arrange- 
ment, so far as regarded the order of attack, was 
recommended by considerations the most decisive ; 
inasmuch, as the capture of the first named of these 
posts, would have involved that of the British fleet, 
(then frozen up in its harbor ;) the entire separation 
of Lower from Upper Canada ; the necessary fall of 
all military and naval armaments within the latter, 

1 Letter from Colonel Connor, Aid-decamp of General Dearborn, 
of June the 12th, to the Secretary of War. 

2 Tliis act of the Executive authority, originated with that poition 
of the House of Representatives most active and influential in support- 
ing the war ; who, believing that habitual ill-health on the part of the 
General, disqualified him from such a discharge of his duty as the 
exigencies of the service required, deputed Messrs. Clay and IngersoU 
to represent their views on the subject to the President. Mr. Monroe 
became the medium of communication between these gentlemen, and 
Mr. Madison, coinciding in their opinion, soon after directed the Gen- 
eral's recall. 



15^ NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

and a speedy termination of the Indian war in the 
west — advantages not to be expected from the most 
successful operations against York, fort George, or 
fort Erie. 

Nor will it appear that on receiving this order, the 
General put a different estimate on the practicability 
of the project, or on the value and importance of the 
objects it presented. In his letter of the 18th of 
February, he says — " Nothing shall be omitted on 
my part, in endeavoring to carry into effect the ex- 
pedition proposed ;" and in that of the 25th he adds, 
"Chaunceyhas not yet returned from New- York ; 
if he had arrived as soon as I expected him, we 
might have made a stroke at Kingston on the ice ; 
but his presence was necessary for having tlie aid 
of the marines and seamen."^ Unfortunately, this 
coincidence of views between the government and 
the General was of short duration. On tlie 3d of 
March, be became " satisfied, on information, (as he 
declared,) entitled to full credit, that a force had been 
collected from Quebec, Montreal and Upper Canada, 
of from six to eight thousand men, at Kingston; and 
that an attack would be made on Sacket's Harbor 
within forty-eight hours, perhaps sooner." Again, 
on the 9th, (though then entertaining doubts whether 

I What an extraordinary reason to be given by the commanding 
General of an army and district, (of which Sacket's Harbor made 
a part,) for omitting to execute an order directly emanating from the 
President of the United States ! Did Mr. Chauncey leave the fleet 
without a commander de facto ? And if not, what rendered his au- 
thority over seamen and marines less efficient than that of the Com- 
modore. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 153 

Provost would hazard an attack,) he announces to 
the government, that "this unexpected movement 
of the enemy, would effectually oppose the measures 
contemplated on our part." And in conformity with 
this desponding view of the subject, a council of war, 
held on the 15th of March, decided, that "no attempt 
upon Kingston should be made before the naval force 
could act ;" or, in other words, before the lake was 
navigable ; — a decision, which, besides putting an 
end to Pike's expedition on the ice, gave to Provost 
all he wanted — an entire month to strengthen his de- 
fences, and a thaw, to restore Yeo and his fleet to their 
ordinary activity and usefulness. After thus demol- 
ishing the most important part of the plan of cam- 
paign, it was not to be expected that what remained 
of it would be treated with more ceremony. " To 
take," says the General, "or destroy the armed ves- 
sels at York, will give us the complete command of 
the lake. Commodore Chauncey can take with him 
ten or tv/elve hundred troops, to be commanded by 
Pike ; take York, from thence proceed to Niagara 
and attack fort George by land and water, while the 
troops at Buffalo cross over and carry forts Erie and 
Chippewa and join those at fort George, and then 
collect our whole force for an attack on Kingston. 
After the most mature deliberation, the above was 
considered by Commodore Chauncey and myself as 
the most certain of ultimate success."^ 

1 Of this plan, we have the following estimate by General Pike 
and otliers. " The opinion of General Pike, founded on a knowledge 
of General Dearborn's intended movements, is, tliat our country Is 



154 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

It will not be easy, perhaps impossible, to give any 
sufficient reason for the course thus recommended, 
and eventually adopted, by the two commanders. If 
they continued to believe, that Provost had assem- 
bled from "six to eight thousand men at Kingston, 
for the express purpose of attacking and destroying 
Sacket's Harbor," as stated by the General in his 
despatch of the 3d of March — what could justify a 
project on their part, which would necessarily ab- 
stract a large portion of the military and the whole 
of the naval force, from this menaced point ? If, on 
the other hand, they had ceased to give credit to a 
fable so absurd, (which is most probable,) and had 
returned to the opinion, that " the garrison of Kings- 
ton was weak,"^ why not return also to the intention 
of carrying the attack on that important post, and 
thus have fulfilled the original plan of campaign ] 

It now but remains for us to show, tlmt ihe'iiifor- 
mation taken by the General as the guide of his 
opinions and conduct on this occasion, was wholly 
unfounded. Our proofs on this head are, I. "That 
Provost, on arriving at Prescott, borrowed from that 
post an escort of soldiers, to prevent his being kid- 
napped on his way to Kingston"^ — a fact, utterly in- 

again doomed to defeat, if the operations now meditated by the Gen- 
eral are attempted to be accomplished. The opinion is also prevalent 
with the best officers, that no conquest of character will be made, if 
your plans of invasion be subject to the continual wavering of the 
commanding; General." — Letter from Major Van de Venter^ D. Q.M. G., 
of the 3\st March, 1813, to the Secretary of War. 

1 General Dearborn's letter of the 14th of February, 1813. 

2 Christie's History of the War in the Canadas, p. iOl. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 155 

consistent with the story of his having brought with 
him, large detachments from Quebec and Montreal ;* 
2d, that Proctor, Barclay, Vincent, and Sheafe, so far 
from being in a condition to yield any aid to the 
supposed project of an attack on Sacket's Harbor, 
were themselves in great want of re-enforcements — 
the former, postponing on that account, an attack 
which he had been ordered to make on Perry's fleet, 
while fitting out at Presque Isle f 3d, that when late 
in the month of May, the British commander-in-chief 
(induced by the continued absence of the American 
fleet and army at the head of the lake) made an 
attack on Sacket's Harbor, he was unable to bring 
against that post, more than seven hundred combatants, 
— a conduct, utterly unaccountable in an old soldier, 
having at his disposition a corps of either six or eight 
thousand men ; 4th, that the maximum of the British 
regular force at Kingston, in 1813, was one thousand 
men — a fact ascertained by the late Major-General 
Brown during the war, and subsequently, on a visit to 
that place.^ And lastly, that Sheafe's papers, taken 
at York and examined by the late Colonel Connor, 
Aid-decamp to General Dearborn, " showed satisfac- 
torily, that the garrison of Kingston, during the winter 
and spring of 1813, was weak^ and much below the 
force necessary to its defence.^'* 

> Christie's History of the War in the Canadas, p. 101. 

2 Letters of Prevost and De Rottenburg to Proctor and Barclay, 
Appendix, No. 19. 

3 Appendix, No. 16. 
< Appendix, No. 17. 



156 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

II. The error next in date, as well as in magni- 
tude, was that of omitting to make any competent 
provision for preventing the escape of the two British 
garrisons, the one from York, the other from fort 
George ; an object, which, had it been accomplished, 
would have given us a complete command of the 
peninsula, and necessarily prevented those blunders 
and misfortunes, the occurrence of which, so com- 
pletely verified the prediction of the much and justly 
lamented Pike. 

Had the commander-in-chief in the first of the 
above mentioned cases, been on the field of battle or 
near it, or had he made Colonel Pierce acquainted 
with the orders given to Pike, (as he ought to have 
done,) the unnecessary delay made in the pursuit of 
the enemy would not have occurred ; and in this 
case, Sheafe and his followers would, in all proba- 
bility, have been overtaken and captured. Again, 
in the other case, if, instead of concentrating his 
whole force, naval and military, on the water-side 
of the enemy's defences, he had divided the attack, 
and made Chandler's brigade, Macomb's regiment, 
and Burns's cavalry, with a few pieces of artillery, 
cross the Niagara below Lewistown, and advance 
on fort George by the Queenstown road, the invest- 
ment of tliat place would have been complete, and 
a retreat of the garrison impracticable. That this 
important duty should have escaped the General's 
notice is the more extraordinary, as the Secretary of 
War, in a letter of the 15th of May, 1813, had suf- 
ficiently apprised him of what would be the obviona 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 157 

policy, and probable conduct of his adversary, should 
he find himself compelled to choose, between giving 
up his fortress, or saving his garrison.' 

III. To correct the preceding error, the army 
was ordered to march on the 28th, to the Beaver 
Dams, in the belief that Vincent, after calling in his 
outposts, would make a stand at that point ; but, 
unfortunately, though the pursuit was right, the 
direction given to it was wrong. Of the two routes 
in the General's choice, that known by the name of 
the Lake-road, would have placed him two miles in 
Vincent's front ; and would of course, have compelled 
that officer (had he committed the blunder ascribed 
to him) to fight a battle, with a force greatly supe- 
rior to his own, when, on the contrary, if approached 
by the Queenstown route, a direct and uninterrupted 
retreat would have been left open to him. 

IV. The effect of this false movement, besides 
unnecessarily trying the strength and patience of the 
troops, was the loss of two entire days to the pur- 
suit. Two others (the army being nov/ recalled 
to fort Gecrge) were given to the consideration of 
some expedient, which should best indemnify us for 
the time and labor thus thrown away. The Gene- 
ral's own wish, was to avail himself of the fleet, to 
carry the army to Burlington Bay ; but the high 
destiny of that arm, on this, as on a later occasion, 
gave it a different and less useful direction. Left, 
therefore, without a choice of measures, he at last 
adopted one, (a march on the enemy by the Lake- 

1 Appendix, No. 18. 
14 



158 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

road,) which ought to have heen taken at daybreak 
of the 28th. But here, the General defeated the 
wisdom of his own decision by the means employed 
to execute it ; for, instead of sending a force com- 
petent to the service required, he on the 1st of June, 
under some extraordinary delusion, despatched only 
a single and small brigade to combat a force, which, 
according to his own estimate on the 28th of May, 
required the presence and co-operation of nearly the 
whole army. 

V. Doubting, at last, the sufficiency of Winder's 
brigade, the General on the 3d of June, despatched 
a second, which, with its precursor, reached Stony 
Creek in the evening of the 5th, when it was de- 
cided that the army should halt for the night. 
Chandler, who was now the leader of the enter- 
prise, finding himself but six miles from the enemy, 
concluded, and not unreasonably, that if Vincent 
intended to give battle, he would make the attempt 
during the ensuing night; and under this impres- 
sion, hastened to call into exercise all his general- 
ship to meet that contingency. Pickets were ac- 
cordingly placed in front and rear, and on both 
flanks ; while a chain of sentinels encircled the 
camp. Yet, with all these precautions, the camp 
was surprised, a portion of its artillery taken, and 
one hundred prisoners made, among whom, were 
the two Brigadiers. A misfortune like this, mus* 
have had a cause, or causes, worth inquiring into , 
with regard to which, we offer the following sug- 
gestions : — 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 159 

1st. " If a General take a position in the neigh- 
borhood of an enemy, from whom a night-attack 
may be expected, his first care ought to be, to keep 
his force together, and so placed, that its several 
parts may be promptly brought to sustain each 
other." This maxim does not appear to have been 
sufficiently attended to. The thirteenth and four- 
teenth regiments, composing the boat and baggage 
guard, were stationed three miles from the encamp- 
ment ; and the cavalry so placed as to be unable to 
act.^ Why the position given to tlie boat-guard, 
had not been taken as the ground of encampment 
for the whole detachment, is not very apparent ; for 
here, besides the advantages of concentration, the 
General would have found himself three miles nearer 
his object ; on the very route, by which he intended 
moving in the morning; and with flanks and rear, 
well secured by the lake and the creek, against the 
night-attack he expected.^ 

2d. " It is not enough that patrols and pickets 
be established against night-attacks. Tliese parties 
should be frequently visited by the General himself, 
or by some one- of his staff, who will be careful to 
enforce the orders already given, or issue new ones 
accommodated to such change of circumstances as 
may have arisen in the case." Had such a super- 
vision been exercised on the present occasion, it is 
quite impossible, that an entire picket would have 



1 Burns's Report to General Dearborn. 

2 Chandler's Report to General Dearborn, of the 18th of June. 



160 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

been caught asleep on its post; or that fires, ordered 
to be extinguished in the evening, siiould have been 
found burning at daybreak.' 

3d. " In night operations, when the eye can do 
Httle, false attacks may be mistaken for real ones — 
but even in this case, the ear of a practised soldier 
cannot long be deceived — for if the onset be neither 
vigorous nor extended, it may at once be considered 
as false." Vincent's demonstrations were of this 
kind, few and feeble ; and making no serious im- 
pression but upon the two Generals — who, mistaking 
them for the main attack, drew off the fifth regi- 
ment from the centre of the line, and thus left the 
artillery unsupported. 

4th. The next blander in this comedy of errors, 
must be ascribed to Burns, on whom the command 
of the army had devolved, in consequence of the 
capture of Chandler and Winder. When, at day- 
break, this officer was called to exercise his new 
functions, he found, as he tells us in his official 
report, that " all the views of the enemy had been 
completely frustrated ; himself obliged to fly, leaving 
the field of battle covered with his dead and wounded, 
and more than seventy men, principally of the forty- 
ninth, made prisoners :" while, on the other hand, 
the troops of the United States had suffered httle 
loss, were in perfect order, and entirely in condition, 
had not both Generals been taken, to have pressed 
Vincent to a second combat, the issue of which, 

1 Chandler's Report to General Dearborn, of the 18th of June. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 161 

would not have been doubtful. Yet, in despite of 
all these discoveries, our modest cavalier (from sheer 
diffidence in his own capacity to direct infantry 
movements) refused to avail himself of the advan- 
tages he possessed, and, instead of longer pursuing 
the objects of the expedition, turned his back at 
once on Vincent and victory, and hastily retired to 
Forty-Mile Creek ; thus practically contradicting 
his own official statements, and giving to the affair 
of Stony Creek, the new and unmerited character of 
a positive defeat on our part. 

5th. But little more mismanagement was now 
wanting, to make the campaign of 1813, as much a 
subject of ridicule at home, and contempt abroad, 
as that of the preceding year. Nor had we long to 
wait for such new instances of misconduct, as could 
not fail to produce this degrading effect. On the 
6th of June — the day on which Burns was flying, 
when none pursued — an order was received from 
the commander-in-chief, recalling without loss of 
time, the whole army to fort George, and virtually 
abandoning all the objects of the campaign. Nor 
was even this ill-judged movement executed, with- 
out a disorder which entailed upon it, the loss of 
"twelve boats, principally laden with the baggage 
of the army."' 

These events were soon known and justly appre- 
ciated by the British commander, who, advancing 
as we retreated, was willing on the 20th of the 



1 General Lewis's Letter of the 14th of June, 1813. 
14* 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

month, to hazard the elite of his army (about five 
hundred combatants) within stroke of his adver- 
sary.^ Every just view of this circumstance, indi- 
cated the wisdom of immediately assailing this corps ; 
the capture, or destruction of which, would have 
effectually defeated the present views and future 
operations of Vincent. But unfortunately, though 
the General adopted this opinion, he altogether 
failed, as in other cases, in the employment of 
means, proper for giving to the experiment a suc- 
cessful issue. Instead of placing, as he ought to 
have done,yScott and Miller at the head of fifteen 
hundred men each,^ and moving them by a night- 
march and the shortest route on De Coos's station, 
he despatched Bcsrstler (an officer not distinguished 
by any prior service) with five hundred and forty 
effectives only, by the Queenstown road, in open 
day, without reserve or demonstration of any kind, 
either to sustain the attack, or cover the retreat !^ 

1 The Stone House, called De Coos's station, was seventeen miles 
from fort George. 

2 The effective strength of General Dearborn's army, amounted at 
this time, to three thousand five hundred combatants. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 163 



CHAPTER VI. 

Second investment of Fort Meigs. — Gallant defence of Fort Stephen- 
son. — Defeat of the British fleet on Lake Erie.— Capture of Ara- 
herstberg. — Recapture of Detroit and the Michigan Territory. — Har- 
rison's pursuit and defeat of Proctor. — Arrival of a part of the 
Western Army on the Niagara. 

Alarmed by the reports in circulation of Perry's 
progress in building and equipping armed vessels at 
Presque Isle, Proctor and Barclay, early in the spring, 
projected an attack on that post ; but for this pur- 
pose, an augmentation of their several means was 
deemed indispensable. The General, accordingly, 
called for a re-enforcement of regular infantry, and 
the Commodore, for an additional number of practised 
seamen; but though the enterprise was promptly ap- 
proved by Provost, and entirely conformed to views 
previously given by him, so weak at the moment 
was the British central division on Lake Ontario, 
that an immediate compliance with either branch 
of the requisition was impracticable ; nor was it till 
about the 10th of July, that "sixty seamen and four 
hundred infantry" could be sent to the division of 
the west.^ 

In the meantime, to avoid a state of inaction, and 
I See letters of Provost and De Rottenburg, Appendix, No. 20. 



164 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

to give employment, in particular, to a great mass 
of restless Indians, which had been assembled at 
Maiden in March and April, Proctor began the cam- 
paign with a demonstration on fort Meigs, from which 
he expected the following results; 1st, Tliat Clay, 
and his garrison, made up of insubordinate militia, 
might be provoked or seduced to quit their intrench- 
ments, and take the risk of a field-fight with him and 
Tecumseh ; and 2d, that by seriously alarming Har- 
rison (then at Lower Sandusky) for the safety of 
his outpost and stores on the Miami, that officer 
would be induced to march to their defence ; and 
thus losing the power of sustaining fort Stephenson, 
Cleveland and Presque Isle, render certain and easy 
the capture of those places.^ 

With these views, the British commander began 
his movement at the head of a force, regular, miUtia 
and Indian, amounting to four thousand combat- 
ants ;'^ with which, on the 22d of May, he appeared 
before fort Meigs. But perceiving early, that his 
stratagem in relation to that place, was not likely to 
succeed, and that what remained of his plan might 
be jeoparded by delay, he on the 28th, raised his 
camp ; sent back a part of his allies to Maiden, de- 
tached another and larger portion to watch and way- 
lay Harrison, and with the residue of his force, white 
and red, hastened to the attack of Lower Sandusky. 
Nor could circumstances more propitious be imag- 
ined, than those under which he found this nominal 

1 See letters of Provost and De Rottcnburg, Appendix, No. 19. 

2 Christie's History of the War in the Canadas, p. 117. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 165 

fortress, — injudiciously placed and badly constructed, 
neither finished nor furnished, and even stripped of a 
partof its ordinary armament, — with asmall garrison 
not exceeding one Irundred and fifty men, under 
orders to retreat, "should the enemy approach in 
force and with cannon, provided a retreat should then 
be practicable.''^ 

Fortunately for the credit of the American arms, 
the first step taken by Proctor was that of isolating 
the fort by a cordon of Indians; thus rendering the 
retreat of the garrison highly perilous, if not imprac- 
ticable, and leaving to the commander a choice only 
between submission and resistance. In making this 
selection, the young and gallant Croghan did not 
hesitate ; and to the demand of a surrender, enforced 
b}^ the usual menace of indiscriminate slaughter in 
case of refusal, he answered svibetantially, — that the 
defence of his post was a point of honor, which could 
only be satisfied by an actual experiment of the rela- 
tive force and fortune of his antagonist and himself. 

While this negotiation was in progress, Proctor 
was employed in landing his artillery and giving it 
a position in aid of his gun-boats ; from which, on 
the delivery of Croghan's answer, a heavy fire was 
opened and contimied on the fort, with little if any 
intermission during the night. At daybreak, a second 
battery of three six-pounders was established within 
two hundred and fifty yards of the pickets ; and about 
four o'clock, P. M., it was found that the whole fire 
of the British cannon, was concentrated on the north- 
west corner of the fort — a circumstance, sufficiently 



166 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

indicating the point and species of attack meditated 
upon it. Major Croghan, accordingly, hastened to 
employ such means as he possessed to strengthen 
the menaced angle, ^ and had barely executed his 
purpose, when the enemy (covering hhnself with 
smoke) was seen rapidly advancing, and but a few 
paces distant from the pickets. A general and well- 
directed fire of musketry from the garrison, which 
immediately followed this discovery, had the effect 
of checking his progress and considerably disturbing 
his order ; but the latter being speedily restored, the 
movement was resumed, and the ditch reached and 
occupied by the head of the column. It was at this 
critical moment, that Croghan's single piece of artil- 
lery, charged with grape-shot and so placed as to 
enfilade the assailants, opened its fire and with such 
effect, that in a fp.w minutes, the combat was virtu- 
ally ended and the battle won.* Mosl of the enemy 
who had entered the ditch, were killed or wounded ; 
and such of them as were less advanced and able to 
fly, sought safety in the neighboring woods — carry- 
ing with them no disposition to renew the attack, 
and strongly impressing their Indian allies with their 
own panic. Proctor now saw, that all attempts to 
rally the fugitives were hopeless ; and that to avoid 
a greater calamity,^ his most prudent course would 

1 Bags of flour and sand. 

2 The cannonade and bombardment lasted thirty-six hours. 

3 A fear that Harrison would quit his camp at Seneca, and pounce 
upon him in his then crippled state. It is worthy of notice, tliat of 
these two commanders, (always the terror of each other,) one, was 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 167 

be, to re-embark wliat could be collected of liis force, 
red and white, and return immediately to Maiden. 
His retreat began accordingly at three o'clock in 
the morning, leaving behind him a note, recom- 
mending to American humanity the burial of his 
dead and the care of his w^ounded. 

The enemy's movements not immediately requir- 
ing further attention from General Harrison, he now 
became actively and exclusively occupied, in bring- 
ing together such militia, in aid of the regular troops 
assigned to his command, as was deemed competent 
to the objects of the campaign. To this service, the 
popular and patriotic Governors of Kentucky and 
Ohio lent themselves freely and successfully ; and 
by the 15th of September, the army collected on the 
southern shore of Lake Erie, and destined to a new 
invasion of Canada, amounted to more than seven 
thousand men. 

Nor was the naval and auxiliary armament con- 
structed at Erie, more tardy in its movements. On 
the 2d of August, the vessels were brought over the 
bar; and on the 5tli, were in condition to offer battle 
to the enemy's fleet. This challenge being declined, 
a second experiment, made with the same view on 
the 7lb, had a similar result. It was, however, soon 
found, that Barclay's hesitancy had not arisen from 
any settled purpose of avoiding a combat, but merely 
to supply a defect in the necessary preparation of his 

now actually flying from his supposed pursuer ; while the other, waited 
only the arrival of Cro2^ian at Seneca, to begin a camp-conflagration, 
and flight to Upper Sandusky. 



168 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

ships. At sunrise of the lOth of September, he was 
seen bearing down from Maiden in the direction of 
Put-in Ba}^, whither Perry hastened to follow and to 
fight him. 

The relative force of the two fleets, was not widely 
different — that of the British, was composed of two 
ships, two schooners, one brig, and one sloop, car- 
rying sixty-three guns (twelve, eighteen and twenty- 
four-pounders) with five hundred and eleven seamen 
and marines ; while that of the United States, con- 
sisted of three brigs, two schooners, and four sloops, 
mounting fifty-four carronades, and jnanned by four 
hundred seamen and marines.^ In command of 
the former, was a distinguished veteran of the Nel- 
son school, to whom all the secrets, real and pre- 
tended, of naval tactics, must have been intimately 
known ; while, at the head of the latter, was a 
youth "whose home had long been en the deep" — 
glowing with patriotism and courage, but having 
no experimental knowledge of battles fought in 
squadron. 

As if in some degree, to compensate this and 
other points of disparity, the wind, which early in 
the morning blew from the south-west, shifted to 
the south-east, and gave to the American fleet the 
weather-gage. Availing himself of this advantage, 
perhaps v/ith too little attention to the sailing qual- 
ities of his smaller vessels. Perry, at a quarter before 
twelve, placed the Lawrence in a position to begin 

1 McAffee's History. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 169 

an action, which, for pertinacity and effect, will 
rank high in the annals of naval warfare. Finding", 
after an experiment of ten minutes, that the distance 
he had taken was better adapted to his enemy's 
guns than to his own, he made sail ahead ; soon 
after which, to his great mortification, "the brig 
became unmanageable — every brace and bowline 
being, in the meantime, shot away." Yet in this 
crippled condition, she gallantly " sustained the 
contest for more than two hours," ai canister dis- 
tance ; when " every gun she had, being rendered 
useless, and a large portion of her crew killed or 
wounded,"^ her commander transferred himself and 
his flag on board the Niagara, which, at this critical 
moment, a gust of wind had brought to his aid. A 
movement was now wanting that should give to 
the conflict a decided character and favorable issue ; 
and this, Perry hastened to employ. At forty-five 
minutes past two, the smaller vessels having got 
hito line, the signal for close action was made ; 
when the Niagara, bearing up and passing the 
Detroit, Queen Charlotte and Lady Provost, at half 
pistol-shot distance, poured into them a most de- 
structive fire from her starboard guns ; and from her 
larboard battery another of equal execution, on the 
Chippewa and Little Belt. What yet remained to 
be done, was soon accomplished by the gun-boats, 
under the skilful direction of Captain Elliot y^ the 



Perry's official letter, dated September 13th, 1813. 
Idem. 



170 NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. 

flags of the Detroit, Queen Charlotte, and Lady 
Provost, were struck in quick succession ; those of 
the brig Hunter and schooner Chippewa, were not 
slow in following the example ; and the Little Belt, 
which now attempted to escape, was promptly pur- 
sued and soon captured. Such was the termination 
of this well-fought and decisive battle — brilliant in 
itself, having the most important bearing on the 
issue of the campaign, and requiring nothing to 
complete its glory, but the humble and pious grati- 
tude with which it was announced. 

The road to Maiden being no longer obstructed 
by the enemy, the commanding General now has- 
tened to avail himself of the first impression made 
on Proctor by this naval victory. Embarking the 
army on the 37th, he on that day sailed under con- 
voy of the fleet for the Canada shore ; which, from 
the favorable state of the wind and weather, he 
was enabled to reach at three o'clock, P. M. No 
enemy appearing to interrupt the debarcation, it was 
safely and promptly made, and the march continued 
to Amherstburg, where the troops bivouacked for 
the night. 

It was here, that General Harrison first learned, 
that Proctor, after dismantling Maiden, burning the 
barracks and navy-yard, and stripping the adjacent 
country of horses and cattle, had early on the 26th, 
began his retreat into the interior of the province. 
Though no time was lost in resuming the piusuit in 
the morning, still, reasoning from the urgency of 
Proctor's motives for a speedy flight, and the ample 



NOTICES OF T^IF. WAR OF 1812. 171 

means he possessed for executing- it successfully, the 
movement was made without the smallest hope that 
the American army could, by any effort, be able to 
overtake him.' This desponding view of the busi- 
ness, which, had it continued longer, would no doubt 
have verified itself, was fortunately much dimin- 
ished, if not entirely removed, (soon after the arrival 
of the army at Sandwich,) by finding, that the want 
of horses, which, in the General's opinion, rendered 
the pursuit hopeless, would be well and abundantly 
supplied by Johnson's mounted regiment, which 
was now seen winding- its way along the opposite 
bank of the Detroit.'^ 

Two days were now employed in re-establishing 
the civil government of the Michigan Territory, and 
assigning to it a defensive corps ; in organizing a 
portion of the army for rapid movement, and in 
giving to the whole of it an order of march and 
battle. It was not, therefore, until the 2d of Octo- 
ber, that the pursuit was resumed, nor until the 5th, 
that the enemy was overtaken. On this day, he 
was discovered in a position skilfully chosen, in 
relation as well to local circumstances, as to the 
character of his troops. A narrow strip of dry 

1 General Harrison's letter to the Secretary of War, dated Septem- 
ber 27th, 1813. In this letter, the General says — "I will pursue the 
enemy to-morrow, although there is no probability of overtaking him ; 
as he has upwards of one thousand horses, and we have not one in 
the army." 

2 This corps had been organized by direction of the War Depart- 
ment, for frontier defence, in the spring of 1813, under the command 
of Colonel R. M. Johnson. 



172 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

ground, flanked by the Thames on the left, and by 
a swamp on the right, was occupied by his regidar 
infantry, amounting to eight hundred bayonets, sus- 
tained by artillery: while on the right flank, lay 
Tecumseh and his followers, on the eastern margin 
of the swamp. After satisfying himself of these 
facts. General Harrison hastened to make such dis- 
position of his force, as, in his opinion, was best 
accommodated to the case. To Trotter's brigade of 
Kentucky volunteers, was assigned the front line, 
extending from the swamp to the road near the 
bank of the river. One hundred and fifty yards in 
the rear of Trotter, King's brigade formed a second 
line, of similar extent; and in the rear of King, 
Child's brigade was held in reserve. On the left 
of Trotter and covering his flank, Desha's division, 
composed of two brigades, was posted in crotchet 
or en potence — while to the mounted gun-men, was 
assigned the duty of turning the right flank of the 
Indian position. 

This arrangement was scarcely announced, when 
two important circumstances, which had either not 
been attended to at all, or very negligently, were 
now fully ascertained ; the one, that the service 
assigned to the mounted regiment, was impractica- 
ble, from the miry character of the soil, and the 
number and closeness of the thickets which cov- 
ered it ; the other, that Proctor had neglected to 
strengthen the front of his position with either ditch 
or abbatis ; and had besides, committed the greater 
fault, of giving to his regular infantry a formation 



NOTICES OP THE WAR OF 1812. 173 

of open order. Acting on this state of things, which 
left no doubt of the true point of attack, or of the 
means most proper to be employed in making it, 
the mounted corps was now ordered to form in close 
column in front of the volunteers ; to advance ob- 
liquely in the direction of the British infantry, and 
after receiving their fire, to charge them at full 
speed. On examining the ground directed by the 
preceding order to be taken, the space was found 
to be too narrow for a useful employment of the 
whole regiment ; when Colonel Johnson, in the 
exercise of a discretion wisely left to him, separated 
the two battalions of which it was composed ; giv- 
ing to the one, the execution of the projected charge 
on the British infantry, and to the other, a simul- 
taneons attack on the Indian line. Of the two 
corps, the second battalion, "in four columns of 
double files," had advanced but a short distance, 
when it received the enemy's fire ; which, as might 
have been expected from men and horses unpractised 
in war, and brought for the first time into actual com- 
bat, produced a recoil in the heads of the columns. 
The disorder was, however, soon and completely 
retrieved, and a second fire sustained, with the sang 
froid of veterans ; when the charge, as directed, 
was promptly and vigorously made, and with a suc- 
cess, seldom equalled and never surpassed. In " the 
single minute of time" which it occupied,* the vic- 
tory of the day was essentially won, and nearly the 

I Harrison's Official Report of the action. 
15* 



174 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

whole of the regular force of the enemy killed, 
wounded, or taken. The contest between the first 
battalion and the savages, was, Uke the preceding, 
sharp but short; its duration not exceeding six or 
seven minutes. In this, the gallant Colonel John- 
son was thrice severely wounded ; and his not less 
gallant adversary, Tecumseh, the head and heart 
of the Indian hne, killed on the spot he defended. 
Proctor, who had saved himself and part of his suite, 
by a base desertion of his troops, was now strenu- 
ously but unsuccessfully pursued. The chase was 
not, however, altogether barren; fifty additional pris- 
oners and six pieces of brass artillery were captured 
and secured. 

Thus fortunately terminated an expedition, the 
results of which were of high importance to the 
United States ; a naval ascendency gained on Lakes 
Erie and Superior ; Maiden destroyed, Detroit re- 
covered. Proctor defeated, the alliance between Great 
Britain and the savages dissolved, and peace and 
industry restored to our widely extended and much 
exposed western frontier. With the proud satisfac- 
tion of having contributed to these important events, 
the Kentucky volunteers began their homeward 
march, under the direction of their gallant and ven- 
erable leader, the late Governor Shelby. 

The attention of General Harrison and Commo- 
dore Perry, on getting back to Sandwich, was for 
a moment, attracted to measures necessary to the 
reduction of Michilimackinac ; but the weather be- 
coming stormy, and the navigation of Lake Superior 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 175 

dangerous, the project was abandoned, and another 
and better substituted in its slead. Leaving to 
General Cass and his brigade the defence of Detroit, 
the residue of the reguhir troops, amounting to thir- 
teen luuKhed men, were promptly embarked and 
brought down to Buffalo^ where they arrived on the 
24th of October. In taking this step, the General 
had anticipated the wishes of the Secretary of War, 
who, in a despatch of the 22d of October, suggested 
as an ulterior operation for the army of the w est, a 
movement to the Niagara, and an attack of the 
right and rear of De Rottenburg's position ; while 
McClure's militia aiul Porter's volunteers should 
assail it in front — a measure, the execution of 
which was only prevented by the slowness with 
which both corps assembled for the purpose ; by 
the reported movement of the enemy from the 
peninsula to Kingston ; and by the risk arising from 
any great accumulation of force at that post, to 
our naval depot at Sacket's Harbor, in the absence 
of the army, which was now moving in another 
direction.^ 

The better to obviate this cause of alarm, the 
Secretary of War directed, that McArthur's brigade 
should be removed, as promptly as might be conve- 
nient, to the harbor ; intending by the limitation 
thus given to the order, that Smith's battalion of 
riflemen should be left to make part of the garrison 

1 See Appendix, No. 24 



176 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

of fort George, and the defence of the Niagara fron- 
tier ; instead of which, both corps were brought 
down the lake by the General, who, hastening his 
return to the west, soon after closed his military 
career by a resignation of his commission. 

Remarks. This third and last campaign of Gen- 
eral Harrison, though in its issue highly important 
to the nation and honorable to its arms, would, in 
all probability, have had a termination as disas- 
trous as its immediate predecessor, had the General 
been indulged, as formerly, with a carte blanche in 
the mode of conducting it. 

It will be remembered, that in prosecuting the 
war in the west, the cabinet of 1812, limited the 
exercise of its authority to a mere designation of 
objects; leaving to the knowledge and judgment of 
the commanding General, the selection of means, 
time and manner of pursuing them. The frequent 
and unexpected misfortunes, which in this and part 
of the succeeding year, befel the American arms in 
district No. 8, could not fail to suggest a change of 
this system, in two essential points — the exclusively 
military character of the armament : and the latitude^ 
given to the General with respect to the number and 
kind of troops to be employed, and the time and mode 
of employing them. A plan of campaign conformed 
Co these general views, was accordingly prescribed, 
limiting the army to seven thousand combatants ; des- 
ignating Maiden as the object of attack ; adding 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 177 

to the military, a naval force ;^ and directing a move- 
ment of the former by water, instead of a land-march 
of ^^ nearly two hundred miles^Uhroiigh a swampy desert; 
in which, besides the ordinary impediments arising 
from roads and weather, it would, at every step, 
have been liable to the attacks, open and covered, 
of four thousand savages.^ 

* No efficient measures were taken by the government to obtain a 
command of the lakes, until October, 1812. A letter, written about 
this time, by General Armstrong to Mr. Gallatin, was probably the 
means of recalling the attention of the cabinet to this important sul)- 
ject. In this letter, the General stated the following facts — " that he 
was informed by Captain Chauncey, that as early as the 1st of July, 
Captain "Woolsey had requested twenty six-pounders, of which, there 
were more than one hundred in tlie navy-yard unemployed ; that the 
intention of Woolsey was to ai*m such vessels of commerce, as could 
be found on the lake, and at Sacket's Harbor, with the aid of which 
he would be able to get a complete command of the water, and that 
he (Captain Chauncey) not believing himself authorized to do more, 
had but referred the letter to the Secretary of the Navy, from whom 
no answer had been received." On these facts, the General siibjoined 
the following opinions, that " it was not yet too late to accomplish 
Mr. Woolsey's object; and that the object in itself was of the highest 
importance ; that besides giving us the advantage of an exclusive and 
uninterrupted use of the Lakes for public purposes, it toould effectually 
separate Upper from Loioer Canada, cut asxinder the enemy's line of 
communication, and prevent Brock and Provost from succoring each 
other.^^ Soon after the receipt of this letter, Commodore Chauncey 
received authority to build and equip, armed vessels on Lake On- 
tario ; and General Dearborn a similar authority, to arm and otherwise 
fit out for public service, such commercial craft as might be useful on 
Lake Champlain. For another communication, involving this and 
other subjects, see Appendix, No. 22. 

2 McAffee and Christie. The latter, residing in Canada, and hav- 
ing access to public functionaries, must be considered good authority 
with respect to the numbers with which the expedition began. 



178 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

To a strategic movement of this kind, expressly 
calculated to gain an ascendency on the Lake, and 
thus to neutralize the Indian part of the enemy's 
force, and secure to the American army a direct 
approach to its ohject, without expense, fatigue, or 
peril — no opposition, on the part of the General, 
was anticipated ; and the more so, as in December 
or January preceding, he had officially announced, 
that ^' if the government would employ naval means, 
all their objects could be accomplished, in the short 
space of two months in the spring. ^^^ Yet, so vacil- 
lating was his judgment on this subject, that in 
March, 1813, he substantially revoked this advice, 
and did what he could, to obtain permission to con- 
duct the campaign by the old route, and in the old 
way.'^ Fortunately, time, and the experience it 
brought with it, had lessened the weight of the 
General's opinions at Washington ; his suggestions 
on the present occasion, were, thereforCj promptly 
and decidedly discarded, and a new order issued, 
for prosecuting the campaign on the plan given in 
March, which, as we have seen, terminated success- 
fully in August. 

Mr. Harrison's next error was of a character even 
more menacing than the preceding ; and but for the 
counteraction given to it by Major Croghan, must 
have been followed by disaster and disgrace — a con- 

1 General Harrison's letter to the War Department, of the 12th 
December, 1812. 

s Harrison's official letter, of the 17tli of March, and answer of the 
Secretary of War, Appendix, No. 23. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF liil'2. 179 

elusion, abundantly established by the following 
facts. On the 2 1st of April, after inspecting the 
defences at Lower Sandusky, the General, in a letter 
to the War Department, denounced that post as 
worthless in itself, and " impossible to save," and, 
therefore, " to be immediately stripped of its stores, 
and promptly abandoned on the approach of the enemy. ^^^ 
Yet, on the 26th or 27th of July, though apprised 
of Proctor's coming, at the head of a force, esti- 
mated at live thousand combatants ; though having 
done nothing to render the place more defensible, 
and somewhat to make it less so ; though neither 
promising, nor intending to sustain it, should it be 
attacked; and though actually withdrawing himself 
and the army to Seneca, nine miles distant from it 
— yet, in despite of all these circumstances of inhi- 
bition, he placed in fort Stephenson a detachment 
of one hundred and sixty United States infantry, 
with " a single and small piece of artillery, and 
seven rounds of cannon cartridges," under orders to 
retreat, if " the enemy landed in force and with 
cannon, provided retreat should then he practicable.^^ 

We need hardly remark, that an order of this 
kind, which put to hazard a detachment of this 
magnitude, in an untenable post, with few of the 
means necessary for meeting either siege or assault, 
and which forbade a retreat, while this could have 
been made with certainty and safety; and for a 
purpose altogether unnecessary, as he had already 

I Harrison's letter of the 21st of April, 1813. 



180 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

concluded — that " coming by water, Proctor had not 
neglected to bring with him artillery"^ — was, in its 
whole bearing, a direct violation of every military 
rule applicable to the case. Nor was the General's 
subsequent conduct better conformed to their in- 
junctions. 

Having on the 29th, sufficiently assured himself 
with regard to the number and equipment of Proc- 
tor's force, and suspecting that this formidable array 
might be directed against his own intrenched camp 
at Seneca ; he at once determined, " to collect and 
destroy his surplus stores, abandon his present posi- 
tion and make good a retreat to Upper Sandusky" 
— ^leaving to the fate that might await them, the 
settlements on the southern shore of the Lake ; the 
boats built and stores collected at Cleveland ; and 
Perry's fleet, then fitting out and nearly ready for 
service, at Presque Isle.^ But though willing and 
prepared to make these sacrifices, he could not but 
perceive that a mere presumption of danger to his 
own camp, would not justify the abandonment of 
Croghan's detachment, without some effort on his 
part, to extend to it the eventual security he sought 
for himself. On this point, however, the General's 



1 " As the enemy, coming by water, could bring with facihty any 
quantity of battering cannon against it, it must inevitably fall" — a fact 
assumed by the General, in the council of war, held on the evening 
of the 23th.— Mc^^ffee's History, p. 322. 

2 That this was the great object of the expedition will be seen by 
Provost's letter to Proctor, of the lUh of July, and De Rottenburg's to 
Barclay, of the same month, Appendix, No. 19. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OP 1812. 181 

sense of duty was soon satisfied ; forgetting alike 
the admonition contained in his first order to Crog- 
han, " not to hazard a retreat in the face of an Indian 
investments^'' and the fact, now perfectly known to 
himself, that such investment did exist ;* he des- 
patched to that officer a second order, for "an imme- 
diate retreats^'' at all hazards ; indicating the route by 
which he was to make it, but taking no step to cover, 
or otherwise sustain the movement. And, as if the 
task thus imposed, was not in itself sufficiently peril- 
ous, he farther prescribed — that the garrison, instead 
of employing all possible means to mask the operar 
tion, should begin ^^by setting fire to their stores and 
barracks,^^ and thus virtually announce their inten- 
tion to the surrounding enemy. '^ 

Fortunately, the great disposer of the events of this 
world, not unfrequently converts evil into good, and 
folly into wisdom. On the present occasion, we 
have seen, that by the first order given to Croghan, 
he was assigned to the defence of a post, which, in 
the General's opinion, " could not be saved,^^ and at 
the same time, forbidden to retreat, in the face of an 
Indian investment ; and that by a second, he was or- 
dered to abandon this untenable post, and make good a 
retreat of nine miles, through a continuous forest filled 
with savages, loithout aid or support of any kind. Left, 

1 In Harrison's official letter of the 4th of August, he says — *' Hav- 
ing heard the firing [at the fort] I made many attempts to ascertain the 
force of the enemy ; but our scouts were unable to get near the fort, from 
the Indians who surrounded it." 

9 Second order given to Croghan, Appendix, No. 21. 
16 



182 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

therefore, to choose between taking the risk of a 
British assault, or an Indian massacre, this officer 
did not hesitate, and was thus compelled to disobey 
an order, which directly defeated its own object. 
Yet, under circumstances so unpromising, whether 
separately or collectively considered, results of the 
most benign character followed — the defeat of the 
enemy's objects, lyrcsent and prospective, and the pres- 
ervation of our own army, from the disgrace of a ivaste^ 
fill and unnecessary fight. ^ 

A word or two, at parting, on the charge made 
by a battalion of Johnson's mounted regiment, (un- 
equipped with either swords or lances,) on a corps 
of veteran infantry, w^ell armed with muskets and 
bayonets, sustained by cannon, and numerically 
stronger than their assailants. That the charge 
was gallantly made, and eminently successful, (loin- 
ning the battle, as acknowledged by the General 
himself, ^'ina single minute,' ') cannot be doubted; 
but to bestow on it, the additional praise of deserv- 
ing its good fortune, must depend on a single fact, 
whether the measure was, or was not, adopted under a 
sense of the advantage furnished to the assailant, by 
this error of his enemy ? If this question can be 
answered affirmatively, the merit of the charge will be 
greatly enhanced and fully established. The affair will 
no longer be subject to be classed with victories merely 

1 Extract from Governor Duncan's report of the defence of San- 
dusky, by Major Croghan, made to Mr. Mercer, chairman of the 
Military Committee of the House of Representatives, in 1834, Ap- 
pendix, No. 20. 



NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 183 

fortuitous ; but take its place with those inspirations^ 
(as they have been called) of Turenne and Bonaparte, 
which, founded on the error of an enemy, and seen at 
a glance of the eye, could justify the most palpable de- 
viation from ordinary rules. 

Another and last question on this subject — On 
whose suggestion was the charge under consideration. 
made 1 Did the General, as he insinuates, " find the 
daisy all himself?" or, was the conception of the 
project, the legitimate property of Colonel R. M. John- 
son ? Non nostrum tantas componere lites.^ 

Proctor's situation at Maiden (after Barclay's de- 
feat) made necessary on his part, a prompt retreat to 
Vincent, unencumbered with baggage ; or, a vigorous 
defence of the post committed .to his custody. By 
adopting the former, he would have saved seven hun- 
dred veteran soldiers and a train of artillery, for the 
future service of his sovereign ; by adopting the latter, 
he would have retained the whole of his Indian allies 
(three thousand combatants) ; given time for the militia 
of the interior to come to his aid ; had the full advan- 
tage of his fortress and its munitions — and a chance, 
at least, of eventual success, with a certainty of keep- 
ing inviolate his own self-respect, and the confidence 
of his followers. Taking a middle course between 

• The affair more particularly alluded to in this passage, is the 
attack and capture made of the Spanish batteries, planted on the 
crest and covering the ascent of the Sommo-Sierra, by the lancers 
of the Imperial guard, in 1808. See Napier's Peninsular War, 
Vol. I, p. 402. 

2 Appendix, No. 21. 



184 NOTICES OF THE WAR OF 1812. 

these extremes, he lost the advantages that would 
have resulted from either. His retreat began too late — 
was much encumbered with women, children, and bag- 
gage, and at no time urged with sufficient vigor, or 
protected with sufficient care. Bridges and roads, 
ferries and boats, were left behind him, neither de- 
stroyed nor obstructed ; and when, at last, he was 
overtaken and obliged to fight, he gave to his veterans 
a formation, which enabled a corps of four hundred 
mounted infantry, armed with rifles, hatchets, and 
butcher-knives, to win the battle " in a single minute." 
Conduct like this, deserved all the opprobrium and 
punishment it received, and justly led to General Har- 
rison's conclusion — that "his antagonist had lost his 
senses." 



APPENDIX, 



APPENDIX. 



[No. 1.] 

The ministry of the elder Adams in England, began 
on the 10th of June, 1785. In a letter to the American 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, on the 19th of July follow- 
ing, he says — " The popular pulse seems to beat high 
against America ; the people are deceived by numberless 
falsehoods circulated by the gazettes, &c., so that there 
is too much reason to believe, that if the nation had an- 
other hundred million to spend, they would soon force 
the ministry into a war against us. Their present sys- 
tem, as far as I can penetrate it, is to maintain a de- 
termined peace with all Europe, in order that they may 
war singly against America, if they should think it neces- 
sary." In a second letter of the 30th of August following, 
he says — "In short, sir, America has no party at present 
in her favor — all parties, on the contrary, have committed 
themselves against us — even Shelburne and Buckingham. 
I had almost said, the friends of America are reduced to 
Dr. Price and Dr. Jebb." Again, on the 15th of Octo- 
ber, 17S5, he informs the American Secretary — "that 
though it is manifestly as much the interest of Great 
Britain to be well with us, as for us to be well with them, 
yet this is not the judgment of the English nation ; it is 



188 APPENDIX. 

not the judgment of Lord North and his party ; it is not 
the judgment of the Duke of Portland and his friends, 
and it does not appear to be the judgment of Mr. Pitt 
and the present set. In short, it does not at present 
appear to be the sentiment of any body ; and I am much 
incHned to beUeve, they will try the issue of importance 
with us." In his two last letters, the one dated in No- 
vember, the other in December, 1787, we find the fol- 
lowing passages — " If she [England] can bind Holland 
in her shackles, and France from internal dissension is 
unable to interfere, she will make war immediately against 
us. No answer is made to any of my memorials, or 
letters to the ministry, nor do I expect that any will be 
done while I stay." 



[No. 2.] 

Letters from Colonel McKee (British Superintendent 
of Indian affairs) to Colonel England, dated 6th of July, 
and 13th and 30th of August, 1794, found among Proc- 
tor's papers, captured in 1S13. — " I send this by a party 
of Saganas, who returned yesterday from fort Recovery, 
where the whole body of Indians, except the Delawares, 
who had gone another route, imprudently attacked the 
fort on Monday, the 30th of last month, and lost sixteen 
or seventeen men, besides a good many wounded. 

" Every thing had been settled prior to their leaving 
tlie Fallen Timber, and it had been agreed upon, to con- 
fine themselves to taking convoys and attacking at a dis- 



APPENDIX. 189 

tance from the forts, if they should have the address to 
entice the enemy out ; but the impetuosity of the Macki- 
naw Indians, and their eagerness to begin with the nearest, 
prevailed with the others to alter their system ; the con- 
sequences of which, from the present appearance of things, 
may most materially injure the interests of these people ; 
both the Mackinaw and Lake Indians seeming resolved 
on going home again, having completed the belts they 
carried with scalps and prisoners, and having no provision 
there, or at the Glaze, to subsist upon ; so that his ma- 
jesty's post will derive no security from the late great 
influx of Indians into this part of the country, should they 
persist in their resolution of returning so soon. 

" Captain Elliot writes, that they [the British agents] 
are immediately to hold a council at the Glaze, in order 
to try if they can prevail on the Lake Indians to remain ; 
but without provisions, ammunition, &c., being sent to 
that place, I conceive it will be extremely difficult to keep 
them together. 

" I was honored last night with your letter of the 11th, 
and am extremely glad to find you are making such exer- 
tions to supply the Indians with provisions. Captain 
Elliot arrived yesterday; what he has brought will greatly 
relieve us, having been obliged yesterday to take all the 
corn and flour which the traders had here. Scouts are 
sent up to view the situation of the [American] army, and 
we now muster one thousand Indians. All the Lake 
Indians, from Sagana downwards, should not lose one 
moment in joining their brethren, as every accession of 
strength is an addition to their spirits. 

" I have been employed several days in endeavoring to 
fix the Indians (who have been driven from their villages 



190 APPENDIX. 

and cornfields) between the fort and the bay. Swan Creek 
is generally agreed upon, and will be a very convenient 
place for the delivery of provisions, &c. The last accounts 
from General Wayne's army were brought me last night 
by an Indian, who says, the army would not be able to 
reach the Glaze, before yesterday evening; it is supposed 
on account of the sick and wounded, many of whom they 
bury every day." 



[No. 3.] 

Letter from President Washington to Mr. Jay, dated 
30th August, 1794. — " As you will receive letters from 
the Secretary of State's Office, giving an official account 
of the public occurrences as they have arisen and ad- 
vanced, it is unnecessary for me to retouch any of them ; 
and yet, I cannot restrain myself from making some obser- 
vations on the most recent of them, the communication of 
which, was received this morning only. I mean the pro- 
test of the Governor of Upper Canada, delivered by Lieu- 
tenant Sheafe, against our occupying lands far from any 
of the posts, which, long ago, they ought to have surren- 
dered, and far within the known, and until now, the 
acknowledged limits of the United States. 

" On this irregular and high-handed proceeding of Mr. 
Simcoe, which is no longer masked, I would rather hear 
what the ministry of Great Britain will say, than pronounce 
my own sentiments thereon. But can that government, 
or will it attempt, after this official act of one of their 



APPENDIX. 191 

governors, to hold out ideas of friendly intentions towards 
the United States, and suffer such conduct to pass with 
impunity 1 

" This may be considered as the most open and daring 
act of the British agents in America, though it is not the 
most hostile and cruel ; for there does not remain a doubt 
in the mind of any well-informed person in this country, 
not shut against conviction, that all the difficuUies we en- 
counter with the Indians, their hostilities, the murders of 
helpless women and children along our frontiers, result from 
the conduct of the agents of Great Britain in this country. 
In vain is it then for its administration in Britain, to dis- 
avow having given orders which will warrant such conduct, 
whilst their agents go unpunished ; whilst we have a 
tliousand corroborating circumstances, and indeed as many 
evidences, some of which cannot be brought forward, to 
prove, that they are seducing from our aUiances, and 
endeavoring to remove over the line, tribes that have hith- 
erto been kept in peace and friendship with us at a heavy 
expense, and who have no causes of complaint, except 
pretended ones of their creating ; whilst they keep in a 
state of irritation the tribes who are hostile to us, and are 
instigating those who know little of us, or we of them, to 
unite in the war against us ; and whilst it is an undeniable 
fact, that they are furnishing the whole with arms, ammuni- 
tion, clothing, and even provisions to carry on the war. I 
might go farther, and, if they are not much belied, add, 
men also in disguise. 

" Can it be expected, I ask, so long as these things are 
known in the United States, or at least, firmly beheved, 
and suffered with impunity by Great Britain, that there 
ever will or can be any cordiality between the two coun- 



APPENDIX. 

tries 1 I answer — No. And I will undertake, withou* 
the gift of prophecy to predict, that it will be impossible 
to keep this country in a state of amity with Great Britain 
long, if these posts are not surrendered. A knowledge 
of these being my sentiments would have little weight, I 
am persuaded, with the British administration, or perhaps 
with the nation, in effecting the measure, but both may 
rest satisfied, that if they want to be at peace with this 
country, cuid to enjoy the benefits of its trade, to give up 
the posts is the only road to it. Withholding them, and 
the consequences we feel at present continuing, war will 
be inevitable." 



[No. 4.] 

Letter of credence given by the Governor-General of 
the Canadas to John Henry. " The bearer, Mr. John 
Henry, is employed by me, and full confidence may be 
placed in him for communications which any person may 
wish to make to me in the business committed to him. 
In faith of which, I have given him this, under my hand 
and seal, at Quebec, the 6th of February, 1809. 

(Signed.) J. H. CRAIG." 

Extract from the letter of instructions to JVlr. Henry. \ 
[Most secret and confidential.] 

" Quebec, 6th February, 1809. 
" It has been supposed, that if the federalists of the 
eastern states should be successful in obtaining that de- 
cided influence, which may enable them to direct the public 



APPENDIX. 193 

opinion, it is not improbable, that rather than submit to a 
continuance of the difficulties and distress to which they 
are now subject, they will exert that influence to bring 
about a separation from the general Union. The earhest 
information on this subject, may be of great consequence 
to our government, as it may also be, that it should be 
informed, how far, in such an event., they would look to 
England for assistance, or be disposed to enter into a con- 
nexion with us ?" 

Report made to Sir James Craig, under the preceding 
instruction, and dated Boston, March 7th, 1809. " Sir, I 
have now ascertained, with as much accuracy as possible, 
the course intended to be pursued by the measures and 
politics of the general government. I have already given 
a decided opinion, that a declaration of war is not to be 
expected ; but, contrary to all reasonable calculation, 
should the Congress possess spirit and independence 
enough to place their popularity in jeopardy by so strong a 
measure, the legislature of Massachusetts will give the tone 
to the neighboring states; will declare itself permanent, until 
a new election of members ; invite a Congress, to be composed 
of delegates from the federal stales, and erect a separate gov- 
ernment for their common defence and common interest.''^ 

Time, that great betrayer of political secrets, has pro- 
duced a curious illustration of the opinion given by Henry 
in the preceding report. Mr. Adams, ci-devant President 
of the United States, in a late publication admits, that in 
1808, "he earnestly recommended to the friends of the 
administration of that day, the substitution of the non- 
intercourse for the embargo ; and in giving his reasons for 
that preference, was necessarily led to enlarge upon the 
views and purposes of certain leaders of the party, which 
17 



194 APPENDIX. 

had the management of the state legislature in their hands. 
He urged, that a continuance of the embargo much longer, 
would certainly be met bij forcible resistance^ supported by the 
legislature, and probably, by the judiciary of the state ; that 
to quell that resistance, (if force should be resorted to by 
the government,) would produce a civil war ; and that in 
that event, he had no doubt the leaders of the party would 
secure the co-operation with them of Great Britain. That 
their object was, and had been for several years, a dissolution 
of the Union, and the establishment of a separate confedera- 
tion, he knew from unequivocal evidence, although not prove- 
able in a court of law ; and that in the case of a civil war, the 
aid of Great Britain to effect that purpose, would be as surely 
resorted to, as it would be indispensably necessary to the 
design.''^ It would be unjust to the party, thus accused by 
Mr. Adams, were we not to add, that the expositions sub- 
sequently made on this subject, do not sustain the opinions 
given by that gentleman. 



[No. 5. J 



As a specimen of the temper of the opposition of that 
day, we subjoin the following resolution of the Senate of 
Massachusetts, passed on the 15th of June, 1813, in con- 
sequence of the capture of his His Britannic Majesty's 
ship Peacock, by the American ship Hornet. 

" Resolved, As the sense of the Senate of Massachusetts, 
that in a war like the present, waged without justifiable 
cause, and prosecuted in a manner which indicates that 



APPENDIX. 195 

conquest and ambition are its real motives ; it is not be- 
coming a moral and religious people, to express any 
approbation of military or naval exploits, which are not 
immediately connected with the defence of our seacoast 
and soil.'' 

A further exposition of this temper will be found in 
an act of the legislature of Connecticut, declaring the law 
of the United States (authorizing the enlistment of minors) 
unconstituiionaU and providing, that all persons acting 
under it within the state, should be punished by fiyie and 
imprisonment. The penal clause was, however, quahfied 
at the instance of the Speaker of the House, and the 
punishment by imprisonment given up. About the same 
time, all troops of the United States were, by an act of 
the Corporation of Hartford, excluded from the city. — 
JVfajor {now General) Jessup^s Report to the Department of 
State, 



[No. 6.] 

Our authority for making this statement will be found 
in the following extract from a letter of the 28th of Sep- 
tember, 1834, written by 3Iajor-General Jessup, of the 
army of the United States. 

" As to the particular fact in relation to which you desire 
information, (the franking of the letters from which the 
enemy derived his knowledge of the declaration of war,) 
it rests on general report and JVIr. Gallatin''s admission^ 
(made to General Findley, in 1812,) that he had franked 



196 APPENDIX. 

letters addressed to persons in the enemifs territory. ^^ Of 
letters, so franked and addressed, three have been noticed ; 
one sent to the west, (probably to St. Joseph,) furnished 
the first authentic evidence of the declaration of war re- 
ceived there ; and with it a good and sufficient reason, 
for attacking and capturing Michilimaekinac and its gar- 
rison. Such was the substance of a report made by 
Lieutenant Hanks to General Hull, and the officer then 
serving as his Adjutant-General. A second, sent to Mai- 
den, (according to information given to General Jessup 
and the late Major Dugan, while at that place,) was re- 
ceived by the British commanding officer, on the 28th of 
June ; and, no doubt, caused the attack and capture of 
the Cayahoga packet, carrying the sick and convalescent 
of Hull's army, with his and their baggage. A third, 
reached Detroit,. " was there retained and seen by many 
perse«is» among whom, was General James Taylor, of 
Kentucky." Whatever may have been the motive of tlie 
letter writer, the injuiy done to the United States cannot 
be denied — as its direct, if not obvious effect, wns to take 
from them and give to the enemy, the power of striking 
the first blow — an advantage, which often decides the fate 
of a campaign, and not unfrequently, that of a war. 



[No. 7.] 



Memorandum of statements made by General Win- 
chester and Major Madison to the Secretary of War, ob 
their return from captivity. 



APPENDIX. 197 

" To avoid embarrassing the service with a personal 
controversy, and at the request of General Harrison, 
though the elder Brigadier, I continued in the command 
of the advanced corps, then on the Au Glaize, under a 
promise on his part, that ' I should be soon re-enforced 
and sufficiently suppUed.' Early in December, I received 
orders to advance to the Rapids ; a point, selected by the 
General, for establishing a magazine for the supply of the 
expedition. From the freezing up of the rivers, which 
prevented the use of boats, and from not being provided 
with teams or pack-horses for transporting the baggage 
and provisions, and being consequently obliged to drag 
both by hand, over roads then deeply covered with snow, 
it was the 10th of January before we arrived at that post. 
When two days on the march, I received a letter from 
General Harrison, advising me to send back within con- 
tract limits, two of the regiments composing the brigade, 
which was now reduced by sickness and fatigue to less 
than nine hundred effectives. This advice I dechned 
following, for the subjoined reasons — The post assigned 
to us had become highly important, from its being the 
site of our magazine, and from the fact, that it was con- 
siderably nearer to the enemy's main body than to our 
own ; that the roads between Maiden and the Rapids, 
were more easily travelled than those between the Rapids 
and General Harrison's head-quarters ; that having no 
intermediate post to observe or interrupt a movement 
against us, if made by the enemy, they might come on 
secretly and invest and carry the position, without giving 
us the power of even making known our condition to the 
other parts of the army ; and lastly, that being thus ex- 
posed to attack and out of sustaining distance, the post 
17* 



198 APPENDIX. 

had not the ordinary means of defence ; having neither 
cannon nor fortification, nor intrenching or other tools, 
necessary for making the latter ; nor even an order for so 
using them, if they had been provided — the only instruc- 
tion given me being that ' of clearing my front of an Indian 
party, supposed to have established itself on Swan Creek, 
and making huts for covering the provisions and baggage.' 
Had I taken the General's advice, my effective force on 
my arrival at the Rapids, would not have exceeded four 
hundred effectives, left to defend themselves and the 
magazines, with muskets and rifles only, against the at- 
tacks of a British and Indian force, which General Har- 
rison did not estimate at less than/owr thousand combatants. 
Having promptly fulfilled the order above mentioned, of 
driving off the Indian party, we proceeded to make a large 
and strong house ; which besides covering our supplies, 
would be useful as a place of defence against the attacks 
of the enemy. Of our arrival and situation the General 
was informed, by the best means I had — a party returning 
to McArthur's block-house ; by whom I also requested a 
fulfilment of his promise of a speedy re-enforcement. In 
this state of things, three expresses, bringmg letters from 
Mr. Day of Frenchtown, arrived in my camp in quick 
succession, with information, that a British and Indian 
force had arrived there (about three hundred in number) 
with orders to seize and send to Maiden, all inhabitants 
attached to the United States government, or suspected 
of being so attached, and with them, all horses and cattle, 
sleds, carioles, and provisions of every kind, and con- 
demning at once the whole settlement to starvation, im- 
prisonment or slaughter, in case of refusal or resistance. 
The information was forthwith communicated to a council 



APPENDIX. 199 

of war, who, after full discussion, unanimously agreed, 
that a detachment should be immediately marched against 
the British and Indian marauders. A detachment of six 
hundred men was accordingly sent under Colonel Lewis, 
of whose success on the 18th, General Harrison was im- 
mediately apprised, and a request made on General Per- 
kins (whose post was nearest to me) for another battalion 
or regiment, and some artillery if practicable. Suspecting 
that Proctor would make an attempt to revenge this stroke, 
and knowing that our wounded men could not be removed, 
I hastened to re-enforce Colonel Lewis with Wells's regi- 
ment, (two hundred and fifty men,) and set out myself to join 
him, and arrived on the morning of the 20th. The town, 
lying on the north side of the river, was picketed on three 
sides — the longest, facing the north and making the front. 
Within these pickets. Colonel Lewis's corps was found. 
Not thinking the position elegible, nor the pickets a suf- 
ficient defence against artillery, I would have retreated, 
but for the wounded, of whom there were fifty-five ; but 
having no sufficient means for transporting these, and 
equally destitute of those necessary for fortifying strongly, 
I issued an order for putting the place in the best condition 
for defence that might be practicable ; intending to con- 
struct some new works, as soon as the means for getting 
out timber might be had. On the evening of the 20th, 
Wells arrived, and was directed to encamp on the right, 
in an open field, immediately without the picketing. On 
the 21st, a patrole as far as Brownstown was sent out, and 
returned without seeing any thing of an enemy ; on the 
same day, a man from Maiden came in, who reported, 
that the enemy were preparing to attack us, but knowing 
nothing of the kind or extent of the preparation made or 



200 APPENDIX. 

making, what he brought was thought to be only conjee 
ture, and such as led to a belief, that it would be some 
days before Proctor would be ready to do any thing. 
The troops were now in high spirits, expecting the arrival 
of General Harrison with re-enforcements from the 
Rapids, where he had got on the 20th ; despatching his 
Inspector- General on the same day with orders to me, 
' to hold the ground we had got at any rate,' implying as 
we believed, an engagement on his part, to be soon with 
us and in force. Neither night-patrole, nor night-pickets 
were ordered by me, from a belief, that both were matters 
of routine and in constant use. Our force now amounted 
to seven hundred and fifty men, stationed as before men- 
tioned ; the volunteers within, and Wells's regiment with- 
out the pickets. Not to discommode the wounded men, 
who, with Colonel Lewis's corps, occupied the houses on 
the north side of the river, I at some increased personal 
risk, took quarters for myself and suite, in a house on 
the southern bank, directly fronting the troops and only 
separated from them by the river, then firmly frozen, and 
but between eighty and one hundred yards wide. While 
the reveille was beating on the morning of the 22d, the 
alarm was given, and was soon followed by an attack of 
the British on the front, and by that of the Indians on 
both flanks. I was with the troops in a few minutes, and 
found every man at his post. Finding the left of the line 
on the outside of the pickets somewhat galled by the 
enemy's fire, (in pursuance of a plan previously laid in 
case of attack,) I requested Colonel Allen to draw them 
forward, and bring them within the picketing. When this 
order had been nearly executed, and the head of the line 
was within a few steps of the entrance, where I stood, 



APPENDIX. 201 

some of the soldiers mistaking the movement for a retreat, 
sounded the alarm and began to fly, when the whole 
broke and rushed towards the river. I instantly ordered 
them to be reformed under the bank ; but though great 
efforts were made by Colonels Lewis and Allen, and 
others, to effect this object, they failed ; the panic of the 
men overcoming all authority. Parts of two companies 
from the picketing, brought out to aid in restoring order, 
were carried off by the current ; and a daring Indian 
attack from both flanks being now commenced on the fugi- 
tives, all further resistance was overwhelmed. Colonel 
Allen fell, and Colonel Lewis and myself were captured. 
My farther agency was only that of an adviser. No 
longer hoping any thing from the intervention of General 
Harrison, and seeing one half of our force already cap- 
tured or dispersed, I anticipated only the slaughter of 
those within the pickets who yet bravely held out ; and 
assured by Proctor, that on a surrender, he would give 
honorable terms, I advised to that measure. Not being 
permitted to communicate with Majors Graves or Madi- 
son in person, my opinion was probably misunderstood, 
and certainly misrepresented, as after my own capture, I 
had no idea that I could legally exercise authority over 
them. I will not, however, pretend that I am able now 
to recollect the terms I used on the occasion, but the 
present is a true statement of what I intended." 

Major Madison's statement, 

" Our force, on the 22d of January, was between seven 
hundred and fifty and eight hundred men. The original 
detachment under Colonel Lewis was diminished by the 
action of the 1 8th with Reynolds, upwards of seventy-five 



APPENDIX. 

men — fifty-five of whom were wounded — and increased 
two hundred and fifty, by Wells's regiment, brought on 
by General Winchester. Proctor's force did not much, 
if at all, exceed one thousand men, three hundred regu- 
lars, the remainder Canadian militia and Indians. On 
the first (the regulars) Proctor's principal dependance 
was placed, but from the coldness of the weather and the 
depth of the snow, his artillery became unmanageable ; 
and his infantry after doing its best, and losing one-fourth 
of its number, was not in either condition or disposition 
to renew its attack on the picketed part of our position. 

" Our camp-police was, perhaps, not what it ought to 
have been ; but I am not here the accuser or excuser of 
any one, though thoroughly convinced that the principal 
error of the campaign, and that which brought all other 
evils upon us, was the great distance at which the other 
parts of the army were kept. Had the disposition been 
different, had the main body been located within sustain- 
ing distance of the advanced corps, or had this corps been 
re-enforced by even a single battalion of five hundred 
men, ours would have been a victory instead of a defeat. 
As it was, so firmly did the few men holding the town 
believe in their power of defending it, even after General 
Winchester's capture, that it was with great reluctance 
they gave it up ; and principally from a want of ammuni- 
tion to continue the contest, and not from Proctor's threats 
of smoking or burning us out, which we knew to be ridicu- 
lous. A sight of the enemy's condition, which could not 
be prevented after our surrender, satisfied me that if we 
could have been supplied with ammunition, we might 
have held out, for no one could show more impatience to 
begin and continue a retreat than Proctor, embarrassed 



APPENDIX. 203 

as he was with wounded and dying men, with the pris- 
oners he had made, and expecting to be attacked every 
moment by Harrison, of whose arrival at the Rapids he 
had been informed by an Indian runner, while the attack 
was going on." 



[No. 8.] 

JMajor Eve^s testimomj, 

"A few days after General Winchester had assumed 
the command at fort Wayne, we were met at the St. 
Mary's by General Harrison, who called together all 
the field-officers who were at that place, with the Hon. 
Samuel McKee. General Harrison then stated that the 
army was in a deplorable situation — that he had relin- 
quished the command to General Winchester ; but from 
a letter which had met him at St. Mary's, he was at a 
loss to understand whether the Secretary of War intended 
that he (Harrison) or Winchester should have the com- 
mand — that the troops at fort Wayne were much dissatis- 
fied at being commanded by General Winchester, and 
that he had to take some pains to satisfy them. He then 
requested the officers present to say, who they, and the 
troops under their respective commands, would rather be 
commanded by. The answer to a man was, that they 
had rather be commanded by General Harrison. He 
then requested the officers to make that expression in 
writing, and called on J)Ir. JVLcKee to draw up a written 
statement to that effect, observing at the same time, that 



204 APPENDIX. 

he would send it to the officers at fort Wayne, and if it was 
the wish of the army generally, that he should command, he 
would take it, and risk the consequences with the government. 
But upon reflection, (after General Harrison had retired,) 
it was thought improper by the officers to sign the statement 
drawn up by Mr. McKee. General Harrison was, in a 
few days afterwards, invested with the command by the 
Secretary of War, which made any further call on the 
officers unnecessary. I have only to state facts, without 
intending to eulogize General Winchester, or to injure 
General Harrison. With the former, I have very little 
acquaintance ; but have no hesitation in saying, that I 
beheve his conduct whilst in the army has been much 
misrepresented to his prejudice." 



[No. 9.] 

Extracts from affidavits in relation to the affair at 
Frenchtown, of the 22d of January, 1813, made by the 
late Governor Madison of Kentucky, Colonel William 
Lewis, and Major S. Garrard. 

" Sometime between the 8th and 12th of January, we 
arrived at the Rapids of the Miami, where a co-operation 
was expected with General Tupper — ^but in that we were 
disappointed. In a few days after our arrival at the 
Rapids, I understood that General Winchester had re- 
ceived communications from the inhabitants of the Au 
Raisin settlement, making application to him for assist- 
ance and protection — which was repeated, with statements 



APPENDIX. 205 

that the enemy were plundering them of their property. A 
council of the oJElicers was then called and their opinions 
taken. To the best of my recollections, they were unani- 
mously of opinion, that a detachment ought to be sent to 
the relief of the inhabitants at Raisin, as soon as prac- 
ticable. I cannot say whether or no General Winchester 
had any right to expect re-enforcements from General 
Tupper and Perkins, but it was generally believed that 
we would receive troops from them. I am well per- 
suaded, that could we have been re-enforced with Jive hundred 
additional men, a victory on the 22d of January, 1813, would 
have been the result instead of a defeat.'^'' 

Extract from the statement of Colonel W. Lewis. 

" / think, had the GeneraVs force at Frenchtown been five 
hundred greater than it was, he would not have experienced a 
defeat. I was immediately with General Winchester, 
during great part of the action, and can bear testimony to 
his coolness and bravery. 

Extract from the affidavit of Major S. Garrard, Inspector 
of Brigadier- General Payne'' s brigade of Kentucky vol- 
unteers, made a prisoner at Frenchtown. 

" On my return from Canada, I passed the Rapids, 
where General Harrison informed me that General Winches- 
ter had every reason to expect re-enforcements on the 1\st ; 
and further, that they were delayed in consequence of 
having, in the first instance, attempted an advance on the 
ice, which they were compelled to abandon, return back, 
and take Hull's road." 

18 



206 APPENDIX. 



[No. 10.] 

Orders given to General Dearborn by the Secretary of 
War in relation to the Niagara frontier. 

June 2Qth, 1812. — " Your preparations [at Albany] it is 
presumed, will be made to move in a direction for Niagara^ 
Kingston., and Montreal.''^ July 151L — "On your arrival 
at Albany, your attention will be directed to the security 
of the northern frontier by the lakes.^^ July 20th. — " You 
will make such arrangements with Governor Tompkins, 
as will place the militia, detached by him for the JViagara 
and other posts on the lake, under your control.^^ July 29th. 
— " Should it be advisable to make any other disposition 
of these restless people, [the warriors of the Seneca tribe 
of Indians,] you will give orders to J\Ir, Grange)' and the 
commanding officer at JViagara." August 1st. — "You 
will make a diversion in favor of him [General Hull] at 
JViagara and Kingston, as soon as may be practicable." 
How, we ask, was it possible for the General, with these 
orders in his portfolio, to believe, that the Niagara fron- 
tier had not been within the limits of his command 1 And 
if he did so believe, by what authority did he extend the 
armistice (entered into between him and Provost) to that 
frontier 1 As, however, the inaction which enabled Brock 
to leave his posts on the Niagara undisturbed and un- 
menaced, and even to carry with him a part of his force 
to Detroit, and there to capture Hull, his army and terri- 
tory, was not noticed by any kind of disapprobation on 
the part of the government, the inference is fair, that it 
(tiie govermnent) was willing to take the responsibility 
on itself. 



APPENDIX. 207 



[No. 11.] 



Extract of a letter from Sir George Provost to General 
Brock, dated SOth of August, 1812. 
" I consider it most fortunate, that I have been able to 
prosecute this object of the government (the armistice) 
without interfering with yoiu* operations on the Detroit. 
I have sent you men, money and stores of all kinds." — 
See Life and Services of Sir George Provost, 



[No. 12.] 

" Albany, February 22c?, 1813. 

"Sir, — In obedience to orders of the 8th instant, requir- 
ing from me * a particular statement in relation to the affair 
at Queenstown,' I have the honor to transmit a journal of 
the incidents connected with tliat affair which fell under 
my observation. 

"On the 10th of October, 1812, 1 waited on Lieutenant- 
Colonel Fenwick, commanding at fort Niagara, to report 
my arrival on the evening of the 9th instant, with a detach- 
ment of nearly four hundred of the thirteenth, at the Four- 
Mile Creek, in charge of military stores, and thirty-nine 
boats capable of canying conveniently each thirty men. 
He informed me of an intended attack that night at 
Queenstown, and I requested orders to join the corps 
designated for it. Such orders he was not authorized to 



APPENDIX. 

give, but sent off an express that evening to General Van 
Rensselaer to procure them. They arrived (I have since 
learned) at Niagara about nine at night, but I was pre- 
vented by an accident from receiving them ; and my detach- 
ment was saved a night's march in a storm, and exposure 
and march the next day, by which all the other regulars in 
that quarter were very considerably harassed ; as, being 
without tents or camp equipage, they were obliged to 
keep on foot until they returned to their quarters. This 
intended attack, in which my detachment was not origin- 
ally included, was to have been conducted by Colonel 
Van Rensselaer and Captain Machesney at the head of a 
party of regulars, but was defeated by some mistake or 
treachery of a man in charge of the boats. 

" On the 11th, (the storm still continuing with unabated 
violence, and the road still covered with stragglers from 
the different detachments of regulars, which had marched 
the night before from fort Niagara and its vicinity to 
Lewistown, on the proposed expedition,) I rode to General 
Van Renssalaer's encampment in order to report more 
particularly the detachment under my command, and to 
request a place in the next attempt ; mentioning that I 
should like forty-eight hours for preparation, being myself 
an entire stranger to the country, and the detachment 
being just off a long march expedition from Oswego, re- 
quiring some time for the issue of several articles of petit 
equipment, and for putting themselves in the best condi- 
tion. It was intimated to me that I should have a part in 
the first attack, and that it would tal^e place in a few 
days. On the 12th, about twelve o'clock. Colonel Van 
Rensselaer rode into my camp and informed me that I 
must march immediately to Lewistown — that he intended 



APPENDIX. 209 

to attack at Queenstown that night. The weather had 
cleared away early, and at this time my tents were struck, 
every musket and lock taken to pieces, and every thing 
in the camp going through the process of police usual on 
such occasions ; I was also informed that the provisions 
for that day had not yet been received from fort Niagara 
and could not be before evening. Colonel Van Rens- 
selaer stated, however, that we should be able to reach 
Lewistown early, and that he v/ould have rations ready 
for them there. We conversed about my waiving rank 
with him, which I told him was impossible ; but as it was 
equally impossible for me to command in a night-attack 
on a place I had never seen — as I was informed it was a 
critical moment which must be used — and as I was not 
disinclined to yield as much as possible to an officer of 
established reputation, and as I was, and knew my whole 
detachment to be anxious for an opportunity of seeing 
some actual service on any terms, I consented to take a 
part without interfering with his arrangements for it, and 
requested for myself only good guides, and a landing in 
good order at the proper point. The detachment ac- 
cordingly moved a little before five o'clock in the after- 
noon, and marched or rather waded to Lewistown, where 
we arrived sometime before ten ; and most of the men 
and some of the officers had then their first meal for that 
day. 

October 13th. — At half-past three, Colonel Van Rens- 
selaer woke me and informed me it was time to move. 
I formed the detachment, read to the officers General 
Van Rensselaer's orders for the battle, and conducted 
partly by a guide and by Colonel Van Rensselaer, marched 
to the river. On the way. Colonel Van Rensselaer in- 



210 APPENDIX. 

troduced my guide for the battle ta me. Between four 
and five o'clock we embarked our first parties. The 
number of boats was eleven or twelve, I understood, aver- 
aging about twenty-five men each, being calculated to 
cany just half of our respective detachments at a time. 
The boats assigned to the detachment under my orders 
were on the right, i. e. down the stream. Having em- 
barked the first party, and given orders to Captain 
Ogilvie to take charge of the embarcation of the next on 
the return of the boats, I chose the boat in which was my 
principal guide, one Hopkins, and a party selected agree- 
ably to General Van Rensselaer's orders, for the advanced 
guard of my detachment in the attack. The first that 
reached the Canada shore was the boat in which Captain 
Armstrong commanded, Captain Malcolm and Lieutenant 
Hugunen being also on board ; and the pilot being skil- 
ful, returned immediately and gave Captain Ogilvie an 
opportunity of executing his orders in part. The boat to 
which I had committed myself, (if the circumstances 
under which I embarked are appreciated, that phrase will 
not be deemed improper,) unhappily lost a row-lock on 
the right, which gave it a direction down the stream ; and 
although an officer. Lieutenant Fink, remedied that evil 
in a great measure, so far as the oar was concerned, by 
holding it, the pilot wanted skill or presence of mind to 
alter his course ; and no one else knowing any thing of 
the stream or point of landing, and it being perfectly dark, 
we were obliged to confide in him. Having in this man- 
ner gone farther down the stream than across it, we soon 
fell below the others, and the fire of the left of the village 
was directed against this boat. The pilot, panic-struck, 
turned about, but being ordered with severity to make the 



APPENDIX. 211 

Canada shore at any point, he made another effort literally 
groamng with tear. Hopkins, who was called on to assist 
him, was useless. The situation of a boat thus managed 
on a rapid stream when descending, not only subjected to 
the severest fire on the boats which was decidedly from 
the left of the village, (where they seemed prepared for 
accidents of this kind, or perhaps expected the principal 
debarkation below,) but also separated from the corps, 
may easily be imagined. It became necessary to take 
the steering-oar from the boatman, and return to the 
American shore. Here my guide, Hopkins, disappeared. 
Being several hundred yards below the point of embarka- 
tion, I returned on foot by the edge of the river, thinking 
I could more immediately procure a proper pilot, and 
cross from that place. In the meantime the troops 
landed and formed immediately on the bank, about twenty 
paces or less from the river, under Colonel Yan Rens- 
selaer. Here a severe fire continued for a few minutes ; 
but having himself received several wounds, and no other 
person being acquainted with the force or defences of the 
enemy, or the topography of the village and its environs, 
he ordered the troops to fall below the bank by which 
they were in a great degree covered. In this scene, 
Lieutenant Valleau and Ensign Morris of the thirteenth, 
both men of the most estimable character, the latter quite 
a youth and of extraordinary promise, were killed ; Lieu- 
tenant Rathbone of the first artillery, severely wounded, 
(since dead ;) Captains Armstrong and Malcolm of the thir- 
teenth, and Ensign Lent of the thirteenth, severely wound- 
ed, and Captain Wool of the thirteenth, also wounded. 

On my return to the upper ferry, I found there a scene 
of confusion hardly to be described. The enemy concen- 



212 APPENDIX. 

trated their fire upon our embarking place : no person be- 
inq charo-ed with directing the boats and embarkation, or 
with the government of the boatmen, they forsook their 
dutv. Persons unacquainted with the river (which was 
indeed the case with most of the militia who had been en- 
camped at Lewiston several weeks, whereas all the regu- 
lars had been mnrched there that night,) would occasionally 
hurry into a boat as they could find one, cross, and leave 
it on the shore, perhaps to go adrift, or else to be brought 
back by the wounded and their attendants, and others re- 
turning without order or permission; and these would land 
where they found it convenient, and leave the boat where 
they landed. During this state of things (the day just be- 
ginning to break) Lieutenant Colonel Fenwick arrived with 
a party consisting of P/Tajor Mullany's detachments of the 
13th and 23d, and Capt. Machesney's of the 6th. He found 
me at ihe river's side, anxiously endeavoring to procure 
boatmen, and was himself bitterly disappointed by the im • 
possibility of crossing his detachment. Deeming it impro- 
per to expose his troops in such a situation without use, he 
countermarched in the best order possible, but not without 
some confusion, owing to the narrowness of the ravine 
which led down to the river, and the severe fire of grape, 
cannister, and shells, which was directed on it. It was 
about this period, and from this fire, that Captain Nelson 
of the 6th, a gentleman equally respected and esteemed in 
his oflicial character and private life, was mortally wounded. 
While things were in this state on the American shore, 
and partial, and generally unsuccessful and ruinous at- 
tempts to cross were made by different officers, the troops 
that had crossed ascended, by order of Coknel Yan R., 
the east side of the hill of Queenstown. Captain Ogilvie 
has the merit with his companions of having led on this 



APPENDIX. 213 

occasion. It was a few minutes after day-break when 
this movement, which was altogether unobserved by the 
enemy, was made. Finding no work, nor even a sentinel 
on the hill, they marched to the north side, half way 
down which wus a one gun battery open in rear. Near 
it were paraded their principal force, which our best intel- 
ligence makes to consist of the two flank companies of the 
49th, commanded by Captains Williams and Dennis. 
These fled on a single fire from the party in their rear on 
the height, but soon rallied, and did not finally retreat un- 
til they had made two unsuccessful attempts to get posses- 
sion of the hill. In this affair Captain Wool of the 13th, 
a gallant officer, commanded, and displayed a firmness 
and activity in the highest degree honorable to him. Capt. 
Ogilvie and 1st Lieutenant Kearney of the 13th, 2d 
Lieutenants Randolph of the Light Artillery, and Carr and 
Hugunin of the 13th, and Ensign Reib, were also highly 
distinguished. On the part of the British, General Brock, 
and his aid. Colonel M'Donald, fell ; both of the officers 
commanding the companies of the 49th were wounded, and 
they lost about twenty or thirty taken prisoners, most of 
them wounded. This affair ended in a few minutes after 
sunrise ; and of the American party, few men and not an 
officer was killed or wounded. 

But it is necessary to state further particulars of the 
disasters attending the embarkation and crossing of the re- 
gulars at this period, as they were the great cause of the 
destruction and confusion of the regulars that day, and of 
so small a number of them being engaged in the subse- 
quent scenes. 

It appears, then, that of four regular officers commanding 
corps, who actually attempted to cross before this affair of 
the morning, (all of them in different boats,) not one sue- 



214 APPENDIX. 

ceeded. They were Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick, Major 
MuUany, Captain Machesney, and myself. 

It appears, also, that five regular officers were taken 
prisoners immediately on landing on the left of the village, 
their parties being almost entirely cut to pieces in their 
boats. These were, Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick, Lieu- 
tenants Phelps (13th) and Clark, (23d) which three were 
severely wounded, and Lieutenants Bailey (3d Artillery) 
and Turner (13th Infantry). 

The names of several other officers might be mentioned 
who were defeated in their attempts to land at the proper 
point, and were obliged to return. 

Our best intelligence on this subject authorises me to 
state, that at least one hundred regulars were killed, wound- 
ed, and taken prisoners on the left of the village before or 
about sunrise. 

About seven, or a few minutes past seven o'clock, I 
crossed; having for some time previous, as soon as the 
crossing became practicable, collected different detach- 
ments and sent them over. I found the senior officer 
there to be Captain Machesney of the 6th, who had, how- 
ever, crossed but a few minutes before under my orders. 
Being in expectation of an immediate attack of the enemy 
in force, I employed myself in disposing of the prisoners 
which were still brought in ; checking the disorders to 
which some of the troops seemed incHned ; and arranging 
the fragments of the different detachments of regulars in 
their proper order. The gun, in the battery which has 
been mentioned, I found had been spiked by one of our 
own artillerists. In the course of an hour, in which I was 
momently expecting the approach of our main force with 
its artillery, and equipage, and supplies, a dragoon who, I 
suspect, threw himself into our hands, was brought to me 



APPENDIX. 



21 



with a dispatch addressed to the commanding officer at 
Fort George. It was from the commanding officer at 
Chippeway, stating that the corps (Colonel Scott's) which 
had laid opposite the day preceding, had moved ; that every 
thing was quiet there, and that he was ready to move. 
After interrogating the bearer, I sent him, in charge of an 
officer, with the dispatch to General Van Rensselaer. He 
was a native of the United States, personally known to one 
of our officers, and stated with great readiness and even 
interest, that the enemy were already in motion from that 
quarter, consisting of regulars and Indians, principally the 
latter. This gave a favorable occasion for a movement 
in the direction of Chippeway, and attacking this party on 
their march, and preventing their junction with the main 
force from Fort George. But at Queenstown every thing 
was stagnant. No considerable or regular embarkation 
appeared to be making on the opposite shore. A large 
stone house on the left of the village remained still in pos- 
session of the enemy, with two light pieces of artillery ; and 
as not a piece of artillery had yet been brought over, it ap- 
peared impossible to attack it advantageously. After some 
time General Wadsworth appeared on the hill, thinking, as 
he told me, that his example might have a better effect than 
his orders in making the militia cross. He had seen the 
dispatch above mentioned, and was aware of the state </f 
things on the hill. After some consultation he agreed that 
I should recross and represent it to General Van Rensse- 
laer : this I did on meeting the General on the road about 
half a mile from the river. He informed me that he had 
ordered Colonel Scott across, and that he would himself 
cross in a short time. He ordered Captain Totten of the 
engineers to repair to the opposite bank, and lay out a for- 
tified encampment, and caused the intrenching tools to be 



216 APPENDIX. 

brought down with a view to be sent after, which, however, 
was neglected to be done. In the course of an hour, 
while the General was giving his directions to his staff and 
preparing for the passage of the river, a small and distant 
fire of musketry was heard. It was evident that this at- 
tack was from the forces from Chippeway, and that it was 
in fact the commencement of an action which must perhaps 
decide the fate of the campaign in that quarter. At least 
half of the boats we had in the morning were lost or da- 
maged ; not half the troops had crossed, although it was 
by this lime about eleven o'clock m the morning ; Lieute- 
nant-Colonel Scott had not received orders to take his ar- 
tillery across ; Captain Gibson had taken but one piece — 
a circumstance attributable to the small size of the only 
boat calculated for that service ; and on reaching the em- 
barking place, we found there a company of men, very 
handsomely equipped, which was just on the point of 
entering the boats when this firing was heard, but had 
thereupon halted, and now absolutely refused to cross ; 
regarding neither the orders, nor threats, nor remonstrances 
of the General. Finding it useless to urge them further, 
he crossed, Major MuUany joining us just as we went on 
board the boat. The instant we ascended the hill, seeing 
the regulars engaged three or four hundred yards from the 
river, near a wood, I hastened to that point, and urging my 
way directly to the front, found there Lieutenant-Colonel 
Scott, with a gallantry I cannot too much extol, leading and 
animating the troops. This officer had a few minutes be- 
fore checked the first charge of the Indians, and saved his 
troops from the disorder they had nearly been thrown into 
by the precipitate retreat of a party of militia. We soon 
reached the wood and penetrated some distance into it ; 
but after some time it was represented to Colonel Scott 



APPENDIX. 217 

that the Indians here presented no object for a charge ; 
that while their fire was bloody, ours produced a compa- 
ratively small effect ; that the wood was not so desirable a 
position as one tibour two himdred yards nearer the river; 
and the intervening space being cleared, the attacks of the 
Indians must be made in the open field, and would, of course, 
be easily repelled ; and we might take the order and position 
intended in the expected engagement. This change of 
position being approved by him, was made gradually and 
uith care ; small detachn "nts being ordered to move to dif- 
ferent points in rear, as with a view to meet otlier attacks, 
Colonel Scott and myself remaining with the last. After 
this movement had been accomplished, the fire of the 
Indians was of course less genera! and fatal, but it was 
never intermitted during the remainder of the day. About 
the time of this movement the first detachments of the Bri- 
tish army were seen at a great distance on the plain on 
their march from Fort George. Meanwhile our numbers 
instead of increasin<>- were diminishing. The boat in which 
General Van Renssalaer came over, returned immediately 
full of men, who had concealed themselves under the bank 
for the purpose of seizing opportunities to recross, and had 
embarked in his presence ; and I understand they even 
crowded into the very boat in which he afterwards return- 
ed, with a view to bring over his principal force which was 
still on the Am.erican shore. At about a quarter of an 
hour after two o'clock in the afternoon, the British troops 
paraded in front of us, we being formed on the edge of the 
hill — the village in our rear, the river on our left, and a 
bush cantonment on our right. In this were disposed a 
number of regulars and a small party of volunteer riflemen, 
commanded by Lieutenant Smith of the militia, who was 
highly distiniruished by his activity and courage. These 
19 



2i8 APPENDIX. 

served to keep the Indians in check, ahbounh they still 
maintained a galling fire on the right flank. My opinion 
of the Ihitish force, founded on my own observation and 
subsequent information is, that they had from four to five 
hundred reguhir^, with f)ur pieces of artillery, from five to 
six hundred militiu, and three hundred Indians. Our whole 
force under arms at this time was less than three bundled, 
with but one piece of artillery, and not a dozen rounds for 
it ; yet I am well persuaded a retreat, much less a surren- 
der, was not thought of; and that the troops were in fact in 
as high spirits as if we had been superior. Such was the 
state of things when a note from General Van Ilensselaer 
to General Wadsworth arrived, ccmmanding him to save 
his troops, informing him that not a regiment or company 
would move to reinforce us ; that he had himself seen the 
movements of the enemy, and knew that we were overpow- 
ered ; and that he would endeavor to furnish boats and 
cover our retreat. He added in a postcript, that General 
Wadsworth might nevertheless govern hitnself according 
to circumstances under his more immediate vi^^w. Gene- 
ral Wadsworth called together the senior oflicers of corps, 
read this letter, and asked their opinions. Nothing wag 
decided on. Meanwhile, the enemy, mancEuvering with 
great caution if not with some hesitation, moved in force 
by their right towards the river in such a way as to recon- 
noitre our whole front and left in part. Finding it difficult 
to believe, perhaps, that so small a body of irien as that in 
view was the whole force they were to contend with, they 
then retr.rned by their left, always skirting the woods, and 
presented themselves in line on our right flank. During 
these marches and coimter-marches of the enemy, we were 
consuUin*T, and at last determined to avail omselves of the 
possibility of rL-treaiing suggested in General Van Rensse- 



APPKNDIX. 219 

lacr's letter. It was desif^nod, accordingly, to throw our 
right on the road leading Iroin the hill to the village, and 
form w ith the river in our rear. To do this it wa:- neces- 
sary to march by the lefi which brought the niihtia in front 
of the colum.i. They soon broke, on the commencement 
of the enemy's fire, and a peilect rout ensued. JNot a 
boat be ng ready, nor any appearance of an attempt lb 
bring them, we surrendered — were taken into the village of 
Queenstown, and treated with the greatest delicacy and 
humanity by General ShealTe. The wounded were attend- 
ed to here ; the prisoners, private soldiers, were collected 
and marched to Newaik ; and, after being about an hour 
in the village, we marched wiih a giu.vd, which was neces- 
sary to protect us from the Indian^, to Fort George. Wo 
arrived there just at dark. 

I am, with great respect, 

Your obedient Servant, 

JOHN CHRYSTIE, 
Lieutenant-Colonel 13th. 
General Tiio^ias H. Gushing, Adjutam-Gcneral. 



[No. 13.] 

" Colonel Cochrane, formerly an aid-de-camp to Sir 
George Prevost, and at present Military In^^pector, and at- 
tached to the District of New Brum^wick, states, * that the 
regular troops in the Canadas and New Brunswick, at the 
commencement of the war of 1812 between the United 
States and Great Britain, did not exceed two thousand 



280 APPENDIX. 

men ; bi:l were increased from time to time, till, in 1S15, 
their numbers amounted to about sixteen thousand five 
hundred.* 

(Signed,) James Watson Webb.** 

April 20lhr 1830. 



[No. 14.] 

For orders given from the 26th of June to the 1st of 
August to General Dearborn, see Appendix No. 10. To 
these we now add the following : — Aiigusl the 8th. — 
" Should the recruits and volunteers be found inadequate 
to immediate operations on the frontier, you are instructed 
to call on any Governor, or commander of a division or a 
brigade, for as many militia as you may deem necessary." 
August 16//i. — " Proceed with the utmost vigor in your 
operations." August '26th. — *' Every thing indicates the 
necessity of early and efficient operations on the Niagara 
and posts below." September 21s/. — " Your arrangements 
for an attack on the British posts on the Niagara will, ii is 
hoped, be in season." The General about this time pro- 
posed an attack to be made at the same time on Fort 
George, Kingston, and Montreal ; to which the Secretary 
answered, " The President thinks not a moment should be 
lost in getting possession of the British posts at Niagara 
and Kingston, or at least of the former." 



APPENDIX. 221 



[No. 15.] 

Letters from the Secretary of War to General Dearborn* 
War Department, February 10/A, 1813. 

" I have the President's orders to communicate to yon, 
as expeditionsly as possible, the outhne of campaign which 
you will immediately institute and pursue against Upper 
Canada : — 

1st. 4000 troops will he assembled at Sackett's harbor. 

2d. 3000 will be brought together at Buffalo and its 
vicinity. 

3d. The former of these corps will be embarked and 
transported under convoy of the fleet to Kin<Tston, where 
they will be landed. Kingston, its garrison, and I he British 
ships wintering in the harbor of that place will be its first 
object. Its second object will be York, (the capital of 
Upper Canada) the stores collected, and the two frio-ates 
building there. Its third object. Forts George and Erie 
and their dependencies. In the attainment of this last 
there will be a co-operation between the two corps. The 
composition of these will be as follows : 

1st. Bloomfield's brigade, - - - 1,436 

2d. Chandler's do, - - . 1,044 

3d. Philadelphia detachment, - - - 400 

4th. Baltimore do, - - . 300 

5th. Carlisle do, - - - 2OO 

eth. Greenbush do, - - - 400 

7th. Sackett's Harbor do, - - - - 250 

4,060 
19* 



APPENDIX. 



8th, Several corps at Buffalo under the com- 
mand of General Porter, and the re- 
cruits belonging thereto, - - 3,000 



Total, 7,030 
The time for executing the enterprise will be governed 
by the opening of Lake Ontario, which usually takes place 
about the 1st of April. 

The Adjutant-General has orders to put the more south- 
ern detachments in march as expeditiously as possible. 
The two brigades on Lake Champlain you will move so 
as to give them full time to reach their place of destination 
by the 25th of March. The route by Elizabeth will, I 
think, be the shortest and best. They will be replaced by 
some new raised regiments from the east. 

You will put into your movements as much privacy as 
may be compatible with their execution. They may be 
masked by reports that Sackett's Harbor is in danger, and 
that their principal effort will be made on the Niagara, in 
co-operation with General Harrison. As the route to 
Sackett's Harbor and to Niagara is for a considerable dis- 
tance the same, it may be well to intimate, even in orders, 
that the latter is the destination of the two brigades now at 
Lake Champlain. 

(Signed,) John Armstrong." 

War Department^ February 24//i, 1813. 
" Before I left New- York, and, till very recently, since 
my arrival here, I was informed through various channels, 
that a winter or spring attack upon Kingston was not prac- 
ticable on account of the snow, which generally lies to the 
depth of two, and sometimes of three feet, over all that 
northern region during those seasons. Hence it is that 



APPENDIX. 223 

in the plan recently communicated, it was thought safest 
and best to make the attack by a combination of naval and 
military means, and to approach our object, not by directly 
crossing the St, Lawrence on the ice, but by setting out 
from Sackett's Harbor, in concert with, and under convoy ot 
the fleet. Later information differs from that on which this 
plan was founded ; and the fortunate issue of Major For- 
syth's last expedition shews, that small enterprises, at least, 
may be successfully executed at the present season. The 
advices, given in your letter of the 14th instant, have a 
bearing also on the same point, and to the same effect. If 
the enemy be really weak at Kingston, and approachable 
by land and ice. Pike, (who will be a brigadier in a day or 
two,) may be put into motion from Lake Champlain by the 
Chateaugay route, (in sleighs) and, with the two brigades, 
cross the St. Lawrence where it may be thought best, de- 
stroy the armed ships, and seize and hold Kingston, until 
you can join him with the other corps destined for the fu- 
ture objects of the expedition ; and, if pressed by Prevost 
before such junction can be effected, he may withdraw him- 
self to Sackett's Harbor, or other place of security, on our 
side of the line. This would be much the shorter road to 
the object, and perhaps the safer one, as the St. Lawrence 
is now every where well bridged, and offers no obstruction 
to either attack or retreat. Such a movement, will, no 
doubt, be soon known to Prevost, and cannot but disquiet 
him. The dilemma it presents will be serious. Either 
he must give up his westv^^rn posts, or, to save them, he must 
carry himself in force, and promply, to Upper Canada. In 
the latter case he will be embarrassed for subsistence. 
His convoys of provision will be open to our attacks, on a 
line of nearly one hundred miles, and his position at 
Montreal much weakened. Another decided advantage 



224 APPENDIX. 

will be, to let us into the secret of his real strength. If 
he be able to make heavy detachments to cover, or to re- 
cover Kingston, and to protect his supplies, and after all 
maintain himself at Montreal and on Lake Champlain, he 
is stronger thEin I imagined, or than any well-authenticated 
reports make him to be. 

With regard to our magazines, my belief is, that we 
have nothing to fear ; because, as stated above, Provost's 
attention must be given to the western posts and to our 
movements against them. He will not dare to advance 
southwardly while a heavy corps is operating on his flank 
and menacing his line of communication. But on the 
other supposition, they (the magazines) may be easily 
secured ; 1st, by taking them to Willsborough ; or 2d, 
to Burlington ; or 3d, by a militia call, to protect them 
where they are. Orders are given for the march of the 
eastern volunteers, excepting Ulmer's regiment and two 
companies of axe-men sent to open the route to the 
Chaudiere. 

" The southern detachments will be much stronger than 
I had supposed. That from Philadelphia will amount to 
nearly one thousand effectives. 

(Signed,) "JOHN ARMSTRONG.'* 



[No. 16.] 



Extract from a letter of the late Major-General Brown. 

'' Head-Q'iarlersy Broivnville, Jiihj 20lh, 1813. 
** I have delayed giving the estimate you reque^Jted. of 
the enemy's forces in Canada, during the years 1812 and 



APPENDIX. 225 

1813 of the late war, that I might examine my minutes 
and papers the more carefully. 

" At the commencement of the war, Sir George Provost 
had the command of very few regulars. The number 
placed under the orders of Governor Brock for the de- 
fence of Upper Canada, was never equal to twelve hun- 
dred men ;' and at no time did the command of this 
distinguished chief consist of less than ' one third of old 
men and invalids fit only for garrison duty.' No con- 
siderable increase of force on the part of the enemy took 
place duiing the campaign of 1812, and I have never been 
able to discover that at the opening of the campaign of 
1813, [June 28th,] there we;e more than five thousand 
regular troops in the Canadas. The force, whatever it 
may have been, was piincipally in the Upper province. 
By the 27di of May of that year, the enemy had assem- 
bled on the Niagara about two thousand men, to resist 
any incursion — and at Kingston, about one thousand, for 
the projected attack on Sachet's Harbor, under the com- 
mand of Sir George in person. The two columns would 
not have exceeded Ihree Ihoiisand combatants, and I havo 
it from unquestionable authority that the left column sus- 
tained a loss of fall/oivT hundred men." 



[No. 17.] 



Letter of Cohnel Connor, of the 18th of March, 1816. 
»♦ Of the immense dcpOt I know nothing but by report, 
which stated that it had been carried to Sachet's Harbor, 



226 APPENDIX. 

and had there been burnt by the mistake of the Commo- 
dore's brother. Of the contents of Sheafe's papers, many 
of which Colonel King and myself examined, I know 
enough to convint:e me that during the winter and spring 
of 1S13, the British garrison of Kingston was extremely 
weak and quite insufficient for defence. 
" I am, &c. 
(Signed) "SAMUEL CONNOR." 

"General Armstrong." 



[No. IS.] 

Letter from the Secretary of War to General Dearborn. 
{Private,) 

" JVashmg;ton, Iblh May, 1813. 
*'Dear General, — Your affair of the 27th u!t. is 
matter of public and private congratulation ; much quali- 
fied, however, by the loss of Pike and the escape of the 
frigate, the capture or destruction of which, was, according 
to the Commodore's calculations, to give him a decided 
and permanent ascendency on the Lake. A nether draw- 
back upon it, less apt to be noticed by ordinary critics, 
but in itself very vexatious, is the escape also of Sheafe 
with the main body of h's regular force. Under the 
present circumstances of Great Britain, bound as she is, 
neck and heels, to the prosecution of the war in Europe, 
she can ill afford to send to this country, cither men or 
money, to support the jie'.ile guerre in which she has so 
inconsiderately involved herself with us. From informa- 



APPENDIX. 227 

tion the most direct and respectable, I am assured that 
her regular force in both the Cana las has at no time sinco 
the declaration of war exceeded three thousand men ; and 
that at the present time, by casualties, (death, desertion, 
&c., always at work thinning the ranks of an army) this 
force is reduced at least one-tifth. Taking then this fact 
for granted, we cannot doubt but that in all cases in which 
a British commander is constrained to act defensively, 
his policy will be that adapted by Sheafe — to prefer the 
preservation of his troops to that of his post, and thus 
carrying off the kernel leave us only the shell. To coun- 
teract this policy, becomes, therefore, a special duty on 
our part — requiring the strictest attention, as well in pro- 
jecting as in executing our attacks. On this head, my 
distance from you and my very insufficient knowledge of 
the topography of the country in which you act, make it 
improbable that any suggestion I couid make, has not 
already presented itself to your mind. As a general 
maxim, however, I may be permitted to say, that in con- 
centrating our whole force on any given point of an 
enemy's position, we necessarily leave all others open to 
him for escape ; whence it follows, that to deprive him 
of this advantage, two attacks (if our force permit it) 
should be made, and one of these so directed as to shut 
him out from all means of retreat ; or at least lo force 
him into roads, where finding little or no accommodation, 
he may sustain the greatest possible loss. In your late 
affair, I have thought (perhaps erroneously) that had the 
descent been made between the town and the barracks, 
things would have turned out better. On that plan, the 
two batteries you had to encounter, would have been le^ 
out of the combat ; and Sheafe, instead of retreating to 



228 APPENDIX. 

King.~t3n, must have sought refuge at fo:t George. In 
the affi'r before you, nothing m'IU, I hope, be omitted, nor 
any thing he misunderstood ; and that v. ith regard to the 
garrison in particular, it will not be permitted to escape 
to-day that it may tight us tJ-morrow. For obvious rea- 
sorxS, I have made this letter private. On the records of 
the War Department it would appear to carry with it 
an official ccns-uie, whereas, it is in truth not'ning more 
than the suggestions of one, who for both your sake, 
and his own, wishes you the fullest and most unqualified 
prosperity." 



[No. 19.] 

^' Head-Quaricrs, Kingston, July llih, 1813. 

" Dear Sir, — Havmg sent Captain McDonald to 
Kngland with despatches, your letter of the 27th ultimo, 
addressed to him, I opened. I was much pleased it con- 
tained a report of Mr. R. Dickson's arrival at Mackinac 
on the 11th. 

*' Your wants have been supplied as far as I had the 
ability of doing so. In addition to the specie and paper- 
money, and articles of clothing, forwarded for the right 
division from hence, in charge of Captain Chambers 
and Lieutenant M'Clean, a considerable supply of shoes, 
trowsers, &c., were embarked in a flotilla going to York 
a few days ago, for Detroit and Michilimackinac. 

*' The ordnance and naval stores you require must be 
taken from the enemy, whose resources on Lake Erio 



APPENDIX. 229 

must become yours. 1 ara much mistaken if you do not 
find Captain Barclay well disposed to play that game. I 
conclude the whole of the forty-first regiment is placed 
under your command. The presents for the Indians are 
not arrived from England, but I shall direct two hundred 
guns for them, to be purchased at Montreal and forwarded 
to you, with a proportion of powder and ball by the Ottawa. 

" I request you will communicate with me upon all 
occasions, with the characteristic frankness which distin- 
guishes a zealous and good soldier. 

" I have the honor, &c. 

"GEORGE PROVOST." 

"Brigadier-General Proctor." 

St. David's, July 18M, 1813. 
" Sir, — I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt 
of your letter of the 10th instant, and have to inform you 
in reply thereto, that a force of nearly four hundred men 
are directed to march in successive divisions upon Long 
Point, as detailed in my letter to General Proctor of this 
day's date. I am fully impressed with the indispensable 
necessity of an attack upon Presque Isle, and should have 
co-operated with you long ago, had I possessed the means 
of so doing. I trust it will not yet be too late, and that 
you will lose no time in making your arrangements for 
taking up the troops from Long Point. 
" I have the honor to be. Sir, 

" Your most obedient servant, 

"FRANCIS DE ROTTENBURG, 
^^Major-GeneraU* 
" Commodore Barclay." 

20 



230 APPENDIX. 



[No. 20.] 



Extract from Governor Duncan'' s Report. 
" McAffee, the historian of the late war, and Dawson, 
the biographer of General Harrison, have studiously kept 
out of view, that the object of the invasion was the de- 
struction of our ships under Commodore Perry at Presque 
Isle, and the boats and stores at Cleveland. These were 
looked upon with great solicitude by the British, were re- 
connoitred, and on one or two occasions were attempted 
to be destroyed by landing a small force from their fleet. 
" They have also faded to account for the movement 
of the whole British force down the Lake in the direction 
of Cleveland and Erie, before their defeat at Sandusky ; 
which was attacked to gratify their Indian allies, who de- 
manded the scalps and plunder of the place. They have 
kept out of view the fact, that General Harrison had deter- 
mined to retreat to the interior after burning all the supplies 
he had collected ; that he ordered Major Croghan to aban- 
don and burn fort Stephenson ; that his refusal to obey and 
failure to arrive at head- quarters^ prevented this retreat, 
and consequent destruction of our fleet and millions of public 
stores ; and the exposure also, of flve hundred miles of 
frontier, to the combined enemy. Both have stated, that 
General Harrison never doubted that Major Crog' an 
would be able to repulse an enemy of near two thousand 
men (and which they say he understood to be five thou- 
sand) with one hundred and thirty men, (Croghan's effective 
force on the day of the battle,) one six-pounder, with am- 
munition for only seven shots, and o^doni forty rounds for the 



APPENDIX. 231 

small arms^ when the fact was notorious, that General Har- 
rison was heard to say during the siege, while the firing 
could be heard in his camp, and speaking of Croghan, 
' The blood he on his own head^ I wash my hands of it,' not 
doubting for a moment, nor did any one with him, that the 
garrison would be cut off. 

" These historians have also published two letters, as 
part of their history, written by Major Croghan and others, 
to allay the excitement against Harrison, fo?' his neglect to 
support Croghan, when he lay within three hours'* march of 
the fort, with a strong force. Those patriotic officers 
wrote these letters, it has been said, to save the army and 
prevent them from following up the indig-nation manifested 
in the States against the General destined to command 
them — believing it of the utmost importance at that mo- 
ment, that he should stand well with the army and the 
country; and it is further said that they were written 
under the belief, that every thing should be placed before 
the public in a proper light at the end of the campaign. 
(Signed) "JOSEPH DUNCAN." 

" General Mercer, 
" Chairman of a Committee of the House of Representatives.^^ 



Second Order to Major Croghan. 

" Head- Quarters, Camp Seneca, ) 

*' Adjutant-GeneraVs Office, July 27th, 1813. ] 
" Sir, — Immediately on receiving this letter you will 
abandon fort Stephenson, set fire to it and repair with 
your command this night to head-quarters. Cross the 
river and come up upon the opposite side. If you should 
deem, and find it impracticable to make good your march 



232 APPENDIX. 

to this station, take the road to Huron and pursue it with 
the utmost circumspection and despatch. By command. 
"God be with you. 
«* A. H. HOLMES, Assistant Adjutant-General 
"P. S. Effect your retreat in the manner heretofore 
directed you. 

"A. H. HOLMES, A, A, G." 
" Major Croghan." 



[No. 21.] 

Letter from Colonel R. M. Johnson. 

''December 22d, 1834. 

" Dear Sir, — I have just received your favor of the 
17th, containing certain inquiries as to the battle of the 
Thames, 5th of October, 1813, in Upper Canada. 

*' 1st. The mounted regiment under my command, con- 
sisted of one thousand men at the time of the charge. 

*' 2d. They were armed with muskets and rifles, and 
tomahawks or small hatchets, and butcher-knives. 

"3d. The British had one brass field-piece, (six- 
pounder,) the same that was taken by us in the revolu- 
tionary war at Saratoga, and retaken from us at the 
surrender of Detroit by General Hull. It was placed in 
the road near the Thames, not far from the centre of the 
British line. 

" 4th. The British formed two lines, resting on the 
Thames and running out to a swamp two or three hun- 
dred yai*ds from the river and parallel with it. 



APPENDIX. 233 

« 5th. I presume Proctor was stationed considerably 
in the rear of his troops, and probably commenced his 
flight the moment he saw his forces defeated and taken 
prisoners. 

" 6th. I think the best ground for defence was selected. 

" 7th. The [militia] infantry were stationed a reasona- 
ble distance in the rear of the mounted regiment, in order 
of battle, say from one half to one mile. My brother, 
Cobnel James Johnson, charged the British forces with 
the first battalion, (five hundred men,) and succeeded 
without the loss of a man — one horse killed, shot in the 
head — in advancing, he received the fire of one line of 
the British, and then of the other, in close succession ; 
the cannon was not fired. I crossed the swamp with the 
second battalion, (five hundred men,) and fought against 
the Indians, (supposed fourteen hundred warriors, under 
Tecumseh,) without any aid whatever. A regiment was 
ordered to re -enforce me at the close of the battle ; but 
did not reach us until the battle was over and the Indians 
had fled. The official report is incorrect in saying, that 
the hard fighting on the left was by a part of Governor 
Shelby's men. We had no assistance, except that of a few 
scattering volunteers from the infantry, who might have 
pushed into our ranks. I was wounded and could give 
no information to the commanding General, and he did 
not know at ths time he made his report, that I had crossed 
the swamp with my regiment ; as when he gave the order 
to make the charge, he thought from my information, that 
I could not cross the swamp ; which I discovered I could 
do a few minutes after he left me, and believing that it 
was most safe, and that my regiment was sufficient, I 
divided my force as stated above, and the victory on both 
20 



234 APPENDIX. 

sides was complete ; but, no doubt, the instantaneous 
capture of the British, and the early death of the Indian 
chief, were powerful operating causes in our favor. 

I am, &c., 
(Signed) R. M. Johnson. 
N. B. II is due to truth to state, that I requested Gene- 
ral Harrison to permit me to charge, and knowing that 1 
had trained my men for it during our short service, he gave 
the order. 



[No. 22.] 

Red Hook, January '2d, 1812. 

Dear Eustis — Yesterday's mail brought your hypo- 
thetical note, which I hasten to answer by a few suggestions 
that, if approved, may be readily drawn out into as much 
detail as may be useful. 

1st. An abundant supply of what is technically called 
the materiel of war is indispensable. This single term in- 
cludes arms, equipments, and ammunition, in all their 
varieties ; tents, blankets, and clothing ; cavalry and 
draught-horses ; oxen, wagons, carts, entrenching tools, 
&c. &c. To make a competent provision of these will 
require a large expenditure of money, but to this you must 
submit, for two unanswerable reasons — the one, that without 
them, war cannot be made, either morally or successfully; 
the other, that their cost, noiv, will be from 50 to 100 per 
cent, less than it will be after the declaration of war. 



APPENDIX. 235 

2d. When obtained, these supplies should be placed in 
magazines, the location of which must be governed by two 
considerations — the security of the articles deposited in 
them, and the facility and safety with which these may be 
brought into use. To each magazine should be attached a 
Laboratory, for fixing ammunition, making and mending 
gun and other carriages, repairing arms, &c. 

3d. If you have remote posts, liable to attack, and diffi- 
cult to sustain, and having no direct or important bearing 
on the progress or issue of the war, hasten to dismantle 
them and withdraw the garrisons. 

4th. Resting, as the Hne of Canadian defence does, in 
its whole extent, on navigable lakes and rivers, no time 
should be lost in getting a naval ascendancy on both, for 
cmleris paribus, the belligerent who is the first to obtain 
this advantage, v/ill (miracles excepted) win the game. 
Whether the commercial craft, at present employed on 
these waters, can be made useful for the purpose, I do not 
know ; but among the sages, now assembled at Washing- 
ton, you cannot fail to find some one who can answer the 
question. 

5th. Without a knowledge, nearly approximating the 
truth, of the force you will have to contend with ; of the dis- 
position made of this, and of the character, physical and 
artificial, of the posts occupied by it, you will be compelled 
to make war conjeduralhj ; and, of course, on data fur- 
nishing no just conclusions with regard to either the number 
or composition of your own army, or of the kind and ex- 
tent of operations which ought to be assigned to it. That 
a state of peace, like the present, will be more favorable 
than one of war for acquiring this preliminary information, 
cannot be doubted ; and if it be true, as I have been told» 



236 APPENDIX. 

that the British posts are victualled hy American contract- 
ors, these agents (who by their vocation must have free 
access to them) may probably form the safest and surest 
medium through which to obtain it. But, whatever be the 
means employed for accomplishing this object, a moment 
should not be lost in putting them into exercise. 

6th. The number and composition of your army (as 
already suggested) should be decided by the service given 
it to perform, and the kind and degree of resistance your 
enemy may be able to oppose to it. Though, from pre- 
sent appearances, it be true that the exigencies of the war 
in Europe will disable England from sending promptly any 
important aid, strictly military, to the Canadas ; it does 
not follow that she will omit to employ such other means 
as she may possess, to supply the deficiency. Of these, 
the most vexatious to us would be a portion of her armed 
vessels, acting separately or in squadron, on our long and 
defenceless line of sea-coast ; while, at the same time, 
hordes of savages are let loose on the women and child- 
ren of the West. And that, in the event of war. Great 
Britain will not hesitate to employ this policy in both 
its branches, cannot be doubted by those who have any re- 
collection of what her past conduct towards the United 
States has been, or who are now capable of perceiving the 
impunity to herself and the mischief to us with which she 
may pursue it. 

From this general view of the subject it follows, that in 
composing your army, you must be careful to provide corps 
specially adapted for two purposes — the protection oj your 
own frontiers^ eastern and western, and the invasion of 
those of your enemy. Of each of these I offer the fol- 
lowing outline. 



APPENDIX. 237 

For the former, divide your coast into militnry districts 
— open in each a rendezvous for volunteer-association and 
local defence^ with engagements commensurate with the 
war, and pay and emoluments, such as are now given to 
the regular army. Of this description of force the maxi- 
mum may be twenty battalions located as follows : 

1 at Portsmouth, 2 at Boston, 1 at Newport, 3 at New- 
York, 1 at Philadelphia, 3 at Baltimore, 3 at Norfolk, 2 at 
Charlestown, 1 at Savannah, and 3 at New-Orleans. 
Each of these stations to be well supplied widi heavy guns 
for position — furnaces for heating shot, light pieces, well 
horsed, for field service, and muskets and bayonets for 
camp and garrison duty. Corps, thus constituted and 
equipped, well instructed in the use of their arms and res- 
pectably commanded, will do much to check, if they do not 
entirely prevent, predatory excursion — the evil most to be 
apprehended from the crews of single ships, or from those 
of small squadrons not sustained by infantry. 

For western defence employ western men, accustomed 
to the rifle and the forest, and not unacquainted with the 
usages and stratagems of Indian warfare. To their cus- 
tomary arms add a pistol and a sabre ; and to ensure ce- 
lerity of movement, mount them on horseback. Give 
them a competent leader and a good position, within 
striking distance of Indian villages or British settlements. 
Why not at Detroit, where you have a strong fortress and 
a detachment of artillerists 1 Recollect, however, that this 
position, far from being good, would be positively bad 
un'ess your naval means have an ascendancy on Lake 
Erie ; because Buffalo, Erie, Cleaveland, and the two 
Sanduskys must be its base or source of supply. The 
maximum of this corps may be six battahons. 



238 APPENDIX. 

Lastly, for a successful invasion of the Canadas, (the 
great operation of the war, because that only by which 
Great Britain can be brought to a sense of justice,) you 
must rely on a regular army. Of this description of force, 
you have now the skeletons of ten regiments ; which, if 
completed, will give you ten thousand combatants — a corps 
that, in the present circumstances of England, and aided by 
militia for the purposes of demonstration, will be compe- 
tent to great achievements. Hasten then to fill up the rank 
and file of your present establishment : and to existing in- 
ducements for enlisting, add an increased pay, and a liberal 
bounty at the end of the war. 

Should better information with regard to your enemy^s 
strength make an increase of your own expedient, give 
one or two additional battaUons to each of your seven regi- 
ments of infantry — a mode of increasing an army much to 
be preferred to creations altogether new. For, besides 
being obviously more economical, the direct association of 
raw recruits with old soldiers has the effect of making the 
former efficient in half the time it would otherwise take to 
do so — the example of comrades being a principle of 
tuition much more active than the instruction of officers. 

On this head it is but necessary to add, that the whole of 
your disposable or field force; when obtained, should be 
immediately assembled at some given point, from which, 
the moment that war shall be authorized, it may begin its 
operations. Under present views, Albany, or its neighbor- 
hood, should be the place of this rendezvous ; because, 
besides other recommendations, it is here that all the roads 
leading from the central portion of the United States to the 
Canadas, diverge — a circumstance which, while it keeps 
up your enemy's doubts as to your real point of attack, 



APPENDIX. 239 

cannot fail to keep his means of defence in a state of 
division. 

7th. In sketching the composition of an army, two 
branches of it, the one having charge of its discipHne and 
its movements, the other of its subsistence, must not be 
forgotten. For the first (a General Staff) I refer you to 
Grimoard's publication, which I sent to the war department 
from Paris, some years ago. If this book be not already 
translated into English, no time should be lost in natu- 
ralizing it for the use of the army. 

The second or feeding department, is of three kinds — 
that founded on Caesar's maxim, that " war should sustain 
war," though fashionable at present, is, in fact, a system ot 
indiscriminate plunder ; forbidden alike, as I hope, by the 
moral feelings and political views of the United States. 
The remaining two are sufficiently known, under the names 
of the Contract and Commissariat systems. To recom? 
mend either, as exclusively and under all circumstances the 
best, would show only great ignorance or great folly. In 
old and well-peopled districts, where corn and cattle are 
abundant, prices little subject to change, roads safe and 
unobstructed, and the means of transportation (teams or 
boatsy easily procured, the contract plan is the best — be- 
cause the most economical, sufficiently punctual in the dis- 
charge of its engagements, and, from the settled character 
of its terms, rarely, if ever, embarrassing the government 
with extra or unexpected charges. In districts of an op- 
posite character, where the population is thin and poor, 
supplies scarce and high priced, roads few and bad, and 
much exposed to obstruction, the commissariat must be 
submitted to ; though certainly liable to great abuse, from 
the ignorance, indolence, or knavery of the agents em- 



240 PPENDIX. 

ployed. The best remedy for the evils of this system 
will be found in subjecting the agents to military law, and 
in rigorously enforcing its provisions. 

8th. and lastly. A project of campaign, conformed to 
military maxims, must embrace three things : 1st. Jin 
object of important or decisive character; the attainment 
of which will give a successful issue to the campaign if 
not to the war. 2d. A line of operation^ as short and per- 
pendicular to this object, as possible ; and 3d. JJ well 
secured base, on which must be accumulated and ready for 
transportation, all supplies necessary to sustain the opera- 
tion. Each of these rules has its own special laws, but it 
is only of the first that I will say more at present than a 
few words. 

In invading a neighboring and independent territory like 
Canada — having a frontier of immense extent ; destitute 
of means strictly its own for the purposes of defence ; se- 
parated from the rest of the empire by an ocean, and hav- 
ing to this but one outlet — this outlet forms your true object 
or point of attach ; because, if gained, every thing depend- 
ing upon it is gained also. Such was the consequence of 
the capture of Quebec in the war, which ended in 1763 ; 
and such would again be the consequence of the reduction 
of that capital, had we the means to effect it. Unfortu- 
nately, from deficient foresight in the government, these 
are wanting. Still, though unable to do what in the ab- 
stract would be best, it by no means follows that we should 
omit to do what may be both practicable and expedient. 
Such, in my opinion, would be the capture oj Montreal — 
a post, which, commanding alike the navigation of the St. 
Lawrence and the Otawa, if seized and heia, would give 
the same control over all that portion of the Canadas lying 



APPENDIX. 241 

westward of itself, that Quebec now exercises over (he 
whole territory : Kingston, York, Fort George, Fort Erie, 
and Maiden, cut off from their common base, must soon 
and necessarily fall. To reach this object, your line of 
operation may be taken on either side of Lake Champlain, 
provided you have secured the command of the lake ; in 
which case also, Albany, Greenbush, Troy, Whitehall, &c. 
covered by a dense population, or secured by a large 
river, no where fordable by infantry, will give you a suffi- 
cient base. When begun, the movement should be made 
rapidly and audaciously ; and the better to secure its suc- 
cess, three demonstrations by masses of militia, may be 
employed : one on the Niagara, to keep within their walls 
the garrisons of Forts George and Erie ; a second at 
Sackett's Harbor, to produce a similar effect on whatever 
force may be found at Kingston ; and a third in Vermont, 
so placed on the eastern side of the Sorel as to menace 
the British posts on that river. 

Though taking for granted, as stated above, that the 
capture of Montreal would involve that of all posts west- 
ward from itself, it will no doubt be proper that the six bat- 
talions of mounted gun-men should march on Maiden, as 
soon as they shall be apprised that the campaign on Lake 
Champlain is opened. And here we must stop : what 
remains of the subject, being Tactical^ and governed by 
circumstances as they occur in the camp or the field, 
must be entirely left to the genius and judgment of your 
Commanding General. I am, &c. 

(Signed) John Armstrong. 

Hon. William Eustis, Secretary of War. 



21 



242 APPENDIX. 



[No. 23.] 



Letter from General Harrison to the Secretary of War. 
^^Head-Quarters, Chilicothe, March 17/A, 1813. 

" Sir, — The known candor of your character, is a suf- 
ficient security for my receiving your pardon for the Hberty 
I take, in making objections to the plan of operations 
communicated in your letter of the 5th instant. If there 
is a positive certainty of our getting the command of 
Lake Erie, and having a regular force of three thousand 
five hundred, or even three thousand, well-disciplined 
men, the proposed plan of setting out from Cleveland, 
and landing on the northern shore, below Maiden, would, 
perhaps, be the one by which that place and its depen- 
dencies could be most easily reduced. I am unacquainted 
with the extent of the preparations that are making to 
obtain the naval superiority upon Lake Erie, but, should 
they fail, and the troops be assembled at Cleveland, it 
would be difficult to get again upon the proper track for 
making the attack round the head of the Lake. The at- 
tempt to cross the Lake from Cleveland should not be 
made with any other than well-disciplined troops. A 
comparatively smaller number of men of this description 
could effect the object, and for those, means of convey- 
ance might be found ; but the means of transporting such 
an army as would be required of militia or undisciplined 
regulars, could not be procured. I can see no reason 
why Cleveland should be preferred as the point of em- 
barkation for the troops, or the deposite of provisions or 
stores. These are already accumulated at the Rapids of 
Miami, or in situations to be easily sent thither, to an 



APPENDIX. 

amount nearly equal to the consumption of a protracted 
campaign. Although the expense and difficulty of trans- 
porting the provisions, artillery and stores for an army, 
round the head of the Lake, would be very considerable, 
the Lake being possessed by our ships, and the heavy bag- 
gage taken in boats along its margin, the troops would 
find no difficulty in the land route. The force contem- 
plated in your letter is, in my opinion, not sufficient to 
secure success. Admitting that the whole should be 
raised by the time pointed out, they would be very little 
superior to militia ; the officers having, with scarcely an 
exception, to learn their duty before they could instruct 
their men ; we have therefore no alternative but to make 
up by numbers the deficiency of discipline. 

" I am well aware of the intolerable expense which at- 
tends the employment of a large militia force. We are 
now, however, in a situation to avoid those errors which 
made that of the last campaign so peculiarly heavy. Our 
suppUes are procured, and so deposited that the period 
fOr the inarch of the army from the advanced posts can 
be ascertained to an hour, and of course the troops need 
not be called out until the moment they are to act. Ex- 
perience has convinced me that militia are more efficient 
in the early, than in the latter part of their service. Upon 
the whole, it is my decided opinion, that the Rapids of 
Miami should be the point of rendezvous for the troops, 
as well as the principal dep8t. Indeed, it must neces- 
sarily be the first deposite — the provisions for tlie army 
being so placed that they can be taken to the Lake in no 
other way. The artillery and a considerable supply of 
ammunition are already there. Boats and perouges have 
been built in considerable numbers on the Au Glaize and 



244 APPENDIX. 

St. Mary's rivers ; and every exertion is now making to 
increase them, intended for the double purpose of taking 
down the provisions to the Rapids, and for coasting the 
Lake with the baggage of the army in its advance. I had 
calculated upon being able partially to use this mode of 
transportation, even if the enemy should continue their 
naval superiority on the Lake ; but with this advantage on 
our side, the whole baggage of the army could be safely 
and expeditiously carried along the coast in the boats and 
perouges, which could be taken into the strait to transport 
the army to the Canada shore. 

" As I have before observed, the army, unencumbered 
with heavy baggage, would find no difficulty in marching 
round the Lake at any season, but what the enemy would 
create, and we have the means of subsisting a force that 
would be irresistible. 

** The objections to proceeding this way, stated in my 
letter to Colonel Munroe, arose from the time that would 
be necessary to construct boats after we should have ar- 
rived at the Strait ; but this objection is entirely obviated 
by our obtaining the command of the Lake, as the boats 
and perouges built upon the Miami will answer the pur- 
pose. With regard to the quantum of force, my opinion 
is, that not only the regular troops, designated in your let- 
ter, but a large auxiliary corps of mihtia should be em- 
ployed. The only objection arises from the expensiveness 
of troops of that description. This, however, could not 
be an object, considering the very short time that it would 
be necessary to employ them. Let the moment for the 
commencement of the march from the Rapids be fixed, 
and the militia might be taken to that point, proceed and 
accomplish the object, and return home in two months. 



APPENDIX. 245 

" Amongst the reasons which make it necessary to 
employ a large force, I am sorry to mention the dismay 
and disinclination to the service which appears to prevail 
in the western country; numbers must give that confi- 
dence which ought to be produced by conscious valor 
and intrepidity, which never existed in any army in a 
superior degree, than amongst the greater part of the 
militia who were with me through the winter. The new 
draughts from this State are entirely of another character, 
and are not to be depended on. I have no doubt, how- 
ever, but a sufficient number of good men can be procured, 
and should they be allowed to serve on horseback, Ken- 
tucky would furnish som.e regiments that would be not 
inferior to those that fought at the river Raisin ; and they 
were, in my opinion, superior to any militia that ever took 
the field in modern times. Eight troops of cavalry have 
been formed in Kentucky, to offer me their services, and 
several of them were intended for twelve months' volun- 
teers. Governor Shelby has some thoughts of taking the 
field in person — a number of good men will follow him. 

" Every exertion shall in the meantime be used to 
forward the recruiting service ; for a few weeks I think 
that my service would be more useful in that than in any 
other employment." 

« War Department, April Ath, 1813. 
" Sir, — ^Your despatches of the 17th ultimo, from Chili- 
cothe, have been received, and I hasten to repeat to you 
the views of the President, in relation to the next cam- 
paign, and the injunctions growing out of these, with 
regard to the employment of militia, &c. 

" Our first object is to get a command of the Lakes. 
21* 



246 APPENDIX. 

Means to accomplish this object have been taken,, and 
we have the fullest assurance, that by the first day of June 
it will be accomplished. 

" This fact assumed, there can be no longer a doubt 
by what means, or by what route, the division of the army 
assigned to you, ought to approach Maiden. A passage 
by water will carry you directly to the fortress you would 
attack, without impairing your strength by fatigue, or 
diminishing it by battle. A passage by land will, on the 
other hand, call for great efforts, and expose you to great 
losses, which if they do not destroy, will at least cripple 
you. Tiie former will be easy, safe and economical ; the 
latter, difficult, dangerous, and enormously expensive. 

" On the other supposition, that we fail to obtain com- 
mand of the Lake, a new question will arise — whether 
the campaign shall take an offensive or defensive char- 
acter 1 Be this question determined as it may, the utmost 
extent which can be given to the force employed, will be 
seven thousand effectives. 

" Various reasons determine this point. The enemy 
have never had in the field, for the defence of Maiden^ 
more than two thousand men. Their number has no 
doubt been hitherto limited by their means of subsistence, 
and this cause is not hkely to suffer any material change 
in their favor during the ensuing campaign. More than 
seven thousand men, therefore, would be unnecessary on 
our part. Again, to maintain a greater number, would 
be impracticable in the present state of the treasury. 

" It now remains only to signify to you, clearly and 
distinctly, the kind of force the government mean hereafter 
to employ in offensive operations, if it can be obtained. 

" When the legislature, at their last session, adopted the 



APPENDIX. 247 

measure of augmenting the army to fifty-two regiments 
of the line, it was expressly with the view of superseding 
hereafter the necessity of employing militia, excepting in 
moments of critical invasion. In obedience to this policy, 
the President assigned to the eighth military district of the 
United States, four of these new regiments, which, if filled, 
and superadded to the two regiments of the line now in that 
district, and the twenty-fourth now in march for it, will give 
a total of seven regiments, or seven thousand men. This 
number forbids the belief, that any employment of militia 
draughts will be necessary, when it shall have been collect- 
ed. Until, however, this be done, or at least until time be 
given for the experiment, so many militia only are to be 
called out, as shall be necessary for the defence of your 
posts on the Miami, and of your dep8ts of provision on 
the Lake. And should the recruiting service go on less 
prosperously in the patriotic States of Kentucky and Ohio, 
than in other parts of the Union, you are in that case, and 
in that case only, authorized to call out so many militia 
draughts as will make good the deficiency ; and organizing 
these under the rules already prescribed, await the farther 
orders of the President in your camp at the Rapids. 

" To these orders I have to add, that you will regard it 
as your duty to keep this department regularly and fre- 
quently informed of the actual condition of the troops under 
your command ; as well in regard to equipment and sup- 
plies of provision and ammunition, as to number, discipline 
and health; and that your weekly and monthly reports 
shall include also the state of the ordnance and quarter- 
master's departments, noting particularly, the number of 
horses and oxen employed by both. You will readily per- 
ceive the necessity of giving this order, when I state, that 



APPENDIX. 

no return of any desa'iplion from your division of the arr ,, 
has ever been received at ike Adjutant- GeneraVs office. Yr ui 
proportion of the new staff has been given to you. Cpp- 
tain Adams has been appointed Assistant Adjutant- Gen- 
eral, and Mr. Bartlett, Deputy Quartermaster- General of 
your division. The Brigadiers Mc Arthur and Cass are 
employed in superintending the recruiting service. A letter 
from the latter, gives reason to beheve that this will go on 
well in the State of Ohio. 

« I am &c. 
(Signed) "JOHN ARMSTRONG." 

" Major-General Harrison, 

« Com, 8th Mil. DisL U. S.» 



Letter to Governor Meigs, of Ohio. 
{Private.) 
" War Department, March 28th, 1813. 

" Sir, — I have this moment been informed by a Senator 
from Ohio, that the plan of campaign presented to Gen- 
eral Harrison, has not been fortunate enough to meet the 
approbation of that officer ; and that there is reason to 
fear that the objections made to it on his part (which it 
appears he has taken no pains to conceal) are likely to 
make an unfavorable impression on public opinion. 

" Under these circumstances, I have believed it to be 
my duty to exhibit to your Excellency a brief view of the 
objections, fiscal and military, to the land march, which the 
General prefers ; and on the other hand, to state the 
grounds on which the approach to Maiden is directed to 
be made by water, and under convoy of the fleet. 

" 1st. The great expensiveness of a land movement. 



APPENDIX. 249 

The cost to the pubHc (according to a statement made in 
December last by the General) for ' tramportaHon alone,^ 
during the six weeks required for a land march to Maiden, 
would of itself be sufficient to build and equip a naval 
force on Lake Erie, wliich would give us a decided and 
permanent command of that Lake. 

" 2d. The increased number of the army, which accord- 
ing to another statement of the General, will be indispen- 
sable, from the altered character of the western mihtia ; 
composed as it will now be of men greatly inferior to the 
gallant bands of the last campaign, and with regard to 
whom, numbers alone must compensate for ike want of spirit 
and patriotism. 

" 3d. The bad policy of any plan which, like that pro- 
posed by the General, leaves your enemy to choose the 
time and place of this attack, and with these, the power of 
compelling you to hazard a battle, upon plans and dispo- 
sitions of his making. 

" 4th. The farther and incalculable advantage, of avail- 
ing himself to tho vtmo^t of ^bp. Indian bovdp« aitaoh^A tn 

him — who, on a long march of six weeks, through swamps, 
forests, and thickets, will find a battle-ground in every 
mile, peculiarly adapted to their arms, powers, and habits 
— a circumstance which renders them more formidable 
than double the number of British grenadiers would be, 
on the same ground. 

" On the other hand, if we turn to the new plan, none of 
these objections against it will be found. It makes neces- 
sary no augmentation of force, nor increase of expenditure. 
It carries you directly to your object, in full health and 
spirits — unimpaired by battle, hunger, or fatigue. It avoids 
all the waste and embarrassment of land transportation, 



250 APPENDIX. 

and what, on military principles, will alone decide the 
question of preference between the two modes of pro- 
ceeding, it instantly and completely neutralizes the 
w^hole Indian force, (now noted by the General at four 
or five thousand combatants,) and leaves the battle to 
be fought on the part of the enemy, by British regu- 
lars and Canadian militia. 

" Your Excellency will best know how, and to whom 
to communicate these views. 
" I am, &c., 

"JOHN AEMSTRONG." 



[No. 24..] 

"War Department, 

Wilna, October 30M, 1813. 
" Sir : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt 

" The despatch by Captain Brown, of the 22d inst., 
and which, with him, was lost in Lake Erie, suggested, 
as an ulterior movement, the coming down to the Ni- 
agara river, and putting yourself on the right and rear 
of De Rottenburg's position before Fort George ; while 
General McClure, with his brigade of militia, volun- 
teers, and Indians, should approach it in front. The 
enemy seems to have been aware of this, or some 
similar movement, as he began his retreat on the 9th, 
and did not stop until he had gained the head of Bur- 
lington bay, where I understand, by report, he yet is. 
This is his last stronghold in the peninsula j routed 



APPENDIX. 251 

from this he must surrender, or make his way down 
Lake Ontario to Kingston. His force is estimated at 
twelve or fifteen hundred effectives, the capture or 
destruction of which would be a glorious finale to 
your campaign. Our operations in this quarter are 
but beginning at a time when they ought to have ended. 
"I am, &;c., 

" JOHN ARMSTRONG." 
" Major-General Harrison." 

" BooNViLLE, JSTovember 3c?, 1813. 
" When I wrote to yon from Wilna it was doubtful 
whether our attack would be made directly upon 
Kingston or upon Montreal. Reasons exist for pre- 
ferring the latter, and have probably determined Gen- 
eral Wilkinson to go down the St. Lawrence. In this 
case the enemy will have at Kingston, beside his fleet, 
a garrison of twelve or fourteen hundred men; had 
we not a corps in the neighborhood, these might do 
mischief, and even render insecure the winter station 
of our fleet. To prevent this, it is deemed advisable 
to draw together at Sacket's Harbor a considerable 
military force. There are now at that post between 
four and five hundred men of all descriptions, sick, 
convalescent, and effective ; Colonel Scott's detach- 
ment (about seven hundred) are on their march thither, 
and it is barely possible that Colonel Randolph's (not 
arriving in time to move with the army) may be there 
also ; this does not exceed three hundred and fifty. 
McArthur's brigade added to these will make a force 
wholly competent to our object. This new disposition 
will render necessary the employment of so many of 
the militia and volunteers, now in service under Gen- 



252 APPENDIX. 

eral McClure, as you may deem competent to the safe- 
keeping of forts George and Niagara and their de- 
pendencies. I am, &c., 

"JOHN ARMSTRONG." 
"Major-General Harrison." 



" Head-Quarters, 

Newark, JTov. 16M, 1813. 

" Sir — Commodore Chauncey with the fleet arrived 
here yesterday morning, and informed me that he was 
ready to receive the troops to convey them down the 
lake ; and that the season was so far advanced, ren- 
dering the navigation dangerous to the smaller vessels, 
that it was desirable they should be embarked as ex- 
peditiously as possible, ^s a very small part of the 
militia and volunteers had arrived^ and the situation of 
Socket's Harbor appearing to me to require immediate 
reinforcement^ I did not think proper to take upon my- 
self the responsibility of postponing the departure of 
the troops for the lower part of the lake^ conformably to 
the directions contained in your letter of the 3d inst. 

" The information I received yesterday from two 
respectable citizens who were taken near Fort Meigs 
in June last, and who made their escape in an open 
boat from Burlington, confirms me in the propriety of 
sending them off. These men state that the troops 
were hurrying to Kingston from York as fast as possible ; 
the regulars going down in boats, and the militia 
bringing the latter back. 
" I am, &c., 

"WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON." 

" Hon. John Armstrong, Secretary of War.'^ 



APPENDIX. 253 



[No. 25.] 



In producing the disaster at Queenstown, two causes 
were efficient, which, as they are not touched upon in 
the text, we will note here. It appears from the letter 
of General Van Rensselaer, given below, that the as- 
sailing force was to consist of tvvo columns 3 the one, 
composed of militia, led by Colonel Solomon Van 
Rensselaer ; the other, of regular troops, commanded 
by Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie. Instead of remaining 
at the head of his corps, the first-mentioned of these 
officers, embarked with a part of the regular detach- 
ment, and was, soon after reaching the Canada shore, 
disabled by wounds. The movement of the militia 
column became necessarilj^ embarrassed by the ab- 
sence of its commander, and this absence will also 
sufficiently account for the insubordination and reluc- 
tance to embark, afterward evinced by that portion of 
the American force. Had Colonel Van Rensselaer 
remained at his post, instead of thrusting himself 
where his presence was not needed, the militia would, 
in all probability, have crossed the river, and the re- 
sult of the action have been diffi3rent. Again : why 
did not General Wadsworth, after the first success of 
the attack, take possession of the village in his front, 
which would have affiarded a covering to his troops, 
and more than counterbalanced the inequality of 
numbers which existed between the two armies, after 
the arrival of General Sheafe and his reinforcement 1 
22 



254 APPENDIX, 

Letter from General Van Rensselaer to General Bear' 
born, October Uih, 1812. 

Head-Quarters, Lewistown. 

Sir : As the movements of the army under my 
command, since I had last the honor to address you, 
on the 8th inst., have been of a very important char- 
acter, producing consequences serious to many indi- 
viduals, establishing facts actually connected with the 
interest of the service, and safety of the army ; and 
as I stand prominently responsible for some of these 
consequences, I beg leave to explain to you, sir, and 
through you to my country, the situation and circum- 
stances in which I have had to act, and the reasons 
and motives which governed me ; and if the result is 
not all that might have been wished, it is such, that 
when the whole ground shall be viewed, I shall cheer- 
fully submit myself to the judgment of my country. 

In my letter of the 8th inst., I apprised you that a 
crisis in this campaign was rapidly approaching, and 
that (to repeat the same words) " the blow must be 
soon struck, or all the toil and expense of the cam- 
paign go for nothing ; and worse than nothing, for the 
whole will be tinged with dishonor." Under such 
impressions I had, on the 5th inst., written to Briga- 
dier-General Smyth, of the United States forces, re- 
questing an interview with him, Major-Generai Hall, 
and the commandants of United States regiments, for 
the purpose of conferring on the subject of future 
operations. I wrote Major-General Hall to the same 
purport. On the 11th, I had received no answer 
from General Smyth ; but in a note of the 10th, Gen- 
eral Hall mentioned that General Smyth had not yet 
then agreed upon any day for the consultation. 



APPENDIX. 255 

In the lYieantime, the partial success of Lieutenant 
Elliot, at Black Roclc, begun to excite a strong dispo- 
sition in the troops to act. This was expressed to me 
through various channels, in the shape of an alterna- 
tiv^e ; that they must have orders to act, or at all haz- 
ards they would go home. I forbear here comment- 
ing upon the obvious consequences to me personally, 
of longer withholding my orders under such circum- 
stances. 

I had a conference with as to the possibility of 

getting some person to pass over to Canada and obtain 
correct information. On the morning of the 4th, he 
wrote to me that he had procured the man who bore 
his letter to go over. Instructions were given him ; 
he passed over, and obtained such information as war- 
ranted an immediate attack. This was confidentially 
communicated to several of my officers, and produced 
great zeal to act ; more especially, as it might have a 
controling effect on the movements at Detroit, where 
it was supposed General Brock had gone, with all the 
force he dare spare from the Niagara frontier. The 
best preparations in my power were therefore made to 
dislodge the enemy from the heights of Queenstown, 
and gain possession of the village, where the troops 
might be sheltered from the inclemency of the weather. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Fenwick's flying artillery, and a 
detachment of regular troops under his command, 
were ordered to be up in season for Fort Niagara. 
Orders were also sent to General Smyth to send down 
from Buffalo such detachment from his brigade as ex- 
isting circumstances in that vicinity might warrant. 
The attack was to have been made at 4 o'clock of the 
morning of the 1 1th, by crossing over in boats from 



256 APPENDIX. 

the old ferry opposite the heights. To avoid any em- 
barrassment in crossing the river (which is here a 
sheet of eddies), experienced boatmen were procured 
to take the boats from the landing below to the place 
of embarkation. Lieutenant Simms was considered 
the man of greatest skill for this service. He went 
ahead, and in the extreme darkness, passed the in- 
tended place far up the river, and there, in a most ex- 
traordinary manner, fastened his boat to the shore, and 
abandoned the detachment. In this front boat he had 
carried nearly every oar which was prepared for all 
the boats. In this agonizing dilemma stood officers 
and men, whose ardor had not been cooled by exposure 
through the night to one of the most tremendous 
northeast storms, which continued unabated for twenty- 
eight hours, and deluged the whole camp. The ap- 
proach of daylight extinguished every hope of success, 
and the detachment returned to camp. Colonel Van 
Kensselaer was to have commanded. 

After this result, I had hoped the patience of the 
troops would have continued, until I could submit to a 
council the plan suggested in my letter of the 8th, that 
I might act under, and in conformity to, the opinion 
which might then be expressed. But my hope was 
idle, and the previously excited ardor seemed to have 
gained new heat from the late miscarriage. Brave men 
were mortified to stop short of the object, and the 
timid thought laurels half won by the attempt. 

On the morning of the 12th, such was the pressure 
upon me from all quarters, that I became satisfied that 
my refusal to act would involve me in suspicion, and 
the service in disgrace. Viewing affairs at Buffalo as 
yet unsettled, I had immediately countermanded the 



APPENDIX. 257 

march of General Smyth's brigade, upon the failure of 
the first expedition ; but having now determined to 
attack Queenstown, I sent new orders to General 
Smyth to march ; not with the view of his aid in the 
attack, for I considered the force detached sufficient, 
but to support the detachment should the conflict be 
obstinate. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie, who had just arrived 
at the Five Mile creek, had late in the night of the 
first contemplated attack, gallantly offered me his own 
and his men's service, but he got my permission too 
late. He now again came forward, had a conference 
with Colonel Van Rensselaer, and begged that he might 
have the honor of a command in the expedition. The 
arrangement was made. Colonel Van Rensselaer was 
to command one column of three hundred militia, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Chrystie a column of the same 
number of regulars. 

Every precaution was now adopted as to boats, and 
confidential and experienced men selected to manage 
them. At an early hour of the night, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Chrystie marched his detachment by the rear 
road from Niagara to camp. At 7 in the evening, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Stranahan's regiment moved from 
Niagara Falls ; at 8 o'clock. Mead's ; and at 9, Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Blain's regiment marched from the same 
place. All were in camp in good season. Agreeably 
to my orders issued upon this occasion, the two col- 
umns were to pass over together ; and as soon as the 
heights should be carried, Lieutenant-Colonel Fen- 
wick's flying artillery was to pass over, then Major 
Mullany's detachment of regulars, and the other troops 
to follow in order. 

22* 



258 APPENDIX. 

At dawn of day the boats were in readiness, and the 
troops commenced embarking under the fire of a 
commanding battery mounting two 18-pounders and 
two 6. The movement was soon discovered, and a 
brisk fire of musketry was poured from the whole line 
of the Canada shore. Our battery then opened to 
sweep the shore, but it was for some minutes too dark 
to direct much fire with safety. A brisk cannonade 
was now opened on the boats from three different 
batteries — our battery returned their fire, and occa- 
sionally threw grape upon the shore, and was itself 
served with shells from a small battery of the enemy. 
Colonel Scott, of the artillery, by hastening his march 
from Niagara Falls in the night, arrived in time to re- 
turn the fire with two 6-pounders. 

The boats were somewhat embarrassed with the 
eddies, as well as with a shower of shot j but Colonel 
Van Rensselaer, with about one hundred men, soon 
effected his landing amid a tremendous fire directed 
upon him from every point ; but to the astonishment 
of all who witnessed the scene, this van of the column 
advanced slowly against the fire. It was a serious 
misfortune to the van, and indeed to the whole expe- 
dition, that in a few minutes after landing. Colonel Van 
Eensselaer received four wounds. Under so severe a 
fire, it was difficult to form raw troops. By some 
mismanagement of the boatmen, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Chrystie did not arrive until sometime after this, and 
was wounded in the hand, in passing the river. Col- 
onel Van Rensselaer, still able to stand, with great 
presence of mind ordered his officers to proceed with 
rapidity and storm the fort. This service was gal- 
lantly performed, and the enemy driven down the hill 



APPENDIX. 259 

in every direction. Soon after this, both parties were 
reinforced, and the conflict was renewed in various 
places — many of the enemy took shelter behind a stone 
guard-house, where a piece of ordnance was briskly 
served. I ordered the fire of the battery to be di- 
rected against the guard-house, and it was so effectu- 
ally done, that, with eight or ten shot, the fire was si- 
lenced. The enemy then retreated behind a large 
storehouse ; but in a short time the rout became gen- 
eral, and the enemy's fire was silenced, except from a 
one gun battery so far down the river, as to be out of 
reach. A number of boats now passed over unan- 
noyed, except from the one unsilenced gun. For 
sometime after I had crossed over the victory appear- 
ed complete ; but in the expectation of future attacks, 
I took measures for fortifying my camp immediately. 
The direction of this service I gave to Lieutenant 
Totten, of the engineers. But very soon the enemy 
were reinforced, by a detachment of several hundred 
Indians from Chippewa. They commenced a furious 
attack, but were met and routed by the rifle and bay- 
onet. By this time I perceived my troops were em- 
barking very slowly. I passed immediately over to 
accelerate their movements, but to my astonishment I 
found that, at the moment when victory was in our 
hands, the ardor of the unengaged troops had subsi- 
ded. I rode in all directions, urged the men by every 
consideration to pass — but in vain. 

At this time, a large reinforcement from Fort 
George was discovered coming up the river. As the 
battery on the hill was considered an important check 
against their ascending the heights, measures were 
immediately taken to send them a fresh supply of am- 



260 APPENDlXi 

munition, as I learned there was left but twenty shot 
for the 18-pounders. The reinforcement obliqued to 
the right from the road, and formed a junction with 
the Indians in the rear of the heights. Finding, to 
my infinite mortification, that no reinforcement would 
pass over ; seeing that another severe conflict must 
soon commence ; and knowing that the brave men on 
the heights were quite exhausted, and nearly out of 
ammunition, all I could do was to send a fresh supply 
of cartridges. At this critical moment, I despatched 
a note to General Wadsworth, acquainting him with 
our situation — leaving the course to be pursued to his 
own judgment, with assurance, that if he thought 
best to retreat, I would endeavor to send over as many 
boats as I could command, and cover his retreat by 
every fire I could make. But the boats were dis- 
persed, many of the boatmen had fled panic-struck, 
and but few got off. But my note could but little 
more than have reached General Wadsworth, about 
4 o'clock, when a most severe and obstinate conflict 
ensued, and continued about half an hour ivith a tre- 
mendous fire of cannon, flying artillery, and musketry. 
The enemy succeeded in re-possessing their battery, 
and gained advantage on every side ; the brave men 
who had gained the victory, exhausted of strength and 
ammunition, and grieved at the unpardonable neglect 
of their fellow- soldiers, gave np the conflict." 



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